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ABSTRACT 
 
Employee involvement in a company's affairs is one of the elementary aspects of 
European corporate governance, but is yet to make substantial progress. European 
Company Statute (Council Regulation No 2157/20011 and Council Directive No 
2001/86/EC2) was legislated to secure employees’ involvement rights in company 
decisions and with a vision to establish a uniform legal framework, but specific legal 
frameworks have been left at the discretion of Member States where the European 
Company (SE3) is registered. As a result, 28 different national SE laws are now in 
force. This research critically analyses and compares employee involvement in the 
corporate governance of Member States and in the SE, and then recommends 
modifications to the European Company Statute so that the SE can become a more 
popular company form in the EU. The prime focus of the research is board-level 
employee representation, which is the most controversial aspect of employee 
involvement. Employee representation, which supposedly constrains managements' 
privileges, has been debated by the European Commission since 1960s. However, 
the specific issue of board-level employee representation in the SE from a legal 
standpoint has remained principally untouched. The provisions for board-level 
employee representation reflect a laissez-faire approach. The European Company 
Statute is quite ambiguous and the employee involvement aspect within the Member 
States is largely uncertain. The research challenges the existing narratives about the 
shortcomings and suggesting reforms to the European Company Statute. In that 
process, dismissing the standard explanation of shortcomings and subsequently 
identifying novel solutions to those shortcomings. The last major contribution was 
Ernst & Young’s ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a 
European Company (SE)’,4 but this was published in 2008 with limited data and 
experience of only three years of the SE coming into force. It was a decade ago. 
However, this research is based on the SE’s 13 years of experience, thereby, 
providing a better assessment on the issue. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company [2001] OJ L294.   
2
 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company 
with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294/22. 
3
 SE (Società Europea) is the company form introduced by the European Company Statute.   
4
 ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE) - 2008/S 144-
192482’ (Ernst & Young, 2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/se/study_SE_9122009_en.pdf> 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Company or 'Societas Europaea' (hereafter, referred to as the “SE”) is 
a corporate entity that was established after few decades of dialogue between the 
Member States and European Commission (hereafter, referred to as the “EC”). The 
idea of the SE is not new given the long history of negotiations. It was not until two 
years after the transposition deadline that the Council Regulation (EC) No 
2157/20015 and Council Directive No 2001/86/EC6 (together referred to as the 
European Company Statute, hereafter, referred to as the “ECS”) was transposed in 
all Member States.7 The term ‘employee involvement’ refers to any mechanism, 
consisting of information, consultation and participation, through which employee 
representatives may exercise control over a company’s’ decisions, affairs or 
undertakings.8  
 
EU legislators claim that ECS contribute substantially to 'social welfare'9. They thus, 
according to these legislators, contribute to the EU’s wider ambition to match its 
superiority as an economic power with greater social responsibility. Legislators claim 
that these directives extensively protect the interests of weaker stakeholders and 
promote employee involvement, especially representation. The EU's desire to create 
a 'European social model'10 has led to several procedural and policy questions (e.g. 
an ideal employee representative model), and structural problems (e.g. subsidiarity 
principle).11 In particular, the company law in Member States might be inclined to 
serve shareholders at the expense of employees and other stakeholders. 
 
Employee representation at board level is one of the most controversial aspects of 
the social economy. In spite of much interest in the subject, little legal research has 
been conducted on it; as a result, the issue remains confused. Some sort of board-
                                                          
5
 Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) 
[2001] OJ L294. 
6
 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company 
with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294/22. 
7
 ECS was adopted in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. 
8
 Article 2 (h) and Article 2 (k) of the SE Directive. 
9
 The welfare of employees is regarded as social welfare in this context. 
10
 Article 138-139 of The Social Chapter of the EU Charter. 
11
 F Butler, 'Social Policy and the European Community: Proposals for Worker Participation 
Legislation' (1991) 6 (1) Public Policy and Administration 72-79. 
7 
level employee representation is provided in 19 out of 28 Member States, but 
employee involvement exists in only 105 out of 2,757 established SEs across the 
EU.12 This difference of representation figures across the Member States might be 
explained as being due to ‘technological and demographic context, social attitudes, 
economic scenarios, public policy and law'.13 But they are hard to justify, given that 
board-level employee involvement is a recognised European fundamental right 
under Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union.14 Article 153 seeks to promote 
the EU's social policy.15 It provides that: 
 
‘the Union shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in the 
following fields: […] representation and collective defence of the interests of workers 
and employers, including codetermination’. 
 
In respect of social dialogue, Article 153 is the most important social article in 
identifying and promoting the function of social partners in an enterprise. Against this 
background, the objectives of this research are to: (i) analyse the ECS in detail, 
especially its provisions on employee representation16; (ii) analyse the rationale for 
employee involvement and the factors influencing or discouraging it within different 
Member States (a comparative study);17 (iii) evaluate whether the ECS has adopted 
                                                          
12
 Figures correct as 31 March 2017; see, ‘SE Companies: Facts and Figures 2017’ (SEEurope, 
March 2017) <http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company-SE/Facts-Figures> accessed 
18 April 2017. 
13
 S Schwimbersky, 'Worker participation in Europe- Current developments and its impacts on 
employees outside the EU' [2005] AIRAANZ 189-198. 
14
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C202. 
15
 EU social policies are covered in Articles 151-161 of The Treaty on European Union. 
16
 This will include identifying any shortcomings of the ECS and potential corrections to effectively 
achieve the EU's intended objectives to "support and complement the activities of the Member States 
in: […] representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including 
codetermination” (per Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union). 
17
 The research will make an attempt to explore all possible rationales behind employee involvement 
as discussed from the perspectives of EU legislators and scholars. One of the first discussions on 
employee involvement by EU legislators (see, Commission, 'Employee participation and company 
structure in the European Community' COM (1975) 150) emphasised the following rationale: from a 
legal standpoint, employee involvement develops social democracy and is a good corporate 
governance practice. From an economic standpoint, employee representation is regarded as a way of 
promoting information exchange, decreasing transaction costs and negotiating a course through 
changed scenarios (see, HA Simon, 'A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship' (1951) 19 (3) 
Econometrica 293-305). However, no unanimous consensus yet has been reached as to whether 
employee involvement is beneficial, detrimental or neutral in a good corporate governance of SE, 
despite numerous research attempts. 
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potentially a laissez-faire approach towards the issue of employee representation;18 
(iv) critically analyse whether the German model of employee involvement in 
corporate governance is superior to the United Kingdom’s (UK) laissez-faire 
approach on employee involvement; and (v) recommend measures to enhance the 
application of the Council Directive No 2001/86/EC19 (hereafter, referred to as the 
"SE Directive")  provisions and enable the SE to be a more functional European 
company form. 
 
In the process, the author attempts to fill the gaps in the literature for employee 
representation rights at board level from a legal standpoint. 90% of current literature 
is from economic,20 human resources or social perspectives;21 and is conducted 
from the perspectives of trade union / worker representative researchers.22 
Inconsistent conclusions have been drawn from various researches so far, which 
have been unable to provide clear guidance on whether employee involvement is in 
fact needed in corporate governance in EU. It is argued by academics and 
economists that there is currently no clear evidence of the correlation between 
board-level employee representation and a company's economic performance. The 
question as to whether board-level employee representation is detrimental or 
beneficial to company economic performance is as old as the first debates on the 
legitimacy for employees to be represented in the boardroom. Marchington et al., 
writing in New Developments in Employee Involvement, conclude that it was 
"problematic to make any precise evaluation" about whether employee involvement 
affects corporate performance.23  
 
                                                          
18
 Analysing the effectiveness of the ECS and substantial arguments supported by evidence will 
demonstrate that unanimous employee involvement rights are essential within the EU for good 
corporate governance. 
19
 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European 
company with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294/22. 
20
 For example, M Gold, S Deakin etc. 
21
 For example, K Lörcher’s research is mostly cited by The European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) in 
their publications. 
22
 For example, A Conchon, J Williamson etc. 
23
 Marchington et al., ‘Understanding the Meaning of Participation: Views from the Workplace’ (1994) 
47 (8) Human Relations 867-894. 
9 
This research will assert that employee representation, generally and at board level, 
along with the 'trivial' directives that regulate it,24 are complex and ambiguous 
aspects in EU Company Law. EU legislators have taken a laissez-faire attitude to 
employee representation: they are neither moving fully in the direction of social 
welfare nor enhancing board-level rights for employees. EU legislators either 
represent or reflect Member States, and Member States themselves lack unanimity 
on social welfare proposals among EU Member States (e.g. the failure of the 
‘Vredeling’ Directive). 
 
The research will seek to answer mainly three legal questions that have not yet been 
comprehensively analysed. First, the effect of the SE Directive will be questioned: 
has it led to a weakening of codetermination rights in SEs or improved the provisions 
of employee involvement and the legal uncertainties in the SE Directive with respect 
to negotiation procedures and employee involvement procedures. Second, why is 
there an inconsistency with respect to employee involvement rights within corporate 
boards across the EU? How has the ECS been implemented in the UK, and has 
there been any change in the UK’s attitude to employee involvement rights? Lastly, 
does the EC’s framework and consultation embrace employee involvement, and has 
this framework been well articulated? What aspects were not addressed in the SE 
Directive? What amendments to the SE Directive will better achieve the objectives 
stated in Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union and make employee 
involvement a prominent aspect of EU corporate governance? 
 
In relation to the problems in question and research objectives, the researcher has 
adopted a socio-legal and comparative approach. A broad range of contemporary 
sources have been reviewed and analysed, such as existing case law and 
legislation, journals, textbooks, conference proceedings papers, government policy 
documents, international treaties, and web pages. The research has derived 
evidence from the following components: 
1. Analysis of existing, proposed and emerging legislation- ECS has been extensively 
examined in line of employee involvement for the purpose of this research. Initial 
debates, academic works and Green Papers on the issue have been carefully 
                                                          
24
 L Enriques, 'EC Company Law Directives And Regulations: How Trivial Are They?' (2006) 27 (1) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 2, 44. 
10 
studied to answer most of the research objectives and questions (for example, 
rationale, shortcomings and analytical solutions or conclusions).  
 
2. Analysing empirical research- Empirical data gathered by other researchers has 
been used to investigate the efficacy of corporate governance in SEs. This evidence 
has provided the basis of legal arguments to grant board-level employee 
representation rights. For example, Workplace Representation and Participation 
Survey Research UK concluded that companies with successful employee 
representation perform 17% better than companies that lack it.25 On the contrary, an 
empirical investigation by Gorton and Schmid found that companies with equal 
employee representation at board-level trade at a discount of 31% in comparison 
with companies comprised of one-third representation on the board-level.26 This 
research has paid minimal attention in analysing economic effects of these claims, 
but has investigated the matter in a legal and social context. 
 
3. Comparative legal research- A comparative and multijurisdictional survey approach 
has also been adopted in the research due to the nature of the topic. The levels of 
employee involvement in companies differ across Member States and the 
transposition of the ECS is left to the discretion of each Member State. The research 
will draw analysis from Member States. To make a comparison, the jurisdictions and 
the position of all 28 Member States will be studied with respect to the SE model. 
Corporate governance in the UK (with minimal employee representation) has been 
compared with that of Germany (equal employee representation in eligible 
scenarios) to provide a useful comparison with respect to the interests of employee 
and other stakeholders. Furthermore, this comparison has provided for the 
exploration of adequate and essential conditions for board-level representation 
rights. 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Workplace Employment Relations Study (2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/workplace-employment-relations-study-wers> accessed 
on 2 March 2014 
26
 G Gorton and F Schmid, 'Capital, Labor and the Firm: A study of German Codetermination' (2004) 2 
Journal of the European Economic Association 863-905 
11 
The structure of this research is as follows: 
Chapter 1- Employee Involvement in the EU’s Corporate Governance Regime will 
provide a background and history to the issue of employee involvement in the EU. 
The ambiguity of defining employee involvement for the purposes of SE Directive will 
be analsyed and employee involvement in the context of the ECS will be introduced.  
 
Chapter 2- Justifying Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance will make an 
attempt to argue all possible rationales for employee involvement as discussed from 
the perspectives of academics and EU legislators. An empirical component will form 
basis of this chapter with respect to analysing the empirical evidence of the empirical 
case studies undertaken by other researchers. The conclusive investigation will 
provide for the basis of legal arguments on the validity of the argument of employee 
representation rights at board-level in the SE.  
 
Chapter 3- Evaluation of the Functioning of the European Company Statute will be 
one the core chapters of this research, as it studies the SE and the ECS in depth. In 
the process, objectives of the ECS will be rationally studied in line of its strengths 
and weaknesses. 
 
Chapter 4- Lessons from the German Model of Corporate Governance will provide 
an ideal perspective on the issue of employee involvement by referring to the 
Germany’s corporate governance model, which has been almost unanimously 
regarded as the model for the rest of EU with respect to works councils and co-
determination.27 The chapter will analyse the strengths of employee involvement 
from Germany’s industrial relations system. 
 
Chapter 5- Laissez-Faire approach towards Employee Involvement in the UK will 
analyse the overall approach of employee involvement in the UK. The rationale for 
studying UK in this chapter and Germany in the previous chapter is to analyse the 
jurisdictions which are the opposite extreme ends of the spectrum of national 
industrial relations system (Germany which has a lot of codetermination options and 
UK which has none). The hypothesis that UK has adopted a laissez-faire approach 
                                                          
27
 E Gaugler and S Wiltz, ‘Germany’ in C Brewster and others (eds), Euro-Dean Guide to Human 
Resource Management (Academic Press 1992) 163-228. 
12 
on the issue of employee involvement will be tested. This will be proved by 
demonstrating that the Council Directive No 2002/14/EC (hereafter, referred to as 
the “ICE Directive”)28 has been more widely accepted and effectively implemented in 
UK as opposed to the acceptance of ECS and its implementation. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that the UK is more receptive when providing information 
and consultation to employees, but is abstinent to provide board-level representation 
rights to employees.  
 
Chapter 6- Case Study: Employee Representation in Selected Member States will 
comparatively analyse employee involvement and in particular, board-level 
employee representation with respect to national industrial relations system in 
Member States and also in relation to the ECS. Since the law of the SE will be based 
on the underlying Member States law and its national industrial relations system, it 
will be imperative to study the national industrial relations system and in particular, 
employee involvement in some detail for the selected Member States and in brief for 
the rest of the Member States. This comparison will provide for the exploration of 
adequate and essential conditions for board-level representation rights. 
 
Chapter 7- Reviewing the European Company Statute will draw arguments from 
Chapter 3, which would have already identified the shortcomings of the ECS. On its 
examination, potential measures which could enhance the application of the SE 
Directive's provisions will be identified. An analytical conclusion will be sought 
concentrating on the effectiveness of the ECS.  
Also, the case for Czech Republic (the SE haven) will be investigated to ascertain the 
driving factors for forming the SE. 
 
Chapter 8- The Future of the SE v European Company Law takes a holistic view of 
European Company Law and its effect on the ECS. Steps that EU legislators must 
take to amend the ECS so that such legislation promotes an effective working model 
of board-level employee representation rights will be discussed. EC’s consultation 
process will be critically analysed and potential measures explored, as the 
                                                          
28
 Council Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community - Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission on employee representation [2002] OJ L80. 
13 
shortcomings in the ECS consultation process directly affected its viability. The 
practicability of the SE Directive in terms of cross-border facilitation will be analysed 
with reference to the Council Directive No 2005/56/EC29 (hereafter, referred to as the 
"Cross-Border Mergers Directive"). It has been argued that the Cross-Border 
Mergers Directive may have undermined the position of the ECS. 
 
Lastly, Chapter 9- Conclusion will reiterate the main research findings from the 
previous chapters. It will be confirmed from the analysis and discussions in the 
previous chapters that employee representation at general level and board-level, 
along with the directives that regulate it are complex and ambiguous aspects in EU 
Company Law. The research questions will be simultaneously addressed along with 
the original contribution to scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Council Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on 
cross-border mergers of limited liability companies [2005] OJ L310. 
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CHAPTER 1- EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE EU’S 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to define the ambiguous 'employee representation' in SE, as this 
term is variably interpreted in different Member States. This is followed by the history 
of employee involvement in continental Europe and how this idea was transposed in 
EU Directives since the first debate in the 1960s between the EC and Member 
States. Lastly, the ECS is discussed briefly to introduce its impact on employee 
involvement with the SE to provide a background to the thesis. The significant 
attributes of this chapter are: (i) the need to establish an EU-wide accepted definition 
of employee involvement, especially employee representation; (ii) to briefly analyse 
employee involvement, namely circumventing representation rights at national level 
owing to the ‘before and after’ principle; the 'freezing' of board-level representation 
rights; the choice of the board system (monistic or dualistic) structure; and employee 
involvement rights after the SE has been established. 
 
1.2 Defining employee involvement 
So far, the SE Directive has been comprehensible in defining involvement, 
information, consultation and participation. However, neither the SE nor the ECS 
contains an explicit definition of employee 'representation'. The definition of 
participation within the SE Directive does refer to employee representatives in the 
affairs of a company, with respect to appointment and opposition of members on the 
supervisory/administrative board, but it is limited in its scope. Furthermore, the actual 
scope of participation and the meaning it has in different Member States is unclear. It 
is imperative to have a unanimous EU-wide definition of every term within the area of 
employee involvement. Such a definition will remove any confusion about the 
relevant words in the different languages spoken across the EU, and so lessen 
ambiguity within meetings of the EU organs. 
 
The following table provides the current EU definitions for the various aspects of 
employee involvement. They are basic rather than comprehensive. For example, in 
the definition of "involvement", legislators should have explained in more detail how 
15 
"employees' representatives may exercise an influence on decisions", as certain 
provisions within the ECS seem trivial to secure board-level representation rights. 
The definition of employees’ “participation" in the SE Directive is essentially practical, 
and not conceptual. It seems designed merely to reflect the wide range of 
established employee involvement mechanisms already in place in Member States. 
It does not seem to adequately summarise them.  
Involvement Information Consultation Participation 
Article 2 (h) of the SE 
Directive: 
"Involvement of 
employees, means any 
mechanism, including 
information, consultation 
and participation 
through which 
employees' 
representatives may 
exercise an influence on 
decisions to be taken 
within the company." 
Article 2 (i) of the SE 
Directive: 
"Information", means the 
informing of the body 
representative of the 
employees and/or 
employees' 
representatives by the 
competent organ of the 
SE on questions which 
concern the SE itself 
and any of its 
subsidiaries or 
establishments situated 
in another Member 
State or which exceed 
the powers of the 
decision-making organs 
in a single Member 
State at a time, in a 
manner and with a 
content which allows the 
employees' 
representatives to 
undertake an in-depth 
assessment of the 
possible impact and, 
where appropriate, 
prepare consultations 
with the competent 
organ of the SE." 
Article 2 (j) of the SE 
Directive: 
"Consultation, means 
the establishment of a 
dialogue and the 
exchange of views 
between the body 
representative of the 
employees and/or the 
employees' 
representatives and the 
competent organ of the 
SE, at a time, in a 
manner and with a 
content which allows the 
employees' 
representatives, on the 
basis of information 
provided, to express an 
opinion on measures 
envisaged by the 
competent organ, which 
may be taken into 
account in the decision-
making process within 
the SE." 
Article 2 (k) of the SE 
Directive: 
"Participation" means 
the influence of the body 
representative of the 
employees and/or the 
employees' 
representatives in the 
affairs of a company by 
way of: 
- the right to elect or 
appoint some of the 
members of the 
company's supervisory 
or administrative organ, 
or 
- the right to recommend 
and/or oppose the 
appointment of some or 
all of the members of 
the company's 
supervisory or 
administrative organ." 
Table 1- Definition of employee involvement, information, consultation and 
participation under the SE Directive 
 
In a theoretically perfect situation, ‘employee representation’ would mean that 
employee representatives on the board have equal control with management in the 
decision-making process. Such a definition would exclude those situations where the 
number of employee representatives on the board is minimal (in some cases even 
one-third representation on the board does not suffice) and cannot influence the 
decision-making process; or where employee representatives are simply influenced 
to accept predetermined board decisions.  
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Replacing the word "company" with "European Company (SE)" would clearly indicate 
that these definitions are only within the scope of the SE Directive and relate only to 
the SEs. This would limit the freedom for interpretation in different Member States 
when implementing the SE Directive. 
 
Employee involvement can be categorised under two sub-headings: (i) European 
works council (EWC); and (ii) board-level employee representation. Employee 
representation exists in companies at general (as trade union representation) or at 
board level (as European works council).30 The following table draws a distinction 
between the two: 
Trade unions European works councils 
Charitable association serving its members' 
interests. 
Legally incorporated to represent the interests of 
all the company's employees. 
Achieving collective bargaining agreements 
(mainly relating to working conditions and 
compensation). 
Influencing decision-making at supervisory/board 
level. 
NB- Employee representation is mainly via trade unions in Italy, Malta, Poland, Finland, Cyprus, 
Denmark Czech Republic, Latvia, Sweden, Malta, Lithuania and Romania. Also, in UK and Ireland, 
trade unions are the sole national representative bodies. In Luxembourg, Germany and Austria both 
works councils and trade unions are not associated at the company level. However, both works 
councils and trade unions have obligatory collective bargaining agreements or statutory 
representation rights in Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Greece and Hungary. 
Table 2- Trade unions vs works councils31 
 
EWC remain somewhat dependent on trade unions for legitimacy and maintenance 
in Member States where they are technically autonomous of trade unions. When 
EWC are principally run by trade unions, representation of non-union employees will 
be significantly less.32 Works councils are an important aspect of employee 
representation, with currently 1057 active EWC in 977 multinational corporations 
across the EU.33 An EWC consists of 3 to 30 elected employee members who 
frequently discuss with the company's management: 
 
"… the structure, economic and financial situation, probable development and 
production and sales of the Community-scale undertaking or group of undertakings. 
                                                          
30
 Wisskirchen et al., 'Employee representation and codetermination rights in Europe' (2010/2011) 1 
Labour and Employee Benefits Handbook. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 P Briône and C Nicholson, 'Employee Empowerment- Towards Greater Workplace Democracy' 
(2012) CentreForum 32-33. 
33
 ‘Statistics and graphs’ (ewcdb) <http://www.ewcdb.eu/statistics_graphs.php> accessed 12 May 
2014. 
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The information and consultation of the European Works Council shall relate in 
particular to the situation and probable trend of employment, investments, and 
substantial changes concerning organisation, introduction of new working methods 
or production processes, transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs or closures of 
undertakings, establishments or important parts thereof, and collective 
redundancies."34 
 
Board-level employee representatives (who may be elected directly, or indirectly 
through EWC or trade unions) play a substantial role in corporate governance, with 
respect to the welfare of employees, management and the company.35 Board-level 
employee representation in the SE is now considered an integral part of the EU's 
vision of corporate governance, which considers that the company must not be 
defined solely by the interests of its shareholders and directors, but also of the 
broader community of stakeholders.36 Germany provides a prominent example of 
board-level employee representation (quasi-parity board representation of 
companies with more than 2000 workers). The company is managed by both 
employee representatives and directors appointed by the shareholders; decisions 
are made with a view more to stakeholder value than to shareholder value. The 
German situation illustrates that board-level worker representation reduces the 
company-employee agency costs and minimises the board's performance in 
regulating director-shareholders agency problems.37 
 
1.3 The history of employee involvement and EU Directives 
It has been widely suggested that employee involvement in Europe began in the 
early years of the 20th century, in Germany's Weimar Republic.38 In 1951, the 
                                                          
34
 Annex 1, 1(a), Council Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale 
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and 
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Montan-Mitbestimmungs -gesetz (German co-determination law- board-level 
representation in its existing form) was established in the iron, coal and steel 
industries.39 However, there is evidence suggesting that employee participation 
schemes were introduced originally in UK in the 1860s by philanthropic employers 
like Henry Briggs and Company; a similar scheme was introduced by the South 
Metropolitan Gas Company in the 1890s.40 The idea did not gain momentum. 
Marchigton et al. rightly cite Poole, who wrote in 'The Origins of Economic 
Democracy'41 that the result was an episode of 'harsh industrial relations issues as 
divisions were created not only between non-union and union labour, but also among 
the union and union associates at the company'.42 
 
Over a century later, relations between employers and employees have changed 
again, as a result of 'societal shifts and economic demands'.43 Summers and Hyman 
point out that:44 (i) employees are now more educated, qualified and aware of the 
economic situation (owing to technology and freedom of information), compared to 
"older non-qualified staff";45 and (ii) the influence of trade unions has considerably 
declined, along with their membership.46 This second point is arguable: Summers 
and Hyman might have failed to consider the fact that 12 out of 28 Member States 
have employee representation through trade unions.47  
 
Employee involvement has been an EU objective since 1960. The EC justified this 
objective in terms of the following political objectives:48 (i) prohibiting social dumping; 
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(ii) expanding and securing workers' rights; (iii) promoting participation as a 
‘productive factor’; and (iv) harmonising company law.  
 
There has been considerable progress at general level with respect to information 
and consultation, but at board-level it has remain significantly untouched. Since the 
1970s, proposed changes were to be made depending upon the escalating scale of 
resistance.49 In 1975, a Green Paper on 'Employee Participation in Company 
Structure'50 proposed to introduce a single standardised model of two-tier corporate 
governance. Subsequently, after strong opposition, it was proposed that the 
companies can choose between a one-tier and two-tier model. The proposal 
disappeared from EC’s agenda during the 1980s and early 1990s; the constitution of 
EWC was the only focus of political interest.51 The ‘Vredeling’ Directive'52, whose 
prime objective was to provide mandatory information, consultation, and 
representation of employees at board level in multinational companies, never came 
into effect due to lack of unanimity, differences of interests and political controversy 
among EU and domestic corporate actors.53 The directive included proposals about 
employee representation on the supervisory board and the right to vote for the 
management board, which was rejected by various Member States as being too 
rigid54 (e.g. UK in the 1980s and 1990s).55 
 
EU Directives are of particular interest for all aspects of EU industrial partnership and 
representation. EU Directives on the transposition process have left ample 
opportunities for specific national interpretation, and room for political manoeuvring. 
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Of course, some aspects of employee involvement are not governed by EU or 
Member States’ legislation, but can be negotiated internally between employees and 
management. 
 
In total, fifteen EU Directives deal with the above mentioned four rationales for 
employee involvement, but there are only four main 'social acquis' Directives:56 (i) 
EU Workplace Health and Safety Directive 89/391/EEC;57 (ii) Council Directive No 
2009/38/EC (hereafter, referred to as the “EWC Directive”)58 (iii) ICE Directive; and 
(iv) SE Directive. 
 
The Internet now provides streamlined access to company information, thereby 
simplifying the disclosure formalities imposed under Council Directive No 
2003/58/EC59.60 Providing information at a general level, ultimately facilitates a 
flexible work environment, improves a company's risk assessment and promotes 
trust between the company and the employee.61 Fauvera and Fuerst note that 
encouraging employee representation and information output are essential in 
codetermination.62 When a company is performing poorly, they suggest, the 
employees will be informed about the situation and the company’s strategies and 
losses; as a result, they will be more willing to make concessions and less likely to 
engage in costly strikes and work stoppages. They also suggest that employee 
representation and the publication of information will lead to the creation of an 
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'information intermediary' between the employees and the company, thereby 
improving cooperation, teamwork in management and efficiency.63 Employee 
representation was established as necessary in the European Court of Justice's 
(ECJ) decision in Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom,64 
when interpreting Council Directive No 75/129/EEC65 and Council Directive No 
77/187/EEC66.  
 
EU Company Law Directives have encouraged employee representation also as a 
way of improving the behaviour of company boards. Representation provides an 
informed board monitor that reduces managerial agency costs (e.g. excessive 
salaries, perk-taking and shirking) and curtails private block-holder privileges.67 A 
judicious level of employee representation maximises the market value and 
efficiency of the company68 and supplies a reliable channel for information flow to the 
highest levels of a company, thereby enhancing the board's decision-making 
abilities.69 This enhanced information also makes board decisions more 
comprehensible. The supervisory board will be able to 'easily identify strategies and 
curb investments representing personal control benefits to directors/management or 
majority shareholders by dilution of small investors, asset stripping, pyramiding, 
simple perquisites and crony capitalism'.70 
 
1.4 Employee involvement and the European Company Statute 
Among these directives, the SE Directive was legislated to secure employees’ 
involvement rights in company decisions and with a vision to establish a uniform 
legal framework. This vision has become blurred, because implementation of the 
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legal framework of the ECS has been left to the discretion of Member States where 
the SE is registered.71 As a result, there are now 28 different national SE laws.72 
 
The shortcomings of the ECS defeat the fundamental principle of the statute and 
subvert the right provided under Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union. The 
legal framework of the ECS, as it stands, fails to secure pre-existing representation 
rights at board level, but also allows Member States to circumvent representation 
rights at national level.73 Owing to the ‘before and after’ principle,74 a company is 
only legally obliged to provide board-level representation rights if these rights were 
available to employees prior to the formation of the SE.75 However, companies in 
Member States who have no company law provisions for employee representation at 
board level (e.g. UK and Italy) are not obliged to provide this right to employees in 
the new SE.  
 
Certain provisions of the ECS are ambiguous. For example, considering the 
objectives of the ECS and Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union, it is difficult 
to understand why the ECS provides for 'freezing' of board-level representation 
rights. A company may already have representation rights in place, but might be 
reluctant to increase those rights, for example from one-third representation to equal 
representation, if the required threshold of employee increases. GfK SE, Fresenius 
SE, Surteco SE are all examples of companies that have frozen board-level 
representation. 
 
The ECS has also failed to acknowledge issues like employee involvement rights at 
group level (e.g. prevalent in certain Member States like France- ‘comité de 
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groupe’)76. Certain aspects of the SE Directive have been broadly interpreted (Article 
4(4) and Part 3(a) Annex) and clarity on the number of employee representatives on 
the board is required.77 Articles 2 to 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 
2157/200178 (hereafter, referred to as the “SE Regulation”) provides for an SE to set 
up additional SEs as subsidiaries and this prevalence has threatened employee 
involvement rights in the SE. The ECS mechanisms for providing employee 
involvement rights are assured only when SEs are founded. However, when 
employees have been recruited, it becomes difficult to negotiate employee 
involvement rights (there are existing examples of involvement rights being 
legitimately denied to employees when a previously SE company without 
involvement rights are activated).79 
 
A company can use the terms of the ECS to deny their employees any substantial 
involvement rights. Shareholders can decide in their General Meeting whether to 
choose a monistic or dualistic board system, in line with Article 38 of the SE 
Regulation. A company not intending to have substantial employee involvement can 
simply opt for a monistic board. Employees would have no influence at all in 
choosing the board structure. Furthermore, employee representatives at board level 
(monistic or dualistic) cannot prevent or block a disputed board decision if all 
shareholder representatives act unanimously;80 and in the event of a tie where there 
is equal representation of employee and shareholders representatives, the chairman 
has a casting vote (per Article 50(2) SE Regulation).  
 
The ECS has thus arguably weakened codetermination rights and allowed for 
companies to circumvent if not completely evade national employee involvement 
rights (although this seldom occurs in practice). The ÖGB (the Austrian 
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confederation of trade unions), on the occasion of its 16th federal congress, stressed 
that:  
 
"...co-determination rights mostly regulated on the national level are in constant 
danger of being undermined by the on-going integration process and a unilateral 
understanding of European fundamental freedoms. The increasing Europeanisation 
of company law continues to be a particular challenge for this pillar of our social 
model’, which led the ÖGB to demand to make ‘the principle of co-determination a 
characteristic feature of participatory democracy into a guiding principle of European 
policies".81 
 
Two further claims may be made. First, the ICE Directive has been drafted very 
broadly, thereby creating a very general framework for consultation and information, 
without harmonising representation;82 as a result, Member States have considerable 
scope to implement its terms. Secondly, European Trade Union Confederation 
scholars claim that, if the EC's proposal for the establishment of the European 
Private Company (SPE) takes effect, companies could use it to circumvent national 
rules on employee involvement83 by: 
 
"allowing companies to escape the statutory board-level employee representation 
regime by choosing to register in a country without an equivalent (in the case of an 
SPE created ex-nihilo)".84  
 
The evidence suggests that the EU's corporate governance model prioritises the 
interests of shareholders. However, the financial crisis in the last decade has opened 
a window on the shortcomings of this ‘shareholder value’ model.85 The concept of a 
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'sustainable company'86 model of corporate governance, emphasising the need to 
give employees a voice and generate ‘stakeholder value’, has gained much 
acceptance among scholars. This model can be considered as a supplement to the 
'stakeholder value' model or the German corporate governance model (which have a 
two-tiered board structure comprised of a supervisory and a management board). 
This research advocates that employee representation at board level is fundamental 
for the progress of European corporate governance. It is controversially argued that 
there is currently no clear evidence of the correlation between board-level employee 
representation and a company's economic performance. 
 
EU legislators claim that employee involvement directives are substantial in 
contributing to social welfare in the EU, and the legislators are promoting the 
employee involvement aspects (especially representation). However, the writer is of 
opinion that the relevance of these directives (e.g. the SE Directive) are 
questionable. One might argue them to be "optional, market-mimicking, unimportant, 
or avoidable...and there is nothing nontrivial that EC corporate law requires, forbids, 
or enables."87  
 
As the EU legislation provides for the restriction of the scope of directives, they are 
usually under-enforced and have been said to have no substantial effect on EU and 
Member States’ Company Law; fail to govern important issues; and 'construed and 
invoked in varied Member States per their local legal culture and usually in 
conformation with pre-existing corporate law'.88 For example, the SE Directive simply 
serves to regulate an elemental framework, but the comprehensive legal principles 
are left to the discretion of the Member States with the registered SE.89 Similarly, 
with respect to the ICE Directive90, Member States have the autonomy to implement 
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the information and consultation procedure most befitting to pre-existing customs, 
labour market systems and industrial relations systems.91 
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CHAPTER 2- JUSTIFYING EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Employee involvement is a recognised European fundamental right under Article 153 
of The Treaty on European Union, which states that the ‘Union will encourage 
employee information, consultation, representation and co-determination within the 
Member States’. Additionally, Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union92 enshrines employee involvement as an elemental right with 
respect to information and consultation. This chapter explores all possible rationales 
that designate this importance in EU Member States to employee involvement.  
 
The issue of employee involvement in corporate governance is best studied under 
company law. However, given the financial crisis of 2007-2008, it will be unfair to 
ignore corporate governance reform as a labour law subject. Company law and 
labour law are justifiably branched between economic and social objectives. 
Company law is more concerned with the relationship between shareholders and 
managers, and economic issues. Labour law focuses on contributing to the social 
welfare and objectives of the employees and their relationship with the employers.93 
Villiers notes that EU Directives are more apt to be classified as economic / single 
market legislation in company law, and as social provisions in labour law.94  
 
One of the foremost dialogues on employee involvement by EU legislators 
emphasised the following rationale: from a socio-legal standpoint, employee 
involvement cultivates social democracy and is a good corporate governance 
practice.95 From an economic standpoint, legislators regarded employee 
representation as a way of promoting information exchange, decreasing transaction 
costs and negotiating a course through changed scenarios. The political rationale 
behind the establishment of involvement policies is consequently to develop national 
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economic efficiency whilst improving the work experience. These rationales are now 
arguably embedded and reflected in the EU’s corporate governance and social 
agenda culture today, but are not exhaustive and only represent the principally 
discussed reasons to encourage employee involvement.  
 
2.2 Investigating prior research findings 
No unanimous consensus yet has been reached as to whether employee 
involvement is advantageous, detrimental or neutral in good corporate governance, 
especially within the SE, despite numerous research attempts. One of many reasons 
behind this lack of agreement is that these researches are conducted in different 
economic climates, making it difficult to establish a clear correlation between 
employee involvement and good corporate governance. For example, the issue of 
employee involvement was much more restricted in the EU between the 1960s and 
1990s, when nearly all proposals for board-level employee representation would 
eventually be rejected by a majority of Member States. 
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The following tables classify notable studies undertaken to date according to the 
outcome of their findings: 
Studies concluding advantageous effect of employee involvement 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency (Balsmeier et al. (2011))
96
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's profit and yield, where the employee 
representation is one-third of the board composition (Boneberg (2010))
97
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency (Debus (2010))
98
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency with respect to awarding dividends and 
market value (Fauver and Fuerst (2006)) 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's productivity, where the employee representation 
is equal of the board composition (FitzRoy and Kraft (2005))
99
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. market value of the company and bookkeeping (Frick and 
Bermig (2009))
100
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. board composition (Gerum and Debus (2006))
101
  
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's profitability (Gurdon and Rai (1990))
102
  
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency (Hollandts et al. (2009))
103
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company innovation, where the employee representation is 
one-third of the board composition (Kraft and Stank (2004))
104
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. equity return, where the employee representation is one-
third of the board composition (Kraft and Ugarkovic (2006))
105
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's profit and yield, where the employee 
representation is one-third of the board composition (Renaud (2007))
106
  
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency (Strom (2007))
107
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Studies concluding advantageous effect of employee involvement 
Employee involvement in the board vs. positive bookkeeping (Vulcheva (2008))
108
  
Employee representation on the board in companies perform 17% better vs. companies lacking 
board level employee representation (Workplace Representation and Participation Survey 
Research, UK)
109
 
Table 3- Advantageous effect of employee involvement 
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Studies concluding detrimental effect of employee involvement 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency (Bohren and Strom (2005, 2010))
110
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's productivity and profitability, where the employee 
representation is one-third of the board composition (Boneberg (2010))
111
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's productivity and profitability, where the employee 
representation is equal of the board composition (FitzRoy and Kraft (1993))
112
  
Employee representation on the board in companies vs. company's efficiency (Ginglinger et al. 
(2011))
113
 
Equal employee representation on the board in companies’ trade at a discount of 31% vs. 
companies comprising of one-third employee representation on the board-level (Gorton and Schmid 
(2000, 2004))
114
. 
Employee representation on the board in companies vs. company's profitability (Gurdon and Rai 
(1990))
115
  
Employee involvement in the board vs. stock price, where the employee representation is equal of 
the board composition (Petry (2009))
116
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. shareholder value, where the employee representation is 
equal of the board composition (Schmid and Seger (1998))
117
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. employment development (Werner and Zimmermann 
(2005))
118
 
Table 4- Detrimental effect of employee involvement 
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Studies concluding neutral effect of employee involvement 
Employee involvement in the board vs. industry-level share price, where the employee 
representation is equal of the board composition (Baums and Frick (1998))
119
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's profitability (Benelli et al. (1987))
120
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's productivity and profitability, where the employee 
representation is equal of the board composition (FitzRoy and Kraft (1993))
121
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. market value of the company and bookkeeping (Frick and 
Bermig (2009))
122
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency (Ginglinger et al. (2011))
123
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. price cost margin, where the employee representation is 
equal of the board composition (Kraft (2001))
124
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company innovation, where the employee representation is 
equal of the board composition (Kraft, Stank and Dewenter (2010))
125
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. industrial sectors productivity (Svejnar (1982))
126
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency, where the employee representation is 
equal of the board composition (Vitols (2006))
127
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency, where the employee representation is 
equal of the board composition (Vitols (2008))
128
 
Employee involvement in the board vs. company's efficiency, productivity and profitability, where the 
employee representation is one-third of the board composition (Wagner (2009))
129
 
Table 5- Neutral effect of employee involvement 
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It is interesting to note that most of the above-mentioned studies are German, based 
on Germany's experience of employee involvement. This can be attributed to the fact 
that Germany has the most experience of employee representation in Europe. 
Further, most literature on employee involvement is in the German language, making 
it difficult for non-German-speaking researchers to gain access to the vast amount of 
information already gathered. Historically, the issue of employee involvement was an 
ideological debate of varied perspective from trade unions, directors or shareholders.  
The debate in recent times has used advanced methodologies to assess the effect of 
employee involvement on a company's productivity, efficiency, market value, 
bookkeeping, industry-level share price, profitability, and corporate governance. 
Nonetheless, the findings of past and current studies on employee involvement are 
almost equally split between regarding it as advantageous, detrimental or neutral. 
 
When the introduction of the ‘Vredeling’ Directive (Draft Fifth Company Law 
Directive) was being debated, Alchian and Demsetz’s conventional investigation 
suggested that a company is more productive when the entire management rests 
with the owners of the company (one agent).130 According to them, the owner 
monitors employees more closely when they are paid a competitive salary, and since 
the owners are the residual claimants this will have resourceful incentives. When 
employees are paid a competitive salary, the owner monitors them more closely, 
and, since the owner is the residual claimant, they are motivated to manage their 
resources more closely. However, by 'involving employees in a company's affairs or 
granting board level representation, this idea is blurred and disrupted as property 
rights are divided between two different agents who have dissimilar agendas'.131 
Fauver and Fuerst note that Alchian and Demsetz’s analysis is overly simplistic i.e. 
though in the ‘neoclassical firm, employees lack firm-specific skills… eventually they 
cultivate firm-specific human capital (like owners, they make investments as 
well)…and since human capital investments are nonconvertible, employees may fear 
future opportunism; undeniably, returns (e.g. wages) on human capital investments 
proportionate with investment may never happen’.132 
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The Draft Fifth Company Law Directive was opposed and rejected by Member States 
on the ground that introducing employee involvement in a company's affairs would 
damage shareholder value. The studies mentioned in Table 4- Detrimental effect of 
employee involvement argue that employee involvement posed an impediment to 
investors, therefore an aspect demonstrating and encouraging ownership 
concentration.133 On the other hand, Parkinson and Kelly argue that the separation 
of controlling rights between employees and shareholders makes it uncertain to 
whom the directors are accountable.134 One could respond by asking why directors 
cannot be held accountable to both employees and shareholders.  
 
The current literature on the issue is sparse and the rationales identified focus more 
on economic analysis rather than legal analysis. Keller and Werner submit that 
board-level worker representation has 'still remained principally, along with other 
issues of workers and information at a general level.135 Although, the SE Regulation 
and the SE Directive have brought substantial reforms and seek to promote social 
and economic integration, it is arguably new in its approach and has many 'striking 
similarities' with the present EWC Directive. 
 
2.3 Arguing for employee involvement: The social welfare rationale 
coherent argument for employee involvement 
The academic rationale with respect to employee involvement is that EU Company 
Law can be used as a tool and be a great contribution to social welfare whilst 
simultaneously enhancing a company's economic value as a result. In terms of EU 
perspective on social rationale, it can be argued that a Member State’s Company 
Law may be more inclined to serve shareholder value. However, EU Company Law 
is extensive in taking into account the stakeholders’ interests and protecting weaker 
parties, such as the employees. It has been widely suggested and accepted that EU 
Company Law Directives have been used as an instrument to contribute greatly 
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towards social welfare (‘social welfare’ in this context meaning the welfare of the 
employees), but this is highly debatable. Nonetheless, the EU is heightening its 
social role along with its strategy to achieve top economic power. EU legislators 
apparently indicated with the introduction of the SE Directive that they are bearing 
the path of social welfare by recognising the rights of few stakeholders, although 
primarily protecting weaker parties’ rights and reinforcing elemental but often 
neglected aspects, such as, employees’ information at a general level and board-
level representation. 
 
Most social welfare aspects such as equal opportunities, equal pay, working time 
etc. have witnessed staunch challenges, but board-level employee representation 
still remains largely ignored besides other matters of employees and information at a 
general level.136 There were several propositions for directives that would enhance 
neglected representation and information rights which never saw the light of the 
day.137 For example, The Draft Fifth Company Law Directive / ‘Vredeling’ Directive 
which incorporated proposals about employee representation at the board level and 
the voting rights for the managerial board was rejected by several Member States. 
This was mainly owing to decades of differences of interests and political 
disharmony among domestic corporate actors within the EU. Member States found 
the suggested proposals and social welfare provisions too rigid.138 One such 
example at the time was the Conservative Government in the UK in the 1980's and 
1990's which inflexibly opposed all aspects of employee participation.139 
 
One might argue that the SE Directive and the SE Regulation have brought about 
and promote significant social integration, but it has been widely suggested that it is 
replicating the present EWC Directive in many ways.140 From the perspective of 
management and corporate governance, it is fair to say that not all of their initiatives 
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have undeviating economic benefits as their exclusive agenda.141 In contrast to 
many management motivations for introducing employee involvement, socially-
centred efforts also emphasise democratic relationships between employees, and 
between management and employees (e.g. co-operatives).142 Social rationales have 
been, and continue to be, debated on numerous grounds. 
 
2.3.1 Dignity and equality 
A company’s conventional structure and strategy regards employees as nameless 
and dispensable human resources that are to be managed with the objective of 
corporate profit in mind. However, the advocates for morality and ethics emphasise 
that employees have intrinsic value and deserve to be treated fairly and with dignity. 
These two contrasting objectives have been the subject of debate since the 
establishment of the first corporation, as corporations have faced resolute challenges 
to respect the autonomy and dignity of employees.143 An employee spends a 
minimum of one-third of their adult lives working, and undoubtedly their work 
experience shapes their personality and life outside their work. The working 
environment and conditions are key factors in defining employees as individuals and 
in establishing their social worth. Therefore, it is fairly rationalised that employees 
must have certain representation or voice in their governance and management.144 
McCall notes that the idea of employee involvement rights draws on contemporary 
western ethical norms that recognise a commitment to employees’ equal dignity: 
 
“While no social system could guarantee that all the interests of its members are 
accommodated, the commitment to equality requires that decisions affecting 
important or basic interests, be made fairly. What more effective guarantee of 
fairness and accountability could there be than allowing workers to represent their 
own interests in the decision-making process? … the mechanism of participation 
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must provide real authority…employees deserve an amount of authority that enables 
them to resist policies that unfairly damage their interests.”145 
 
2.3.2 Social rationale and the unions 
Employee involvement initiatives that depend on union support are also an important 
aspect of the social rationale (for example, management/employee buyouts). Such 
involvement initiatives are mostly the consequence of negotiations between 
management and the trade unions, thereby combining social and economic 
rationales. For example, in the UK, employee buyouts have been set up as 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP). 
 
Not all researchers accept that employee buyouts are in a company’s best interests. 
In the UK, employee buyouts in their modern form have been recognised as 
ESOP.146 In the past decade, this type of ‘social participation has demonstrated to be 
comparatively short-lived and uncertain’ (e.g. most ESOPs have resorted to 
conventional ownership).147 Pencavel argues that this is clear evidence of a 
traditional dilemma: employee involvement schemes eventually ‘degenerate’ into 
conventional ownership.148 Jensen and Meckling also strongly maintain that a self-
governing firm involving employee participation will unvaryingly flounder and will 
eventually deteriorate into a traditionally controlled firm.149  
 
Sometimes employee participation schemes are introduced either by a union’s 
demands or as a management’s initiative to secure jobs, but it is often seen that 
economic demands take over the social agenda, subsequently causing the 
company’s shutdown or takeover by another company.150 It is herein argued that to 
mitigate this employee involvement which is fairly seen as an obstacle in the UK, 
union’s involvement without ownership is categorised as a social partnership 
programmes. This is also encouraged by the government participation policies, and 
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both the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) support these programmes, as they incorporate social as well as economic 
rationales.151 
 
Employee involvement is an indispensable aspect of the ‘European Social Model’152 
which sustains economic competition among the SEs and other companies. 
However, there is a lack of unanimity regarding social welfare proposals among 
Member States, because EU legislators are projections of each Member State’s 
interests. For this reason, EU legislators have not fully been achieving social welfare 
objectives; it took almost four decades for employee interests to be legislated finally 
in the form of ECS (as previously mentioned in Chapter 1- Employee Involvement in 
the EU’s Corporate Governance Regime). Even if it is accepted that EU legislators 
are moving in the direction of social welfare and genuinely represent the interests of 
employees, and EU Directives do in fact contribute towards social welfare, the 
significance of the EU Directive itself is questionable. Enriques describes Corporate 
Law Directives in the EU as ‘discretionary, market-mimicking, trivial, or avoidable’.153 
These Directives seem to have no great impact on national company laws or the way 
the SEs or other companies and corporations are administered or governed. This is 
attributed to the fact that EU Corporate Law Directives are under-enforced (option to 
limit the scope of the directives); they cover peripheral matters and core areas of 
fiduciary duties and shareholder remedies and board-level employee representation 
are regulated only marginally; and lastly, owing to inconsistent judicial interpretation 
by the ECJ, these directives are enforced variably in each Member State per their 
native legal traditions and persistently with pre-existing provisions in corporate 
law.154 For instance, the ICE Directive155 provides Member States with the 
independence to implement and adopt information and consultation measures 
appropriate to their prevailing traditions, labour market systems and industrial 
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relations arrangements.156 Likewise, the SE Directive157 provides only a general 
framework for SE’s governance in their registered Member State, because 
comprehensive procedures of law are left at each Member State's discretion.158 
Owing to objections like these, an in-depth public consultation in 2012 on the 
prospects for EU Company Law, and to adopt more suitable mechanisms to meet 
existing societal, employee, social and economic needs was launched.159 Three 
years after this consultation closed,160 progress is yet to be seen. 
 
2.4 Embedding employee involvement in the EU’s corporate governance 
model 
The 2008 economic crisis highlighted the shortcomings within the shareholder value 
corporate governance structure and ignited the need to promote employee 
involvement within corporate governance. Until this point, corporate governance 
arguments had concentrated upon bolstering the position of shareholders. The 
shareholder model of corporate governance had selfishly been one-sided serving 
short-term shareholders’ interests (share value). This model disregarded the 
interests of other stakeholders, including employees. This inadvertently affects the 
company’s future prospects and a company’s social responsibility. A company's 
economic success within a Member State depends on a variety of factors, not least 
employee involvement.  
 
However, it is largely evident from studies mentioned in Table 3- Advantageous 
effect of employee involvement, that companies within Member States161 with 
employee involvement rights are more successful on a range of measures than 
those in Member States162 without employee involvement rights. While this is not 
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directly evident, employee involvement contributing positively to the success of a 
company should not be ignored. Employees’ interests are connected with the 
longstanding interests of the company; the board benefits from employee opinion, 
which supports them in their decision-making. This is contrary to the interim 
economic logistics, which ultimately fail.163 Simultaneously, if employees’ interests 
are well accounted for in a company's decisions and employees are evenly 
represented on the board, then it will improve the quality of employees thus 
increasing the firm's performance, i.e. productivity. Employee representatives on the 
board have extensive knowledge about the inner functioning of a company and 
subsequently, during board decision-making, these representatives can enrich 
operational and tactical dialogue. 
 
It is also logically viable that employee involvement in a company’s decision-making 
will substantially reduce company costs. Employee involvement in work-related 
matters can delay or prevent quits from the workplace and promote a reduced 
absence rate. Share schemes have been found to reduce employee turnover164 and 
a reduction in employee turnover will reduce a company’s recruitment and training 
budget.165 A lower absence rate will subsequently be a cost saving factor for the 
company. An employee-management relationship prevents industrial feuds and 
leads to swifter acceptance and implementation of a company’s policies and 
changes. An abundance of empirical evidence demonstrates that employee 
involvement can: (i) enrich decision-making quality by widening the contributions 
made by employees on the matter in question; (ii) encourage commitment to the 
conclusions of the management’s decision-making; (iii) develop communication, 
motivation and cooperation in the workplace; (iv) potentially reduce supervisors’ 
workload; (v) encourage skill development; and (vi) enhance employer-employee 
relations, thereby reducing strikes and union intervention.166 Markey submits that ‘the 
power-sharing debate was more prevalent four or five decades ago, but firm 
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efficiency has yielded the strongest base for employee involvement promotion since 
the 1980s, in a setting of increased competition in an international economic 
environment (e.g. works councils in Germany are endorsed with a substantial 
responsibility share for competitiveness and efficiency)’.167 
 
Common sense alone suggests that, if board decisions affect employees, then it is in 
the interests of justice that these employees are represented on the board to 
participate within consultation and decision-making. This is in alignment with the 
industrial democracy agenda.168 There is no uniform model of board-level employee 
involvement among Member States and employee involvement varies among 
Member States with respect to (i) two-tier board structure (e.g. as in Germany) or 
monistic board structure; (ii) eligibility, nomination and election of employee 
representatives on the board; (iii) the proportion or size of employee representatives 
on to the board (e.g. one-third or equal representation); and (iv) the kind of 
companies which are obliged to adhere to employee involvement. 
 
2.4.1 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
EC frequently attempts to stress the importance of CSR. In its Green Paper 
‘European Corporate Governance Framework’, EC makes reference to CSR in the 
first paragraph of the first page:169 
 
“Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are key elements in 
building people’s trust in the single market. They also contribute to the 
competitiveness of European business, because well run, sustainable companies 
are best placed to contribute to the ambitious growth targets set by ‘Agenda 
2020’170.” 
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Businesses have been urged to demonstrate their duty towards European society 
and not just to further the interests of shareholders’ and employees.171 The EC 
recognises CSR as ‘a concept where companies assimilate social and environmental 
interests in their business and voluntary interaction with their stakeholders’.172 
Traditionally, CSR focuses more on environmental and human rights issues than on 
employment issues; trade unions take a dim view of CSR with respect to their 
interests. However, a ‘stronger identification with CSR might be a significant 
approach of improving the legitimacy of employee involvement’.173 One might assert 
that CSR is a voluntary role undertaken by corporations to contribute to society in 
their own way, and it would be inappropriate to list the issues that need to be 
covered under CSR (for example, employee involvement). Maybe for this reason, 
employee relations have never been a highlight of CSR. Some scholars suggest, 
however, that unions could try to use CSR to influence globalisation in the interests 
of employees and society as a whole.174 
 
2.4.2 Employee involvement, governance and ownership 
Employee involvement is vital to the corporate governance of companies in the 
Member States, provoking intense discussion on power sharing between 
stakeholders and shareholders, the nature of the company and the relationship 
between company structure and productivity.175 In Member States where employee 
involvement is prominent, especially board-level employee representation, such 
Member States have thrived during economic crises, political and social turmoil.176 It 
is widely suggested that when employee representatives are elected on to the 
supervisory board of an SE or any other company within a Member State that have 
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little experience of  ‘codetermination’,177 such involvement ‘advances a culture where 
codetermination is regarded by companies more as a norm than as an exception in 
Member State’.178 This is in concurrence with the study findings of Ernst and Young, 
which were commissioned by Directorate-General Internal Market of the EC.179 
Wider connections exist between ‘employee involvement and the future progression 
of the company’s general ownership structure and governance’.180 Njoya points out 
that those companies with already established traditions of codetermination adapt 
readily by embracing the closely-held shared ownership arrangement that prevails in 
the EU. On the other hand, “it may be the fact that these firms have a closely held 
structure with blocks of shares and dominant shareholders presenting holdup 
problems that makes codetermination necessary.”181 As a result, if ‘a codetermined 
firm procures a more disjointed shareholding, then codetermination would no longer 
be required and therefore the firm would be reasonably expected to withdraw 
codetermination after being made public’.182 
 
The correlation between codetermination and corporate governance (especially 
decision-making) has been found to be widely positive in most Member States 
because it presents a more balanced corporate approach. On many occasions, 
shareholders and employee representatives have mutually agreed on issues to 
further a company’s interests. For example, Gold’s study (which included interviews 
with employee representatives on the board in thirteen companies within Member 
States) finds that employee representatives play an essential role in decision-making 
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along with shareholders’ representatives.183 For example, in one company, 
employee representatives in partnership with shareholder representatives defeated a 
merger proposal when employees identified the risks of the merger. In another, 
employee representatives opposed an outsourcing proposal based on the exchange 
rates argument (the argument was correctly put and the proposal was dismissed). 
These examples demonstrate that employees often possess extensive knowledge of 
the everyday workings of the company and are vital stakeholders. Employees’ 
interests often run in conjunction with the companies’ interests.  
 
2.4.3 Property rights objections 
Opponents of employee representation in corporate governance dismiss these 
arguments for employee involvement, asserting that there is not enough empirical 
evidence to support them. One of the most interesting objections to employee 
involvement in a company’s governance is based on property rights.184 This 
argument suggests that employee representation on the supervisory board is a clear 
infringement of the company or corporation owner’s property rights.185 This argument 
advocates that property owners (shareholders) have exclusive rights to delegate 
management powers to directors, who may initiate employee involvement 
arrangements if they see fit. The argument asserts that this decision should not be 
legally mandated or imposed for social reasons and later justified by asserting that 
employee involvement contributes to positive decision taking and good corporate 
governance. The objection based on property rights is built on the shareholder 
theory of corporate governance: that corporate governance’s principal function is to 
maximise shareholder value.186 The notion of separation of ownership and control187 
in the contemporary company had its foundation in property law, as analysed by 
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Berle and Means.188 The analysis advocates an owner’s absolute control and 
residual rights because: 
 
“...if the individual is protected in the right both to use his own property as he sees fit 
and to receive the full fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be 
relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property he 
may possess.”189 
 
The property right objection would seem to survive, even when shareholders have 
surrendered governance to board members. McCall argues that: 
 
“First, even if owners have ceded control, they possibly have done so under the 
assumption that management will act as their fiduciary and will promote the interests 
of shareholders alone. Second, that the property is the corporation's and that 
management has a quasi-ownership right to control the corporate assets. Under this 
interpretation, the right to control decisions is still vested in another constituency 
whose interests are in potential conflict with the interests of employees. A defence of 
strong employee participation rights must still, then, confront a property rights 
objection.”190 
 
In a contemporary quasi-public firm, this alignment of incentives breaks down. 
Shareholders (owners) do not exercise control over the firm, and managers 
(directors / employee representative directors) who manage the firm do not share in 
the residual profits. Managers may not be able to act in the best interests of 
shareholders, as the interests of shareholders and managers may diverge. As a 
result, there should not be any struggle between property owner rights and 
employees’ representation in a board’s decision-making process. 
 
The property rights objection could be dismissed also by asserting that a company is 
not a piece of property but a union of several contracts expressing the contributions 
and responsibilities of numerous stakeholders in the company. Jensen and Meckling 
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note that a company is a ‘legal fiction’191, representing a nexus of several contracts 
and parties, and that a fictional notional cannot be owned.192 Even if any significance 
is attributed to the property rights objection, infringing corporate property owner 
rights and withdrawing employee involvement rights may both be ethically incorrect. 
It is a question of choosing the lesser of two evils to have a wider positive effect.  
 
The criterion for good corporate governance is now increasingly a growing concern 
in Member States merely because what constitutes good corporate governance is 
still debateable. Some recognise the value of employee representatives193 and some 
may regard employee representation as reintroducing ‘investment inefficiency’.194 
Levinson’s study, which surveyed company chairs and managing directors of 
prominent Swedish companies, found that 69% of company chairs were in favour of 
employee representatives having a positive impact on the governance of their 
respective companies, while only 5% held opposing views.195 61% of managing 
directors held positive views and only 9% considered employee representatives to 
be a negative driver in the governance structure.196  
 
A diverse boardroom with various stakeholder representatives may be less likely to 
make short-sighted and risky decisions. Employee involvement in corporate 
governance from an economic perspective serves as a ‘monitoring mechanism on 
the board to reduce managerial agency costs which includes taking perks, shirking, 
excessive salary, minimising private blockholder privileges and maximising the 
company’s value’.197 Promoting employee involvement in corporate governance will 
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probably help the EU to achieve its 2020 growth targets by developing and raising 
the bar of competition and sustainability.198 
 
2.5 Political basis: A continuing struggle 
A Member State's domestic interference in employee involvement potentially 
comprises both social and economic reasoning and is assumed to have positive 
accomplishments which would benefit a variety of interested communities / 
stakeholders. The government rationale behind the establishment of involvement 
policies is consequently to develop nationalised economic efficiency whilst improving 
the work experience.199 
 
One of the first discussions on employee involvement by EU legislators was in 1975. 
The Green Paper on 'Employee Participation in Company Structure'200 emphasised 
that employee involvement from a legal standpoint develops social democracy and is 
a good corporate governance practice. From an economic standpoint, employee 
representation is regarded as a way of promoting information exchange, decreasing 
transaction costs and negotiating a course through changed scenarios.201 However, 
no politically unanimous consensus yet has been reached as to whether employee 
involvement is beneficial, detrimental or neutral in a good corporate governance of 
SE, despite numerous research and legislative attempts. The following EU Directives 
and Regulations were some attempts made by the EU legislators with respect to the 
rights of employees within the EU: 
(i) Framework Directive for Health and Safety at Work202 
(ii) EWC Directive 
(iii) SE Regulation 
(iv) The Transfers of Undertakings Directive203 
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(v) SE Directive 
(vi) ICE Directive 
(vii) Employer Insolvency Directive204 
(viii) Directive for the protection of the interests of members and third parties205 
 
Although there has been considerable progress at general level with respect to 
employee’s information and consultation,206 but at board-level the progress has been 
sparse.207 The ‘Vredeling Directive’208 whose anticipated prime objectives were to 
provide mandatory information, consultation, and representation of employees at 
board-level in multinational companies never came into effect due to lack of 
unanimity, differences of interests and political controversy among EU and domestic 
corporate actors.209 It included proposals about employee representation on the 
supervisory board and the right to vote for the managerial board, which was 
disapproved by various Member States for being too rigid210 (e.g. UK in 1980's and 
1990's211). After years of intense debate and political compromise, Member States 
finally adopted the SE Regulation and the SE Directive, which has touched on many 
aspects of employee involvement that were historically objected to by many Member 
States. Scholars like Enriques212 (previously mentioned) have rightly suggested that 
one would rationalise that EU legislators must have legislated ECS in order to fill the 
gaps of employee involvement, which were initially left unresolved in previous 
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legislation and were in line with the growing demands of the EU’s objective of the 
'European social model'.  
 
On the face of it, ECS appears to secure employees’ involvement rights in company 
decisions and with a vision to establish a uniform legal framework, but there are now 
28 different national SE laws. This is because the comprehensive legal framework 
has been left to the discretion of Member States where the SE is registered.213 
Furthermore, each Member State adopts a different view to employee involvement 
when implementing ECS. For example, Germany takes a more expansive approach 
and the UK takes a more restrictive one and this is owed to their own national 
traditions on the issue. Therefore, the governmental rationale on employee 
involvement is difficult to comprehend as discussion papers, working papers, public 
debates and adopted legislations claim to further the interests and rights of 
employees for universal benefit (social, economic and corporate governance), but in 
practice seem to have a very ambiguous effect on the issue. For example, ECS is in 
contradiction with its own fundamental principle and is contrary to the right provided 
under Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union. ECS fails to secure pre-existing 
representation rights at board level, but also has the possibility to circumvent 
representation rights at each Member State level.214 Owing to the ‘before and after 
principle'215 in ECS, a company is only legally obliged to provide board-level 
representation rights if such rights were available to employees prior to the formation 
of an SE.216 However, companies in Member States who have no company law 
provisions for employee representation at board-level (e.g. UK, Italy etc.) are not 
obligated to provide this right to employees in the new SE. Considering the 
objectives of ECS and Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union, it is also difficult 
to comprehend why ECS provides for 'freezing' of board-level representation rights 
(companies who have already representation rights in place, but are reluctant for any 
possible increases in those rights, e.g. from 1/3 representation to equal 
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representation if the required threshold of employee increases), as seen in practice 
at GfK SE, Fresenius SE and Surteco SE. 
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CHAPTER 3- EVALUATION OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE 
 
3.1 Background and historical development of the ECS 
Contemporary company law instruments are the product of legislative developments 
that were initiated to satisfy the contracting interests of business parties and to 
minimise agency costs.217 New legislation is introduced in an effort to ‘augment 
social welfare by rectifying market failures' and 'governing company forms in the 
interest of the public'.218 Various aspects of EU Company Law and legal research 
has focused on the corporate board's role in generating firm value and offsetting 
agency costs owing to the division of control and ownership.219 Employee 
involvement that supposedly constrains management’s privileges has been the most 
controversial issue of EU Company Law and has been debated by the EC since 
1960s.  
 
Employee involvement in the SE is now considered an integral part of the EU's 
corporate governance strategy. According to this strategy, a company’s strategy 
must not be determined solely by the interests of its shareholders and directors, but 
also by those of other stakeholders. The academic view is that, with respect to 
employee involvement, EU Company Law can contribute to social welfare and 
simultaneously enhance a company's economic value. Ever since the 1960s, various 
facets of employee involvement have been on the EU's social and single market 
agenda. In that context, the EC identified four sets of political goals (previously 
discussed in Section 1.3 The History of Employee Involvement and EU Directives), 
which are now supposedly reflected in the EWC Directive, the ICE Directive and the 
ECS.  
 
These three directives had different aims and effects. The EWC Directive enhanced 
employees’ information and consultation rights throughout undertakings and groups 
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of undertakings across the EU.220 The ICE Directive extended information and 
consultation rights to national companies.221 It aimed to reinforce European-level 
support for informing and consulting with employees in an international business 
environment by escalating social dialogue among the employees market parties, as 
legislators felt that there were insufficient legislative measures at both EU and 
domestic level.222 However, the most significant achievement of EU legislators in 
moving towards securing employees’ representation and information at a general 
level was the adoption of the ECS.  
 
The SE Regulation is not comprehensive. It fails to discuss many aspects of EU 
Company Law (for example, tax), and some scholars suggest that it has 
‘deliberately’ failed to cover these aspects, leaving them at the Member State’s 
discretion.223 The SE Regulation has referred to domestic legislation of Member 
States 84 times in its text.224 The SE Directive, on the other hand, signifies evolution 
to the present cross-border consultation and information rights under the EWC 
Directive. For the first time, 'participation' rights are included in this legislation as a 
central part of negotiations. As discussed previously in Chapter 1- Employee 
Involvement in the EU’s Corporate Governance Regime, 'participation' in this context 
means exerting influence over the formation of the administrative body or the 
supervisory board.225 
 
The EC published the first draft proposal and memorandum for the SEs in 1966. By 
1970, a formal preliminary draft on the SE Regulation encompassing all the main 
aspects of its activities was introduced.226 Three types of employee involvement 
were incorporated in this draft: (i) European works council; (ii) board-level employee 
representation; and (iii) collective agreements. This was influenced by the company 
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law traditions in Germany which specified a mandatory two-tier model.227 However, 
no agreement on this proposed regulation was reached because of the variation in 
Member States’ Company Law and the problematic issue of defining employee 
involvement. Domestic company law vehicles in various Member States were 
reluctant to permit board-level employee representation (one-tier board 
representation or two-tier representation); some Member States allowed this 
minimally.228 In 1975, the EC’s proposal was revised by the proposal of one-third 
parity: one third of board members would be appointed by employees, one third by 
shareholders and the other third would be appointed jointly.229 This proposal was 
resolutely opposed by the Netherlands, who claimed that the idea was 'inspired' by 
'Mitbestimmung' (German for codetermination); they preferred a more relaxed 
system, as in the UK.230 In 1989, the EC made another attempt: in this third 
proposal. The SE legislation was proposed to be divided into the SE Regulation and 
the SE Directive, supplementing it with respect to employee involvement.231 The SE 
would be able to choose between one-tier board representation and two-tier 
representation and the SE Directive allowed Member States to choose between the 
German, Scandinavian, French or Dutch models. 
 
After years of unsuccessful struggle for an agreement, the EC commissioned the 
Davignon Group232, who in their final report (Davignon Report, 1997) submitted that 
the Member States policies on employee involvement were too diverse to make 
harmonisation possible. The group proposed that an arrangement of participation 
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should be determined by negotiations between employee representatives and 
management. The standard rules would be applicable if the negotiations failed.233 
While the outcome of the Davignon Report was positive, unanimity was yet to be 
achieved. It was not until 2004 that the ECS came into force, and it was not until two 
years after the deadline had passed when it was transposed in all Member States.234 
 
3.2 Summarising European Company 
The SE's legal form is supranational. It allows companies from different Member 
States to function under common rules and management having its individual 
legislative framework. This provides companies that want to expand beyond their 
national borders the option to be subject to a single set of laws, rather than the laws 
of each Member State where the company is active. There is no definite Treaty 
foundation for the adoption of ECS by the EU, but the legal basis is Article 352 of 
The Treaty on European Union, which allows the European Council functioning 
unanimously to embrace legislation when required to achieve the Treaty’s objectives. 
Subsequently, the SE is not ‘constitutionally obligated to the multifaceted approach 
to EU corporate or company law of Article 50(2)(g) of The Treaty on European 
Union’.235 An SE’s registered office within a Member State can be transferred, which 
can subsequently make it a more attractive market for companies.236 
 
The SE Regulation encompasses the company law for creating an SE and combines 
various methods for creating management structures and employee involvement. 
The SE Directive, on the other hand, specifies the context for employee participation. 
An SE may be established by (i) the merger of two or more existing public limited-
liability companies from two different Member States at least;237 (ii) the formation of a 
holding company by public or private limited liability companies from two different 
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Member States at least;238 (iii) creating a subsidiary by an SE;239 or (iv) 
transformation of a public limited liability company that has had a subsidiary in a 
different Member State for a minimum of two years.240 The subscribed minimum 
capital is €120,000 for establishing an SE, and the name of the company should be 
followed or headed by “SE” (e.g. Porsche Automobil Holding SE). 
 
The SE Directive attempts to develop the current corporate governance structures 
prevalent in the EU in accordance with the EU social model.241 Therefore, employee 
information, consultation and participation are critical to the SE Directive and, for this 
reason; the type of employee involvement to be used needs to be negotiated as a 
mandatory requirement before an SE can be validly registered.242 The SE Directive 
sets out numerous provisions on employee involvement in the SE. Employee 
representatives are allowed to approve the formation of the board of management 
(one-tier) or the supervisory board (two-tier).243 The SE Directive allows the one-tier 
system's administrative organ or the two-tier system's management organ to start 
negotiations with employee representatives about arrangements for employees’ 
involvement;244 to do so, a Special Negotiating Body (hereafter, referred to as the 
“SNB”) representative of the employees is created.245 The SNB would negotiate 
measures with the management to establish a stable employee representative body 
and to consult on its participation rights. The SE does not provide a uniform model 
for this; the parties can have their own agreement regarding the nature of employee 
involvement.246 
 
Furthermore, to minimise the application of prevailing domestic board-level 
employee representation rights, two-thirds of the SNB representatives must back the 
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arrangement in a company where pre-existing rights included at least 25% 
employees in an SE formed by merger (or 50% in the creation of joint subsidiaries or 
a holding company).247 An SNB cannot minimise pre-existing rights if an SE is 
formed by conversion. The standard Annex rules to the SE Directive will be 
applicable if the management and SNB agree or cannot reach an agreement within a 
set time. Any pre-existing rights of board-level employee representation will still be 
applicable where the SE is formed by conversion. Employee information and 
consultation rights will always be included in the agreement, but with respect to 
board-level employee representation rights, the ‘before and after principle’ will apply, 
which would safeguard any pre-existing rights. However, if none of the companies 
had board-level employee representation rights prior to the establishment of SE, 
then no representation rights will be applicable after the SE is registered.248 
 
3.3 The efficiency of the SE Directive 
The SE Directive may have been a historic achievement, delivered after decades of 
negotiation in the EU,249 but it has shortcomings that defeat the fundamental 
principle of the statute and are contrary to the rights provided under Article 153 of 
The Treaty on European Union. The legal framework for the SE Directive fails to 
secure pre-existing representation rights at board-level for employees in companies 
intending to become an SE, but also allows a company to circumvent representation 
rights at national level.250 First, owing to the ‘before and after’ principle,251 a company 
is only legally obliged to provide board-level representation rights if they were 
available to employees prior to the formation of an SE.252 Because it protects only 
existing provisions for employee participation, the SE Directive in fact weakens 
codetermination rights. Secondly, in a Member State with no company law provisions 
for employee representation at board level (e.g. UK, Italy etc.), a company is not 
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obliged to provide this right to employees in the new SE unless it has a separate 
agreement to state otherwise.253  
 
Companies could avoid granting board-level representation rights by keeping the 
number of employees below the minimum threshold stated in the SE Directive. That 
minimum is applicable within each Member State, so that companies domestically 
could opt to convert into an SE before reaching their individual Member State’s 
threshold. Eidenmüller et al. argue that ‘domestic provisions on mandatory employee 
involvement in the supervisory board considerably increases the number of SEs 
registered in a Member State, thereby implying that the SE model provides an option 
to circumvent domestic level employee involvement.254 Some argue that this notion 
is based on the example of Germany, where a fraction of companies have converted 
into an SE to circumvent employee involvement rights.255 However, this has not been 
confirmed empirically. Köstler points out that only a small number of current German 
SEs were PLCs and characterised by board-level employee representation before 
being registered as an SE.256 This reiterates the point made before that it is 
incomprehensible to conceptualise the notion of 'freezing' of board-level 
representation rights, especially when considering Article 153 of The Treaty on 
European Union and the objectives of the SE Directive. This is particularly relevant 
for German companies, which will require to increase their employees’ board-level 
representation rights to equal representation if the threshold of their employees 
reaches 2000.257 It was claimed by the GfK SE employee representatives that the 
decision to convert GfK into a SE was to avoid the conversion from 1/3 employee 
representation to equal representation, as that time they were very close to the 2,000 
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employees threshold.258 This was also confirmed by the GfK management that this 
was a ‘positive side-effect’ of transforming into an SE.259The EC has identified that 
the SE Directive has not addressed and does not provide legal certainty regarding 
some aspects of employee involvement negotiation procedure. These situations 
include: (i) when no employee representatives opt to participate in the SNB or are 
ineligible; (ii) the lack of rules governing the SE Representative Body relationship 
with the European Works Council (EWC) that may be there within the group of 
companies; (iii) the connection between the domestic and cross-border levels of 
information and consultation are not administered; and (iv) there is no process of 
calculating the number of employees to be involved in the negotiation procedure (this 
can lead to the unbalance in the influence of different parties involved in the 
negotiation).260 These issues may not be substantial and might be easily resolved 
with mutual understanding or by defining rules; but they create uncertainty and 
potentially waste resources and time. For example, the employer’s association and 
trade unions in Spain recognise that the lack of legal certainty in these matters has 
affected the formation of the SEs in Spain – for example, in calculating the number of 
employees to be involved in the negotiation procedure – but they do not see it as a 
significant issue. Legal uncertainty also affects the relationship between employee 
representatives in the EWC and a group of SEs. 
 
Article 2-3 of the SE Regulation provides for an SE to set up additional SEs as 
subsidiaries, and this provision has effectively threatened employee involvement 
rights in SEs. The ECS mechanisms for providing employee involvement rights are 
only assured when the SEs are founded. When employees are subsequently 
recruited, it becomes difficult to negotiate employee involvement rights. As a result, 
involvement rights could be legitimately denied to employees in an SE in which these 
rights have been previously activated. The SE Directive does not provide for any 
mechanism that would facilitate restarting employee involvement negotiations after 
an SE has been established, and any changes that may happen later. Furthermore, 
it provides that: 
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“It is a fundamental principle and stated aim of this Directive to secure employees' 
acquired rights as regards involvement in company decisions. Employee rights in 
force before the establishment of SEs should provide the basis for employee rights 
of involvement in the SE (the "before and after" principle). Consequently, that 
approach should apply not only to the initial establishment of an SE but also to 
structural changes in an existing SE and to the companies affected by structural 
change processes.”261 
 
This is a major shortcoming. EU legislators have failed to define ‘structural change’ 
and have failed to prescribe the procedure for restarting employee involvement 
negotiations after an SE has been established. There have been attempts to explain 
‘structural changes’. For instance, German courts have concurred that employee 
growth in a company would be regarded as a ‘structural change; some legal scholars 
suggest that this interpretation is too restrictive.262 France, Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands and Malta tried in their domestic provisions when transposing the SE 
Directive to provide for restarting negotiations when a major change in SE occurs 
(for example, a substantial increase in the number of employees). 
 
As previously discussed in Section 1.4 Employee involvement and the European 
Company Statute, the founding ground of setting up an SE and considering 
employee involvement rights seems to make a mockery of the concept as it is the 
shareholders who decide in their General Meeting whether to choose a monistic or 
dualistic board system.263 Employees do not exert any influence at all in the option of 
the board structure. This gives rise to a question whether shareholders’ decisions 
(residual owners in the company) should take precedence over that of the 
employees.264  
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Therefore, due to this procedure, a company who never intended to have substantial 
employee involvement rights can opt to circumvent by opting for a monistic board. 
Furthermore, employee representatives at board-level (monistic or dualistic) have no 
recourse to prevent or block a disputed board decision in question if all shareholder 
representatives act unanimously;265 and in the event of a tie where there is equal 
representation of employee and shareholders representatives, the chairman has a 
casting vote.266 
 
Other contentious issues that prevent the SE Directive from achieving its objectives 
are summarised in the table below: 
Issue in contention Negative consequence 
Group level employee 
representation 
The EU legislator has failed to acknowledge the issue of employee 
involvement rights at group level within the SE Directive (e.g. prevalent in 
certain Member States like France- ‘comité de groupe’). 
Denominating 
employee 
representatives in the 
supervisory board 
Article 4(4) and Part 3(a) Annex of the SE Directive has not been 
interpreted broadly and clarity on the number of employee representatives 
on the board is essentially required. 
SE’s basic rules Furthermore, the SE Directive only provides a basic framework for overall 
incorporation, and the detailed rules of law have been left to the Member 
State’s discretion where the SE is registered. This gives Member States 
autonomy to have their individual employee involvement cultures embedded 
when transposing the SE Directive. Therefore, there will be 28 different SE 
legislation as opposed to the objective to having a “European Company”. 
Uncertainty with 
SNB’s undermining 
board-level employee 
involvement rights 
SNB's may be tempted to give up extensive or partial board-level employee 
representation rights in exchange for added resources and extended rights 
for the SE works council (e.g. as seen in Hager SE).
267
 
Reduction in 
employee 
involvement rights, 
when an SE converts 
back to a public 
limited company 
A company within a Member State could first incorporate as an SE and later 
convert back to a public limited company.
268
 This is a possible strategy to 
circumvent employee involvement rights as the employee involvement 
rights will be lost or minimised if the new form of company created does not 
embrace employee involvement rights or the degree of employee 
involvement is lessened.
269
 
Table 6- Other negative consequence of the SE Directive 
 
                                                          
265
 M Stollt and E Wolters, Worker involvement in the European Company (SE) - A handbook for 
practitioners (ETUI 2011). 
266
 Article 50(2) of the SE Regulation. 
267
 Rehfeldt et al., ‘Employee involvement in companies under the European Company Statute’ 
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2011) 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2011/industrial-relations/employee-involvement-
in-companies-under-the-european-company-statute> accessed 18 May 2015. 
268
 Pursuant to Article 66 of the SE Regulation. 
269
 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on the review of Council Directive 2001/86/EC 
of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement 
of employees’ COM (2008) 591 final. 
61 
The SE Directive contains other provisions that, although not related to employee 
involvement, still make SE an unattractive company model for stakeholders other 
than shareholders. In particular, an SE can only be ‘incorporated by companies 
already registered under their individual Member State’s domestic legislation and not 
available to natural persons’. Economically speaking, this provides further obstacles 
‘financially and administratively’.270 Further, the SE Directive surrenders creditors’ 
and minority shareholders’ interests, which are left to the discretion of the Member 
State’s legislation. Usually, minority shareholders have the option to buy back their 
shares at a ‘proportionate’ rate if they opposed the SE’s creation or the proposal to 
transfer the registered office (at the general meeting).271 Creditors’ interests are also 
left to the discretion of the legislation of the Member State concerned, due to the 
merger’s cross-border nature.272 Both the SE Directive and the SE Regulation are 
ambiguous in this regard: Member States may protect the interests of creditors and 
minority shareholders in different ways. It should be noted that no example of this 
happening has yet been recorded. 
 
Bearing these shortcomings in mind, the EC reviewed the SE Directive273 and 
subsequently shortlisted the issues of “regime shopping”274 and group-level 
employee participation275 as ‘major concerns’.276 However, the EC took the view that 
it was too early to conduct a full assessment or judge the directive, because it had 
been transposed only recently.277 The EC cites that lack of practice in applying the 
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SE Directive in Member States as a reason for not yet revising it.278 Given that any 
identified shortcoming with the SE Directive will remain a shortcoming regardless of 
time and experience, this reasoning seems frivolous. These issues, if not resolutely 
addressed, will continue to make the SE a less preferred form of company. It is likely 
that the EC has decided against revising the SE Directive because it fears going 
back to the political turmoil that led to five decades of negotiation. The issue of 
employee involvement is still sensitive and yet necessary. 
 
Another obstacle that makes the SE less attractive is the mandatory requirement to 
negotiate employee participation and the creation of a SNB. The process is lengthy, 
time-consuming and overly complicated, principally because a company proposing to 
convert to an SE needs to take expert advice, thus adding costs to the €120,000 
minimum capital requirement. These requirements make the SE less attractive 
especially to start-up businesses or small and medium sized enterprises. These 
businesses must, therefore, continue to rely on the existing corporate systems under 
their own domestic legislation until they have the required funds to convert their 
businesses into an SE.279 Borg-Barthet critically comments that if these businesses: 
 
“wish to benefit from corporate mobility and transfer their seat to another jurisdiction, 
it appears that it may be easier to do so by taking advantage of the developments in 
the case-law concerning freedom of establishment, provided that they also change 
their governing law.”280  
 
Only 2,757 SEs have been established in the last decade since the ECS came into 
force.281 This number demonstrates the apparent lack of interest among Member 
States in the SE. However, the numbers of established SEs in the Czech Republic 
and Germany have considerably increased. The SE was anticipated to resolve the 
problem of companies within its Member State by facilitating movement without the 
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need for incorporation or dissolution. The impact of the SE Directive is limited when 
the objectives of the ECS and the accuracy and efficiency of the SEs are compared, 
as summarised in the table below: 
 
 
 
 
Objectives 
To complete the notion of the internal market so competitiveness and efficiency 
can be augmented, since the SE conforms to EU's economic framework.
282
 
To facilitate companies with cross-border aspects to restructure, amalgamate 
and increase their operations on an EU level scale which would facilitate 
transferring company’s registered office to another Member State readily and at 
the same time securing interests of shareholders and stakeholders (including 
employees).
283
 
To facilitate companies with cross-border aspects to opt for an appropriate 
corporate governance structure that would provide management efficiency, apt 
supervision and securing employee involvement rights.
284
 
 
Veracity and 
efficiency of 
the SE 
There is a substantial distinction due to the following aspects when the SE's reality 
and advancement is concerned: 
 
 
Activity areas 
Most SEs are functioning within the service sectors (especially banking and 
financial sector), while the manufacturing sector comprises only 7% of the total 
count. SE is frequently used by insurance and finance businesses group for 
regulatory issues i.e. computation of the solvency and capital ratios; the manner 
in which businesses operate within an SE having branches across Member 
States can be a befitting mechanism in this sector to restructure the group. It is 
interesting to note that most SEs are in fact shelf SEs.
285
 
Group reorganisation 
SE is a corporate entity opted by groups,
286
 and it holds the parent company 
position within the group.
287
 20% of the total of non-shelf SEs exists as 
subsidiaries. SE creation is equally brought about by creation of a subsidiary, 
creation of a joint subsidiary, merger and conversion. Instead of amalgamating 
previously sovereign companies, SE functions as an ingredient of a group 
strategy: for example, integration of corporate governance or simplification of 
group structure. 
Establishing SEs facilitates group restricting and decreases the number of legal 
entities, especially when an SE is created by cross-border merger. Nonetheless, 
decreasing the number of legal entities results in reduced margins of limited 
liability, which European groups find less appealing. Groups restructuring and 
reorganisation can also be made possible via cross-border mergers since the 
EU's adoption of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive.
288
 However, this aspect of 
group restructuring, and reorganisation of cross-border groups, is limited owing 
to disharmony in the insolvency, tax, intellectual property and competition fields. 
Relocating registered office 
Owing to a harmonised procedure, the SE Directive allows EU companies to 
transfer registered and head offices to another Member State, as this option 
was not available to domestic companies. The option to freely transfer its 
registered office across Member States is attractive for companies who wish to 
opt for a lenient or favourable legislation, and is arguably one of the reasons for 
forming an SE (as discussed previously) from the perspective of employee 
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involvement, corporate governance rules etc.  
UK, Luxembourg, France and Cyprus are the main chosen Member States to 
have the registered offices transferred. Furthermore, from a labour, tax and 
corporate governance perspective, the transfer of registered and head offices of 
the SEs in reality has advantaged Member States with an added flexible 
legislation. 
Safeguarding various stakeholders’ interests 
With respect to the adoption of the ECS, the major concern of any Member 
State was various stakeholders’ interests. Safeguarding these interests is 
normally in consideration of the policies pertinent to the SE with those of the 
national PLCs. However, sometimes bigger protection is provided to SE 
stakeholders owing to its global nature, as many Member States prohibit the 
cross-border transfer of national PLC's registered offices. Subsequently, 
Member States like Cyprus, Portugal and Germany provide greater level of 
stakeholder protection than UK, Luxembourg and Belgium, where greater 
interest is paid to shareholders. 
Harmonisation of corporate governance structure 
SE is less frequently chosen by companies within Member States as a tool for 
corporate governance structure's harmonisation. Since the SE provides that 
registered and head office must be in the same Member State, a cross-border 
group cannot exercise singular SE but must exercise the SEs in each Member 
State respectively, thereby leading to slight differences.  
i) Opting for efficient management system of corporate governance: 
SE provides added options for companies from Member States where only one 
corporate governance structure is available to PLCs. Respectively, the SE 
Directive has administered a starting point for corporate governance systems 
harmonisation across EU and efficient management notion. SE is far more 
accomplished in Member States like Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovakia, Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus and Czech Republic where one-
tier corporate governance structure is not available to national PLCs, compared 
to Spain, UK, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, where it is available. 
ii) Opting for proficient supervision system of corporate governance: 
Proficient supervision is provided for in both one-tier and two tier corporate 
governance structures in the SE Directive. However, the one-tier corporate 
governance structure is ambiguous owing to the lack of a clear definition from 
the EU. This leads to complexities in linking employee involvement with 
proficient supervision, especially when concerning administrative organ. 
Employee involvement 
The employee involvement negotiation procedure while creating an SE provides 
for bespoke solutions for companies concerned and the SE Directive's standard 
rules on negotiation grants employees’ substantial protection of their pre-
existing involvement rights before an SE is formed.
289
 This is even after the SE 
negotiation procedure is regarded as abundantly time consuming and 
ambiguous. Leaving aside situations where the employee involvement 
negotiation procedure appears complex or not tailored to situations like where 
shelf SEs are activated afterwards, substantial protection of employee rights is 
usually ensured. Certain SEs like shelf SEs are formed irrespective of the 
employee involvement negotiation procedure. On the face of it, this will not be in 
full compliance of the objectives of the ECS. 
 
Therefore, the SE Directive provides for EU cross-border groups to adjust their 
organisational formation and to choose a more appropriate corporate governance 
system that in return provides efficient management, proficient supervision and 
securing employee involvement rights.  
Table 7- Analysing ECS efficiency290 
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3.4 The SE as a positive driver to the EU market 
The SE is designed to play a substantial role in contributing positively to the EU 
single market and the European Social Model, by securing and augmenting 
employee involvement rights. The following factors can be identified to support this 
claim. 
 
3.4.1 Cross-border reorganisation 
The ECS offers a secure legal foundation for national companies within a Member 
State to ‘initiate cross-border restructurings of companies, e.g. establishment of joint 
ventures, establishment of European holdings and mergers’.291 The SE provides that 
there is no requirement for companies to establish a network of subsidiaries, which 
would have been governed by individual set of legislation in the Member State where 
it was created, thereby avoiding the practical and legal limitations which will arise 
from 28 different legislations. Companies can restructure and increase their 
operations on a cross-border level. Subsequently, SE will operate on a uniform 
governance structure, reporting system and management; this decreases 
administrative and legal costs substantially.292 Furthermore, relocation expenses are 
reduced further since relocating a registered and head office will not require an SE to 
conclude the company in one Member State and register again in another Member 
State.293 
 
3.4.2 One-tier and two-tier governance system 
One of the notable contributions of the SE Directive is that it allows the establishing 
companies to choose between one-tier and two-tier corporate governance 
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systems.294 This allows a company to opt for a system that best suits its nature and 
requirements and to introduce a similar corporate governance structure in all 
Member States. Under the two-tier corporate governance system, an SE can be 
created with a supervisory board and a management board; the one-tier corporate 
governance system combines supervisory board functions and management board 
functions into one administrative organ.295 
 
3.4.3 The option to freely transfer the SE’s registered office to a different Member 
State 
An SE’s registered office can be freely relocated to any Member State of more 
favourable location with respect to the SE‘s activities without compromising its 
corporate identity or being bound by creditors’ prior consent.296 Subsequently, the 
SE’s head office must be relocated to that Member State simultaneously, since both 
the registered office and head office should be in the same Member State.297 This is 
especially positive for the EU market: since the SE is regulated by the legislation of 
the Member State where it is registered, the Member State is under constant 
pressure to regularly advance their business environment so that the SE is deterred 
from moving to another Member State with more favourable legislation.  
 
3.4.4 Extension of employee involvement rights 
It is generally assumed that the SE Directive presents a uniform model for employee 
involvement, but in fact the SE Directive and the SE Regulation both focus on and 
encourage the negotiation procedure. An SNB comprising employee and 
management representatives have the task of successfully negotiating the policies of 
employee involvement for the SE in question. Representatives of both sides are 
autonomous in approving the terms of the agreement;298  if the negotiations are 
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inconclusive, standard rules will be applied to the agreement.299 These agreements 
normally include providing employee representatives with the power to influence 
decisions taken during board meetings, the company’s strategic development300 and 
often direct supervision.301 These employee representatives have the power to 
recommend, elect, appoint or dispute some or all of the members of the supervisory 
board and administrative board (provided these powers were conferred in the 
agreement for employee involvement rights during the negotiations procedure).  
 
The final report on the ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a 
European Company (SE)’ concluded that the ECS enhances domestic laws on 
employee involvement, and this enhancement is multi-faceted.302 The SE 
encourages codetermination within the Member States, and within the SNB there 
must be a proportional distribution of members with the total employees in the 
founding companies, establishments and subsidiaries in each Member State. Most of 
the SEs that were interviewed in this study asserted that the ‘SNB was a genuine 
team-building tool extending its advantages across the participating Member 
States.303 Furthermore, the SE’s corporate governance system implies that co-
determination is not limited to employees from the Member States with 
codetermination system; employees from all Member States may have board-level 
employee representation rights, subject to conditions mentioned previously in this 
chapter. This has been considered beneficial in EU group-wide structures, as the 
variety of representatives of a company from different Member States contributes to 
building ‘European employee consciousness’.304 This extension of employee 
involvement rights from an industrial relations outlook was a major step and a central 
advancement of employees’ rights. For the first time, a board-level employee 
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representation right on a cross-border level was considered. If a company within a 
Member State provided board-level representation rights to its employees, it could 
not deny them to its employees in another Member State.305 
 
Another positive characteristic of the ECS with respect to employee involvement is 
that it provides a choice of ‘downsizing the size of the supervisory board globalising 
employee involvement on such supervisory board, subsequently decreasing the 
trade union’s influence’ on the company’s operations and governance.306 This has 
been one of the driving factors to establish an SE, as it supposedly ‘increases the 
productivity of the working process of supervisory body’ – as demonstrated in Allianz 
SE, BASF SE and Fresenius SE.307 
 
3.4.5 Promoting European branding and EU business culture 
Opting for an SE gives the company a symbolic European branding and a European 
corporate identity. This, along with other positive drivers mentioned earlier, makes 
the SE an ‘ideal legal form for big international companies and small and medium-
sized enterprises as well (with respect to the option for employee participation and 
corporate governance / management system)’.308 The SE gives companies the 
option to restructure and uniformly administer their business throughout the Member 
States and without being restricted to the legal form of each Member State where the 
company is registered or operates. This would allow businesses to create 
subsidiaries and holding companies which would be capable of operating business in 
all Member States. Furthermore, since the bankruptcy, market regulations and tax 
aspects of a company are left for the laws of the Member State where an SE is 
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registered,309 there is a constant pressure on Member States to improve their 
business environment and simplify these aspects (as discussed earlier) to attract 
more companies to be established in their State or from deterring the SEs to move 
elsewhere.310 
 
3.4.6 Fostering cross-border communication  
The ECS fosters cross-border communication. It leaves most provisions to be 
interpreted by individual Member States. The creation of SE requires that many 
aspects will be dealt with by a Member State’s domestic legislation. Issues like “the 
national company law provisions on mergers of both (or all) of the companies 
involved govern the law of each of the merging companies,311 and with respect to 
employee participation, it is necessary to determine which law grants more 
protection”.312 Therefore, it is not only essential to communicate the application and 
‘implementation of the SE laws across the Member States, but also translation and 
communication of overall domestic company law provisions313 will increase’.314 
 
3.5 Tax neutrality 
The absence of any rules dealing with tax-related issues while setting up an SE has 
gathered mixed opinions. ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a 
European Company (SE)’ argues that this absence of any tax provision is one of the 
reasons that deters European groups of companies from forming an SE.315 The SE 
Regulation only provides that when the SEs transfer their registered office across the 
Member State there will be no extra tax incurred, but due to lack of any rules dealing 
with tax, the SEs are referred to domestic legislation. In practice, many Member 
States apply a ‘liquidation treatment that results in the taxation of the silent reserves 
and a complete disclosure, when an SE transfers its head office and registered office 
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outside their jurisdiction’.316 However, if the SE in question maintains a ‘permanent 
establishment’ in its earlier incorporating Member State, then the Member State 
cannot apply exit taxation.317 If ‘permanent establishment’ remains in the earlier 
incorporating Member State, then the SE by merger is tax neutral along with any 
Holding SE, Subsidiary SE and Transformation SE.318 Applying exit taxation may be 
likely in situations where an SE did not preserve a ‘permanent establishment’ in its 
earlier incorporating Member State and may be regarded as contradicting with the 
freedom of establishment, per ECJ decision in Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v 
Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie.319 A Member State was 
disallowed to apply exit taxation to an individual’s freedom of establishment right and 
minus needing an association to be maintained with the earlier incorporating 
Member State.320 The EC’s communication on ‘Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-
Border Situations’ on exit taxation asserted that a Member State must take 
measures ‘postponing the tax collection unconditionally until the gain is actually 
recognised’.321 By efficient organisational cooperation, an ‘exit state’s’ tax base can 
be protected.322 
On the other hand, Wenz submits that the SE has many tax advantages owing to its 
specific legal construction and its ability to transfer its registered office across 
Member States.323 Exercising a credit versus exemption system to avoid being 
doubly taxed internationally, and using a wide-ranging network of tax treaties is one 
of the positive aspects of the SE. Additionally, an SE may consider offsetting the 
costs of cross-border ‘permanent establishments’ and/or subsidiaries from profits 
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incurred by the respective SE in its registered Member State.324 SE is also 
advantageous for the avoidance or exercise of supplementary thin capitalisation 
provisions; transferring assets tax neutrally across Member States between various 
‘permanent establishments’; and minimising the tax burden of pending income and 
capital gains.325  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive background to the ECS and in that 
process, identified the existing narratives about the shortcomings and will continue in 
Chapter 7- Reviewing the European Company Statute in suggesting reforms to the 
ECS. The rationale being to dismiss the standard explanation of shortcomings and 
subsequently identifying novel solutions to those shortcomings.  
 
SE is still in its raw form, nonetheless, having the potential to augment greater 
harmonisation within the Member States’ company law, as analysed in Table 7- 
Analysing ECS efficiency326 and Section 3.4 The SE as a positive driver to the EU 
market327. Despite reviewing the SE Directive,328 the EC has not substantially 
worked towards making any revisions to it, but does accept that it is “essential in the 
future to work on improving the attractiveness of the SE Statute which could be a key 
factor towards increasing harmonisation between Member States”.329 This seems 
rather contradictory.  
 
The above evaluation of the functioning of the ECS indicates that ECS has in fact 
established the latest foundation for an appropriate system of employee involvement 
when considering Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union and the objectives of 
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the ECS. Nonetheless, the intended effect of a European social model by 
encouraging employee involvement and a revised corporate governance structure 
has been limited. This is considerable because of the shortcomings identified in 
Section 3.3 The efficiency of the SE Directive and the ECS is not comprehensive, as 
it fails to encompass other important aspects of EU Company Law (see, Section 3.5 
Tax neutrality). Thus, this has been the argued as a deterrent for the European 
groups of companies from forming an SE.330 Further, the frequent reference by the 
SE Directive to the laws of the Member States for certain provisions makes it under-
enforced, for example, as seen with the interests of creditors’ and minority 
shareholders’.331 The mere figure of 2,757 SEs established in the last decade since 
the ECS came into force puts these shortcomings into perspective. 
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CHAPTER 4- LESSONS FROM THE GERMAN MODEL OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is widely defined as ‘the methods by which finance suppliers 
to corporations guarantee themselves of getting a yield on their investment’.332 
Corporate governance has historically been perceived to focus either on maximising 
shareholders’ value or recognising the interests of certain stakeholders. There is no 
common definition of corporate governance; there are many types and it has been 
said ‘there are as many corporate governance structures as there are nations’.333 
This global variation in corporate governance is also reflected in the level of board-
level employee representation of corporations.334 Countries like Germany, France 
and Japan have been considered as “humane versions of capitalism or stakeholder 
capitalism”, as they have strong employee representation rights in their corporate 
governance structures.335  
 
Employees’ representation at board level is now a fundamental aspect of corporate 
governance in the EU. EU legislators have been moving in the direction of social 
welfare. The EU has made two major attempts to establish an appropriate single 
corporate governance model: first, by the introduction of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate 
Governance; and secondly, by introducing the SE as a new EU company form. Since 
the 2008 financial crisis, governments, analysts and legal scholars in the EU and the 
US have begun to examine corporate governance afresh, particularly to establish the 
roots of the financial turbulences.336  
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For the purpose of this research and this chapter, Germany’s model of corporate 
governance will be analysed in detail. The prime reason for studying the German 
model of corporate governance is that it has had considerable economic success 
arguably because of its corporate governance system. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) reports Germany’s gross domestic product (GDP) for 2015 to be $3.473 
trillion, which is Europe’s largest economy.337 Germany’s GDP value represents 
6.21% of the world economy.338 The German model of corporate governance has 
been regarded as the model for the rest of the EU, especially with regard to its works 
councils and co-determination.339 This chapter will analyse how the German model 
has influenced the issue of employee involvement in EU corporations. Germany's 
position provides a prominent example of board-level employee representation 
(quasi-parity board representation of companies with more than 2000 workers). A 
company is managed by employee representatives, in addition to the directors 
appointed by the shareholders, and there is an inclination towards stakeholder value 
rather than shareholders’ value. The German situation demonstrates that board-level 
employee representation reduces company-employee agency costs. This chapter 
will argue that an ideal corporate governance system (as implemented in Germany) 
effectively mitigates agency conflicts by increasing efficiency and promoting the 
normative goal of cumulative social welfare. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the German model will be studied. The study of 
German corporate governance of its employees may provide lessons to deal with 
the governance, economic and social issues for the rest of the EU. The German 
'Mitbestimmung' (codetermination) might provide an ideal framework for board-
level employee representation, which, if applied uniformly across Member States, 
will help to encourage employee involvement.  
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4.2 Models of corporate governance   
The two most prominent models of corporate governance are the Anglo-American 
model and the German model. They differ substantially and provide different 
solutions to corporate governance issues: for example, innovation and oversight, 
crisis management, and shareholder activism. They also differ in the risk oversight 
they supply to more strategic topics like board composition, including employee 
involvement and corporate strategy.340 
The Anglo-American model of corporate governance is a ‘pure liberal model’.341 The 
model applies principles of capitalism and liberalism. Thus, the Anglo-American 
model has a dominant CEO in a single board, which governs the company and is 
primarily concerned with maximising shareholder value.342 
 
 
Figure 1- Anglo-American model343 
 
The German model, on the other hand, is based on the concept of ‘industrial 
partnerships’.344 It includes a principle of social responsibility by taking into account 
the interests of stakeholders (including employees) as well as maximising 
shareholder value. The German model provides unambiguous and set board level 
employee representation rights, making employees key stakeholders in the 
management of a company. The number of employee representatives depends on 
the size of the company (quasi-parity board representation of companies with more 
than 2000 workers). 
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Figure 2- German model345 
 
In the German corporate governance system, social responsibility is embedded at 
the very core of a company’s legal definition.  Article 14 (2) of the German Federal 
Constitution promotes the philosophy of a ‘social market’ and the ‘social governance 
of markets’346; it provides that ‘property demands responsibilities and its usage 
should also function for the public wealth.’347 This model is thus instrumental in 
achieving the objectives of the EU’s ‘social model’. 
 
4.3 Dualistic board structure 
There are two corporate governance systems in the EU: a monistic board structure 
and a dualistic board structure. These structures are the major features 
distinguishing one corporate governance system from another. The monistic board 
structure has a single board of directors (administrative organ), which governs the 
company. The dualistic board structure has a management board (governing the 
company) and the supervisory board (monitoring and governing the management 
board). The supervisory board can also appoint and terminate the management.348 
 
Before the introduction of the SE, companies relied on the domestic legal rules that 
would determine the type of corporate governance systems in each Member State. 
Figure 3- Monistic and dualistic board structure map of EU below depicts the main 
corporate governance systems now prevalent in each Member State. Member States 
like Ireland, the UK and Greece have a strong monistic board structure and in 
                                                          
345
 D Hummel, ‘The Corporate Governance of Banks- Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis’ 
(2013) Universität Potsdam 180. 
346
 JE Dixon, Responses to Governance: Governing Corporations, Societies and the World (Praeger 
2003) 93. 
347
 AD Clarke, ‘German Corporate Governance Provision For Employees: Lessons For Australia?’ 
(2006) 10 Southern Cross University Law Review 7. 
348
 AF Conard, ‘Comparative Law: The Supervision of Corporate Managements: A Supervision of 
Developments in European Community and United States Law’ (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 
1459. 
77 
Member States like Netherlands, Germany and Austria dualistic board structures are 
more prevalent. However, Member States like Belgium, France, Finland, Hungary, 
Italy Spain and Portugal leave it to the discretion of individual companies to choose 
between the two corporate governance systems. 
 
Figure 3- Monistic and dualistic board structure map of EU 
 
The dualistic board structure is a paradigm of stakeholder theory in corporate 
governance. According to this paradigm, a company must seek to do more than 
maximise shareholder value; a company belongs also to all its stakeholders: 
employees, suppliers, creditors, customers and indeed government. Viable 
economic governance can be achieved by taking into account the interest of all the 
stakeholders.349  
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The dualistic board structure and board-level employee representation are two 
prominent features of German corporate governance. The German corporate 
governance structure provides that the shareholders elect the supervisory board 
members who are detached from the management board.350 The structure is mostly 
evident in AG / Aktiengesellschaft (public limited company).  
 
The dualistic board structure is convoluted. Structural issues mostly stem from 
tensions between social independence and industrialisation, as the supervisory 
board consists of employee representatives who have their own agenda, which does 
not always necessarily align with that of the company.351 This explains why 
stakeholder theory is not universally acceptable: it provokes property rights 
objections and raises the possibility of stakeholders abusing their position and 
disregarding a company’s objectives to serve their own interests (as discussed in 
Chapter 2- Justifying Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance).352 
 
4.4 Codetermination: An ideal corporate governance feature of the EU 
Legal scholars regard German codetermination as a ‘model’ for the EU. It is 
‘extensive and involves employee involvement in almost entire company policies’.353 
Lahovary quotes Overbeck354 in providing a condensed definition of codetermination: 
‘a structured employee involvement or by their representatives in formulating 
company’s objectives and decision-making’.355  
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German law provides that ‘employees have control rights via supervisory board356 
over corporate assets and they oversee the management board’357 (participating in 
decision-making duties, appointing executive directors, setting salaries etc.).358 
Germany has legally embodied codetermination in its corporate governance in the 
following acts: (i) Act on the Co-determination of Employees in the Supervisory 
Boards and Boards of the Mining and Iron-Steel Industry 1951; (ii) Works Council 
Constitution Act 1952; (iii) Works Council Constitution Act 1972; (iv) Codetermination 
Act 1976; and (v) One Third Participation Act 2004. 
 
The Iron, Coal and Steel Codetermination Act of 1951 provide that the composition 
of the supervisory board includes the same number of employee representatives and 
shareholders, along with one neutral member as a vote tie-breaker. Also, on the 
management board there is an employee director. 
 
The Works Council Constitution Act 1952 specifies that there will be one-third 
employee representation on the supervisory board if a company has more than 500 
employees, but fewer than 2000 employees. It also identifies the companies that are 
exempt from codetermination. These include family-owned stock companies with 
fewer than 500 employees; companies within the media sector; and companies that 
follow educational, labour movement, political, artistic, religious or charitable 
interests, or companies with similar interests.  
 
The Codetermination Act 1976 lays down provisions for equal representation on the 
supervisory board for shareholders and employees for companies with more than 
2000 employees. The management board includes one employee director and the 
supervisory board’s chairperson is appointed from the shareholders’ representative 
who acts as an additional voting tie-breaker.359 Codetermination functions at 
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workplace level, plant level and company level; employees can be involved through 
works councils, the management board and the supervisory board.360 
 
German companies mostly consider codetermination as a positive factor for a 
company’s success. The following table shows that there is considerable support for 
codetermination at board-level among German private shareholders or investors and 
executives of companies with one-third codetermination. A survey by Financial 
Times Deutschland also highlighted that companies like Adidas, TUI, Volkswagen, 
and Deutsche Telekom were in favour of codetermination.361 However, there are 
mixed views with executives of larger companies with parity or equal 
codetermination (for example, Commerzbank, SAP).362  
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Target people Findings 
German private shareholders 
/ investors 
63% consider codetermination as an advantage
.363
 
Executives of companies 
with parity / equal 
codetermination 
38% consider codetermination as a disadvantage.
364
 
34% consider codetermination as an advantage.
 365
 
Executives of companies 
with one-third 
codetermination 
57% consider codetermination as an advantage.
366
 
19% consider codetermination as a disadvantage.
367
 
Executives of medium-sized 
companies on negative 
factors for their firm
368
 
18% consider external union representatives to be a negative 
factor.
369
 
15% consider works councils to be a negative factor.
370
 
82% consider high non-wage labour costs to be a negative factor.
371
 
84% consider bureaucracy to be a negative factor.
372
 
Table 8- Survey on co-determination373 
 
However, codetermination in its current form may be outdated or require major 
revisions. The Federation of German Industry (BDI) and Confederation of German 
Employers' Associations (BDA) rejected a positive report on codetermination by 
Biedenkopf-Kommission II (commission set by the German government) for the 
following reasons:374 (i) a board’s decision-making process gets obstructed and 
decelerated by codetermination; (ii) Many large companies consider codetermination 
as blunting Germany’s competitive edge on international financial markets;375 and 
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(iii) codetermination is often considered an obstacle by companies involved in cross-
border mergers.376 
 
Research scholars, academics and economists have also reached mixed 
conclusions on the viability of codetermination and its effect on business 
performance. A number of studies have come out in support of codetermination as a 
positive contributor to company success. Kraft and Stank’s research established that 
codetermination had a positive effect on company’s innovation with one-third board 
level employee representation.377 Kraft and Ugarkovic’s research concluded that 
companies with one-third board level employee representation had a positive equity 
return for their shareholders.378 Renaud writes that a company with one-third board 
level employee representation yields more profit.379 Rogers and Streeck maintain 
that ‘as a result of temporary veto given to employees under codetermination, 
German company’s management is protected from constricted, temporary reactions 
to market signals and making them avoid financial blunders by losing reflection’.380 
Other studies that support codetermination say that it is positive for a company's 
efficiency on awarding dividends and market value, e.g. Fauver and Fuerst (2006),381 
Frick and Bermig (2009),382 Debus (2010),383 and Balsmeier et al. (2011).384  
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Freeman and Lazear claimed that codetermination has increased job security in 
Germany.385 The unemployment rate at the time of their research in Germany was 
8.2% in 1995.386 The current unemployment rate in Germany is 5.2%.387 The lower 
unemployment rate at the time in comparison with other Member States in the EU, 
and a further drop in two decades supports their conclusion. 
 
Other studies have less positive conclusions. Gorton and Schmid do not completely 
dismiss the positivity of codetermination but suggest that parity level board 
representation destroys firm value in comparison with one-third board level 
employee representation.388 FitzRoy and Kraft in ‘Economic Effects of 
Codetermination’ (1993) concluded that a German company's productivity and 
profitability is negatively affected by codetermination, where employee 
representation is half of the board composition.389 But, their next research over a 
decade later, ‘Co-determination and efficiency’ (2005), concluded that 
codetermination has no substantial adverse effects on German companies’ 
productivity.390  
 
Similarly, Bohren and Strøm in ‘The value-creating board: Theory and evidence’ 
(2005) claimed that codetermination has a negative effect on the company’s 
efficiency,391 but Strøm in ‘Better Firm Performance with Employees on the Board? 
Not in the Long Run’ (2007) had almost a positive conclusion.392 
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Looking across all these studies, it is difficult to establish a clear correlation between 
employee involvement and a company’s economic success because research 
conducted at different times, in different economic climates, will yield different 
results.  
 
Some studies suggest that employee representation allows employees to influence 
the management of a company positively. Gorton and Schmid, for example, 
conceptualise codetermination as the effective cooperation in running a company 
between equity capital suppliers and suppliers of employees.393 They also suggest 
that codetermination allows employees to monitor management, who do not always 
act in the outside shareholders’ best interests. Employees can also safeguard their 
interests against the possibility of shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour.394 
Employee involvement in German companies encourages dialogue, thereby 
ensuring that employees’ interests are articulated and conflict is handled in an 
organised manner. Codetermination rights increase employees’ power: employees 
are well placed to facilitate the cooperative authority applied by management and the 
board’s inspiration to protect the influence of shareholders.395 Employees also have 
a dominant negotiating position over rents-related decisions, as they have the right 
to veto over working hours.396  
 
Some objections to codetermination have been raised. Owing to strong employees’ 
power under codetermination rights, for example, management boards are often 
antagonistic about codetermination, but there have never been serious attempts to 
revise the Works Council Constitution Act 1972. This could be due to the net 
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economic benefits of joint decision-making.397 Ziegler identifies this factor to be a 
reflection of ‘radical workplace democracy’ and ‘constitutionalism’.398  
 
Notwithstanding this, codetermination may introduce some agency problems that it 
was meant to mitigate; as employees may further their interests of maximising their 
salary rather than the company’s stock value, and a situation will be created where 
monitors need monitoring.399  
 
That being said, apart from a few objections (for example, property right objections 
and potential agency costs), codetermination remains the most important feature of 
the German corporate governance system. It may be a significant contributor to 
Germany becoming the world's richest country400 by 2030, as predicted by Dirk 
Heilmann’s book ‘Fat Years: Why Germany has a Brilliant Future’.401 
 
It is difficult to assess the economic effects of codetermination empirically in 
countries other than Germany. Clarke suggests that codetermination has not been 
adopted by the ‘Anglo-American model or other models because the economic 
effects of codetermination cannot be empirically checked and cross-checked’.402 
Clarke quotes Gerum and Wagner to suggest that ‘it is enormously difficult for the 
supervisory board to check codetermination’s economic effect empirically as almost 
all large German corporations have codetermination, thus there is no way to 
compare companies with and without codetermination’.403 Due to the ‘substantial 
influence of company size on productivity, comparison with small companies would 
be futile’.404 Comparing codetermination internationally is not easy because of the 
‘doubt that other institutional and economic factors may well be influencing the 
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comparison of codetermination’s efficiency (i.e. trade union’s economic rationality, 
employees’ high usual qualifications, exchange rate, social culture, GDP)’.405 These 
arguments conclusively assert that it is difficult to assess the economic effects of 
codetermination empirically, but there has been indication so far that it has a positive 
impact on the economic performance of companies in Germany. Therefore, this in 
conjunction with the social rationales for codetermination serves as an ideal model 
for the debate about employee involvement in the EU context.  
 
4.5 Minimal agency costs in German corporate governance model 
Conflicts of interest between company players have been denoted by economists as 
'agency problems' or 'principal-agent' problems.406 Company law in Germany 
operates to manage these conflicts of interest. The key documents are:407 (i) the 
German Corporate Governance Code (Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex); (ii) 
the German Stock Corporation Act 1965 (Aktiengesetz); (iii) the Civil Code of 
Germany (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch); and (iv) the Codetermination Act 1976 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz). 
The measures taken by Germany have created a corporate governance structure 
that, if adopted across the EU, can mitigate agency costs. 
 
An agency relationship can be any contractual relationship, under which one or more 
individuals (agent) undertakes the performance of services to another (principal).408 
Any agency relationship can lead to agency costs. An agency cost can be described 
as 'the totality of the agent’s bonding expenditures, principal’s monitoring 
expenditures and the residual loss'.409 Agency costs are incurred when the 
shareholders’ objectives and that of the management do not align; where there is 
information asymmetry between the shareholders and the management; where there 
is divergence of control; and finally, where there is separation of control and 
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ownership.410 Germany’s financial market is inescapably affected by the corporate 
governance system of its companies. Therefore, its dualistic board corporate 
governance system is designed to reduce the agency costs between the company 
players.411 
The type of agency costs incurred largely depends on the ownership structure of the 
company: (i) agency costs are increased by non-managing shareholders; (ii) external 
managers incur huge agency costs; (iii) if banks monitor the company then the 
agency costs are significantly lower; and (iv) agency costs differ inversely with 
directors' ownership share.412  
 
In addition, agency costs are minimal in a family-owned company. In contrast, a 
public limited company in Germany (AG / Aktiengesellschaft) potentially raises 
managerial agency costs to shareholders, for example,  
 
“...by pushing managers to choose strategies that they and employees, but not 
shareholders, prefer. This is based on another German firm assumption that 
‘managers have a well-known propensity to expand firms in ways that do not benefit 
shareholders, but rather favour themselves (and incumbent employees).”413 
 
A German company, like any other, has a single legal personality but various organs: 
first, the executive directors who manage the company; second, the non-executive 
directors who supervise the management; and third, shareholders who own the 
company. Although employee representatives (supervisory board) and the directors 
(management board) have the potential to incur agency costs (for the reasons 
discussed in Section 4.4 Codetermination: An ideal corporate governance feature of 
the EU), German corporate governance tends to focus on two major agency 
problems: shareholders and the management; and majority shareholders and the 
minority shareholders.414  
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The first agency problem dealt by the German corporate governance is between the 
shareholders and the management.415 The basic concept is that if shareholders own 
the shares in the company and the management employed by them manages the 
company, then the management will potentially do what is in the company’s best 
interests, and subsequently to the benefit of the shareholders. The dilemma lies in 
promising that the management (agents) are receptive to the shareholders’ 
(principal) best interests, as opposed to seeking their own personal gains.416 Clarke 
argues that, in Germany, “managers have a well-known propensity to expand firms 
in ways that do not benefit shareholders, but rather favour themselves (and 
incumbent employees).”417 Due to the marginal contribution to a company's 
performance by its shareholders, which is hard to measure, the governance system 
typically distributes residual control to the shareholders.  
 
The second agency costs can arise between the majority shareholders (agents) and 
the minority shareholders (principals).418 Agency costs can be incurred when the 
minority shareholders are advantaged from their power to veto management 
decisions.419 Similarly, majority shareholders can influence directors’ decisions (as 
they possess appointment / removal rights) that may affect the minority 
shareholders’ interests. Thus, minority shareholders’ rights may be compromised 
and interests restricted by the directors under the influence of the majority 
shareholders.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
policies in company dealings. UK economists and legislators are more interested in reforming the 
national governance structure: (i) to minimise the agency costs between primarily the management 
and the shareholders; and (ii) restrict the management’s power for company's best interest. If the 
shareholders’ body is considerably weak, then the directors become too controlling and subsequently 
decisions cannot be coordinated due to this dispersed nature. If directors do perform their 
responsibilities well or in in alignment with the interest of the shareholders then it becomes hard to 
exercise removal rights to remove the directors as the majority vote is problematic to coordinate. 
Additionally, the majority shareholders and minority shareholders agency costs will be considerably 
lower in reality as the shareholders’ majority will all be some kind of minority since they are all 
dispersed and have problems in coordinating with each other. 
415
 Armour et al., 'Agency Problems and Legal Strategies' in R Kraakman and others (eds), The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (3
rd
 edn, Oxford University 
Press 2017) 35-54. 
416
 Ibid. 
417
 AD Clarke, ‘German Corporate Governance Provision For Employees: Lessons For Australia?’ 
(2006) 10 Southern Cross University Law Review 20. 
418
 Armour et al., 'Agency Problems and Legal Strategies' in R Kraakman and others (eds), The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (3
rd
 edn, Oxford University 
Press 2017) 35-54. 
419
 Ibid. 
89 
 
German corporate governance plays a substantial role in minimising these agency 
costs. With respect to the shareholders and the management agency costs, there 
are three main approaches designed to mitigate these costs: (i) shareholders 
exercising the appointment and removal rights for the directors; (ii) subjecting 
directors to legal accountabilities, which obliges them to apply their discretion in the 
interest of the shareholders; and (iii) organising the incentives of the members of the 
board, thus motivating them to further the interest of the shareholders.420  
 
The German corporate governance model observes two legal strategies when 
addressing agency problems: governance strategies and regulatory strategies. 
Governance strategies streamline principals' control over the behaviour of the agents 
and their effectiveness relies on the principals' proficiency to exercise their control 
rights. Regulatory strategies have rigid characteristics and command substantive 
terms that manage the agent-principal relationship by limiting the agent's behaviour. 
Regulatory strategies rely on the capacity of an external authority (e.g. regulatory 
bodies or the court) to determine whether an agent discharged their designated 
duties.421  
 
The tables below list the six governances and four regulatory strategies for 
protecting principals: 
 Appointment 
Rights 
Decision-making 
Rights 
Agent 
Incentives 
Ex Ante Selection Initiation Trusteeship 
Ex Post Removal Veto Reward 
Table 9- Governance strategies for principal’s protection422 
 
 Agent constraints Affiliation terms 
Ex Ante Rules Entry 
Ex Post Standards Exit 
Table 10- Regulatory strategies for principal’s protection423 
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Furthermore, ‘governance structures’ together with 'executive compensation' serves 
to mitigate agency costs by safeguarding shareholders’ best interests and confirming 
the principal-agent-interest association.424 Directors’ liability also minimises agency 
problems by coordinating shareholder interests with directors’ inducements (although 
it has been argued that directors’ liability is relatively less effective in limiting 
directors' activities).425   
 
When dealing with the majority-minority shareholders relationship, Davis et al. 
suggest that the match between ownership structure and minority shareholders 
protection has weakened considerably.426 However, corporate governance systems 
across the EU have recognised that minority shareholders’ statutory protection is an 
established policy to encourage external investment.427 A functional governance 
mechanism secures minority shareholders’ board level representation, making it 
possible for minority shareholders to be well aware of a board’s actions and 
persuade the board to acknowledge their interests as well.428 For example, minority 
shareholders in German companies have been progressively and emphatically 
exercising their rights to challenge board resolutions that may potentially be 
unfavourable to their interests.429 Similarly, Italy now gives minority shareholders the 
right to elect a director on to a listed company's board. Model legal restrictions on the 
majority shareholders’ capacity to expropriate minority shareholders should increase 
the price at which shares may be traded to minority shareholders, consequently 
minimising the cost of external equity capital for companies.430 
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Disclosure is also another significant aspect of German corporate governance that 
helps reducing agency costs. It exposes possibly challenging transactions, thus 
dispensing information to the potential litigants for legal proceedings and can also be 
purposeful on to decision-making rights on the board.431 
 
Lastly, the financial accounting system can further mitigate agency costs.432 
Financial accounting in corporate governance provides creditors, shareholders and 
external directors with substantial information for monitoring the management.433 If 
the information asymmetries between the management directors, external directors, 
creditors, shareholders and other stakeholders are left unmonitored, then the 
management may be drawn into withholding information that is damaging to their 
personal interests (for example, taking private perks, suppressing information 
suggesting inadequate performance).  
 
Corporate governance systems must also to ‘a certain extent’ recognise the interests 
of business parties and other stakeholders, in addition to the two major agency 
issues discussed above.434 Agency costs can be incurred between the company and 
these stakeholders (creditors, employees, or the community), because it is hard to 
guarantee that the company (agent) does not operate opportunistically towards its 
principals (for example by expropriating creditors or exploiting employees).435 The 
stress has been put on the phrase 'to a certain extent' as an ideal corporate 
governance structure does not or should not completely recognise business parties 
and stakeholders rights: the purpose of the company could be defeated by putting 
the interests of business parties and stakeholders before the company’s interests.  
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Additionally, it can be argued that there are already sufficient functional laws and 
governance mechanisms in place to protect these stakeholders. Employees and 
creditors are well provided with contractual guarantees; over time they can 
renegotiate higher security. Shareholders, in contrast, buy shares minus any 
contractual guarantees of increasing returns and while they remain shareholders 
they are 'stuck with their deal'.436 Further, the following protection is provided under 
the EU Directives: (i) capital maintenance policies (when in risk of debt default then 
limiting a company’s control to dispose of their assets); (ii) minimum share capital 
requirements mandated by law;437 (iii) the obligation of consolidated accounts, when 
companies transfer assets to the disadvantage of the creditors;438 (iv) disclosure 
obligations (this helps creditors to establish a company’s credibility);439 and (v) 
protecting the creditors when two companies form a merger as the initial debtors are 
lost.440  
 
Management policies to protect creditors are underdeveloped in any corporate 
governance system, as their interests are well safeguarded at a general level by the 
board's obligation to further the company's interests, short of liquidation.441  
 
4.6 The influence of blockholding in German corporate governance model 
Blockholders are dominant across companies worldwide and can be simply defined 
as any shareholder who owns at least 5% of a company’s common stock.442 In 
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Germany, blockholding is also a mechanism for mitigating agency costs between the 
management and the shareholders. The corporate governance system is established 
on ‘block’, in contrast with shared ownership. In stock-market-based economies, 
external block shareholders are regarded as monitors of the management board; this 
is more prevalent in governance systems like Germany in comparison with the UK or 
the Anglo-American model of governance.443 Blockholding principally involves the 
banks, such that several companies cultivate a main bank relationship.444 Clarke 
notes that 18/20 German companies which have stock market capitalisation over 
$500 million have blockholders owning more than 20% of the stock.445 Scholars have 
yet to establish whether the calculated advantages and costs of large blocks held by 
various shareholders are detrimental or beneficial to German companies.446 Some 
have suggested that blockholdings a vital indicator of an insider-based or closed 
financial market. 
 
Blockholding and codetermination are historically related. Codetermination was a 
‘social and political reaction to blockholding’.447 Codetermination establishes a 
balance of power on a supervisory board by delegating half the seats to employee 
representatives, thus limiting the influence of blockholding.  
 
4.7 Works Councils: An alternative to trade unions  
Employee representation in the private sector of German corporate governance 
through elected works councils began in 1950s and now is very common in German 
private companies. Employee representation rights are not only ‘exercised in 
national works council organisations, but in more than 1,000 European Works 
councils that represent more than 18 million employees’.448 This representation was 
mainly found at the establishment level, as trade unions were predominantly active 
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at industry level.449 Works councils deal with matters that directly affect the 
employees and do not represent directors’ or employers’ interests.450 Private sector 
companies with five employees or more are legally required to set up a works 
council.451 The election procedure for works councils, its composition and rules are 
governed by law. The Works Council Constitution Act 1972 provides the works 
council’s roles, and guarantees that they are now a crucial part of the German 
industrial relations landscape.452 A works council’s objective is to function in a way 
that is beneficial for both the management and the employees; it is required to work 
in a spirit of mutual trust with management.453  
 
Works councils have rights of information, codetermination and participation 
bestowed upon them by law. The type of issue in question establishes the strength 
of these rights.454 Gaugler and Wiltz identify three key areas where works councils 
have the right to make submissions:455 (i) development and training measures; (ii) 
making and implementation of employment planning; and (iii) vocational training.  
 
Companies that ignore the works council’s rights can be legally forbidden by an 
injunction from putting their business decisions into effect. Works councils have a 
legal right to information concerning:456 (i) the appointment of executives; (ii) the 
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working environment; (iii) health and safety; (iv) work organisation; and (v) 
organisational changes that could potentially be detrimental to the employees. 
 
Furthermore, works councils have participation rights on the following matters:457 (i) 
veto rights on specific employee movements; (ii) information rights on financial 
matters and changes; and (iii) codetermination rights on social and employees’ 
matters.  
 
Works councils have codetermination rights on any resolutions concerning:458 (i) the 
company pension; (ii) profit-sharing; (iii) saving schemes; (iv) working hours; (v) 
vacations; (vi) job evaluation and appraisals; (vii)hiring, promotion and dismissal 
policies; (viii) grievance handling; (ix) training; (x) conduct of employees; and (xi) any 
employment terms that do not include industrial agreement between the employers’ 
association and the relevant unions.  
 
In the event of a disagreement, works councils must negotiate with the 
management.459 If an agreement cannot be reached, the law requires the 
negotiations have a waiting period of a month after which the management can 
implement its decision. Unlike trade unions which strike to pressurise the 
management to meet their objectives, works councils must take unresolved conflicts 
to courts. This ensures that conflicts are resolved in a fashion that does not 
disregard the company’s interests, in the way that a trade union strike does.460  
 
It is interesting that information, participation and codetermination rights can be 
considered by the management but it is not mandatory for them to make it 
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applicable.461 Many of the information, participation and codetermination rights are 
repetitive and these rights do not allow employee representatives to make absolute 
business decisions; these rights are retained by the management exclusively.462  
 
However, if mutual cooperation exists between management and works council, then 
the works council may function as a valuable connection and resolve perilous 
situations before they worsen, thus exhibiting a collectivist and centralising 
tendency.463 Works councils may also accomplish systematic working terms and 
standards in operations.464 On the other hand, the rights provided under works 
councils can ‘generate complications too in management’s daily business 
operations, managerial questions and other sectors which demand cooperation’.465 
 
After the financial crisis of 2008, works councils must now be consulted on the 
company’s investors’ objectives and notify them of the effect of any potential 
takeovers.466 Additionally, trade unions have attempted to connect state employment 
programmes into works councils to minimise job losses; an employee who loses their 
job can secure employment elsewhere in the company by ‘specially aimed training 
measures’.467 
 
The significance of learning from German works councils is that they represent 
employees’ interests effectively at an establishment level, as trade unions are more 
functional at an industry level. It seems obvious that the adoption of the EWC 
Directive was based on the success of works councils in Germany. 
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4.8 Management accountability 
One of the foremost advantages of the German corporate governance is 
management accountability. This is because German banks can hold ‘enormous 
blocks of stock and accordingly delegate their representatives on the governing 
board, who can influence corporate decision-making’.468 An enduring relationship is 
developed between the management and the bank representatives; and the 
management takes a view that bank representatives have the company’s best 
interest in mind to have a long-term relationship and expect profits. This is contrary 
to the view that shareholders have ‘little loyalty’ to the company like ‘an anonymous 
monolith’.469 
 
4.9 Enhanced auditing systems 
Inadequacy of systematic dialogue between the internal auditors, the audit 
committee and the external auditors470 is an example of a flawed or ineffective 
auditing system and can be a substantial cause for a company’s downfall. Cioffi 
correctly notes on the general issue of a flawed auditing system: 
 
“Management controlled the auditing and disclosure of firm finances. The imbalance 
of power between supervisory and management boards was so great that managers 
engaged in a fairly common practice of providing supervisory board members with 
the auditor's report on the corporation's finances at the meeting in which they were to 
approve it ± and then collecting the report at the end of the meeting, ostensibly to 
preserve the confidentiality of the information it contained. This practice effectively 
kept the firm's finances confidential from the supervisory board as well and resulted 
in the rubber-stamping of the accounts.”471 
 
Enron's failure in the U.S. revealed that there were conflicts of interest involved in its 
corporate auditing.472 This led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
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U.S. to minimise any such future conflicts. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act focused on 
safeguarding investors by enhancing the accuracy and dependability of company 
disclosures made per the securities laws.473 Similarly, the UK corporate governance 
system may be currently flawed in that the rules allow a management board to 
appoint and dismiss their auditors, thereby creating a potential for interest 
conflicts.474 
 
Assuring systematic dialogue between the internal auditors, the audit committee and 
the external auditors ensures the absence of loopholes in substantiation of revenues, 
assets, expenses and liabilities, risk monitoring and compliance coverage in its 
entirety.475 Germany’s corporate governance serves as an example of such a 
systematic communication and the dualistic board structure in Germany allows the 
supervisory board to balance and control corporate management. For instance, 
section 5.3.3 of the German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex) requires that: 
 
“The Supervisory Board shall set up an Audit Committee which, in particular, handles 
the monitoring of the accounting process, the effectiveness of the internal control 
system, risk management system and internal audit system, the audit of the Annual 
Financial Statements, here in particular the independence of the auditor, the services 
rendered additionally by the auditor, the issuing of the audit mandate to the auditor, 
the determination of auditing focal points and the fee agreement, and - unless 
another committee is entrusted therewith - compliance.”476 
 
                                                          
473
 T Glaub, ‘Lessons from Germany: Improving on the U.S. Model for Corporate Governance’ (2009) 
5 (2) International Law & Management Review 239. 
474
 KJ Hopt and PC Leyens, ‘Board Models in Europe: Recent Developments of Internal Corporate 
Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy’ (2004) European 
Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper No. 18 <http://ssrn.C<lIn/abstract=487944> accessed 
10 October 2015. 
475
 ‘Long-Form Audit Report in Germany: Audit Regulatory Committee’ (Federal Ministry of Justice, 3 
March 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/committees/pres1-03-03-11_en.pdf> 
10 October 2015. 
476
 ‘German Corporate Governance Code’ (Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance 
Kodex) <http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cg_code_germany_24jun2014_en.pdf> accessed 10 
October 2015. 
99 
The management board is required to prepare the consolidated financial statements, 
which are subsequently examined by the auditors and the supervisory board.477 The 
auditors also participate in the supervisory board’s discussions on the consolidated 
financial statements, annual financial statements and reports on the essential results 
of their audit.478 Further, the law requires that the external auditors must provide the 
supervisory board with a ‘long-form report’.479 In comparison with a general auditor's 
report, a long-form report comprehensively recapitulates the audit’s significant 
findings on the associated monitoring systems and going concern assumption, 
irregularities encountered, ‘window dressing’ dealings, material disclosures, 
application of accounting methods, and future developments and risks facing the 
company.480 
Therefore, the German corporate governance system can be considered much more 
effective because the dualistic board structure provides that the audit is ‘completely 
and exclusively’ dealt with by the supervisory board.481 This aspect allows: (i) direct 
submission of the audit reports to the supervisory board; (ii) confidentiality of the 
auditors’ report; and (iii) the auditors’ participation in annual accounts approval 
meetings.  
  
4.10 Conclusion 
There is an ambiguity to ascertain whether there is a strong connection between a 
company’s economic success and employee involvement. This has been confirmed 
in various study conclusions in Section 4.4 Codetermination: An ideal corporate 
governance feature of the EU, Table 4- Detrimental effect of employee 
involvement482 and Table 5- Neutral effect of employee involvement483. Also, the 
simple fact that all these studies have been conducted in different economic climates 
in the past few decades have yielded different conclusions. 
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Nonetheless, this chapter has demonstrated the strengths of the German model of 
corporate governance, especially the dualistic board structure and board-level 
employee representation which subsequently results in increasing the company’s 
efficiency and its market value. This is in concurrence with the findings in previous 
Table 3- Advantageous effect of employee involvement484 and the absence of any 
serious attempts to revise the German codetermination laws. The German model 
case study provides that board-level employee representation facilitates a 
dependable channel of information flow, thereby improving the decision-making 
process. Involving employees’ in the preliminary stages of decision-making on 
significant matters helps limit criticism and encourages acceptance within the 
workforce, as it is arguable that executive board directors cannot assimilate all 
pertinent information that is required to execute decision-making on significant 
matters. The German model is coherently structed in comparison with other 
contemporary and complex economic models where the information flow is 
extensively dispersed.  
 
The discussions in this chapter also evidences that Germany is one Member State 
that has positively established the corporate board’s function in reducing agency 
costs and maximising firm value since the 2008 financial crisis. The key German 
company law mechanisms,485 disclosure requirements, blockholding, financial 
accounting system along with the governances and regulatory strategies for 
protecting principals (see, Table 9- Governance strategies for principal’s protection 
and Table 10- Regulatory strategies for principal’s protection) successfully deal with 
the agency problems between: (i) the shareholders and the management; and (ii) the 
majority shareholders and the minority shareholders. This collectively provides an 
ideal framework for the EU to effectively mitigate agency conflicts by increasing 
productivity and encouraging the normative goal of cumulative social welfare. 
 
Other positive discussed aspects were the German works councils which is mirrored 
in the EWC Directive and serves as the works councils model for the entire EU and 
the German audit system which eliminates possibility of any conflict of interest due to 
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its independent nature. This is vital in producing a true representation of a 
company’s performance.  
 
In the context of an SE, this chapter reiterates, at least moderately, the observation 
of the trend that an SE is relatively successful in Member States with dualistic board 
structure. The number of registered SEs in Member States which have dualistic 
board structure is higher than the number of SEs in Member States which have 
monistic board structure. This is consistent with the Figure 3- Monistic and dualistic 
board structure map of EU in Section 4.3 Dualistic board structure discussed above. 
For example, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Netherlands and France 
have dualistic board structure and the highest number of registered SEs in 
comparison with other Member States.486 This indicates that monistic board structure 
is unsuitable to employee involvement and is best suited to the Anglo-American 
model or family-run industries. The German model of corporate governance which 
emphasises collaboration between the employees and management distributes 
resources more proficiently than the Anglo-American model. Further, the supervisory 
board in the German model is well equipped to monitor corporate management. 
 
The objective to identify an ideal corporate governance structure that will serve as a 
model to the EU company law has been evaluated in this chapter. The legal 
embodiment of the above discussed features in Germany’s company law has led to 
codetermination being considered as a positive factor for a company’s success by 
most German national and multinational companies.487 Table 8- Survey on co-
determination provides one such example to support this notion that there is 
significant support for codetermination at board-level. 
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CHAPTER 5- LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH TOWARDS 
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE UK 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis differed substantially in two of the most 
powerful economies in Europe. Germany was more resilient during and after the 
financial crisis and continues to prosper; the UK, in contrast, has endured a longer 
period of the financial crisis. Some authors go as far as to claim that Germany ‘came 
roaring out of recession with higher growth’ and the financial crisis was more of a 
vindication for its economy.488 German corporations continued to remain global 
industrial leaders – for example. BASF and Volkswagen (despite its global emissions 
scandal); in the UK, car489 and chemical companies490 collapsed.491  
 
This chapter analyses the overall approach to employee involvement in the UK and 
will take a critical view of the shareholder value concept prevalent in the UK’s 
corporate governance culture. The chapter will seek to establish answers to the 
following questions. 
(i) Does domestic company law adequately deal with employees’ interests? 
(ii) What are the driving factors for the lack of board-level employee representation 
in the UK? 
(iii) Have trade unions outlived their purpose?  
(iv) What corporate governance arguments work in the interest of employees? 
(v) What are the shortcomings of British codetermination and how can ECS fill the 
gap to augment a functional and beneficial codetermination in the UK? 
 
Employee participation has developed little in the UK since the 1980s, when the 
Conservative government rigidly opposed all forms of employee participation.492 The 
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general approach can be characterised as laissez-faire: an approach or policy of 
letting things take their ‘natural’ course. It was an 18th century economic theory that 
signified the absence of government interference in businesses.493 For example, the 
UK has evolved (or, arguably, has been forced by EU laws) towards the information 
and consultation aspects of employee involvement, but representation rights for 
employees at board level remain absent. The ICE Directive has been widely and 
effectively implemented; in contrast, the ECS remains unpopular. This chapter will 
discuss the progressive explanations for employee involvement and identify 
proposals for an amicable way forward.  
 
5.2 History of British codetermination 
The irony is that the UK was the first country in the world to undergo an industrial 
revolution in the 18th century,494 and legislated one of the first codetermination laws 
in the world: The Port of London Act 1908. Section 1(7) of the Port of London Act 
1908 stated: 
 
“With a view to providing for the representation of labour on the Port Authority, one of 
the members of the Port Authority appointed by the Board of Trade shall be 
appointed by the Board after consultation with such organisations representative of 
labour as the Board think best qualified to advise them upon the matter, and one of 
the members of the Port Authority appointed by the London County Council shall be 
appointed by the council after consultation with such organisations representative of 
labour as the council think best qualified to advise them upon the matter.” 
 
This law allowed just one appointed employee representative to the Port of London 
Authority’s board of directors for trade union consultations. At present, the UK is one 
of the Member States in the EU that has no statutory or traditional form of board-
level employee representation embedded in its corporate governance system. 
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Historically, trade unions were the only means of employee representation in the UK. 
This is a single channel approach, where the state would refrain from involving itself 
in matters of industrial relations and the trade unions have a monopoly on employee 
representation.495 Since the 19th century, this dominance of trade unions has 
remained the defining feature of the UK’s industrial relations.496 This approach 
derived from two main assumptions: that a company operates to aggrandise 
shareholders’ value; and that employees and the managerial board cannot work 
together. These assumptions leave reduced options for the representation of 
employees at the board level. There is no domestic law that forbids employee 
representation on company boards, but owing to traditional company models, 
employee representation has generally only been channelled via this single channel 
approach. The UK finds itself, therefore, way behind modern developments. This 
shortcoming became especially evident after the UK joined the EU, which led to 
amalgamating different notions of corporate governance and industrial relations. This 
shortcoming is truer now than ever before, when the world has become ‘vasudhaiva 
kutumbakam’.497 As communication and globalisation progress, company operatives 
must work together for mutual benefit. The UK’s position of having no statutory 
requirement of board-level employee representation, and the resolute opposition of 
British employers' associations to any type of employee involvement, has become 
contestable. 
 
Early efforts to bring about a change were seen in the Bullock Commission’s Report 
(1977).498 This proposed a dual channel of representation, along with other 
provisions that would have increased employee involvement in UK companies. 
However, these proposals were never implemented; any prospect of meaningful 
employee representation was dashed when the Conservative party rose to power in 
1979 and the issue was taken off the political agenda. 
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McGaughey notes that ‘the practice of British codetermination was torn between two 
competing views: that participation at work should only be channelled through 
purchase of company shares, or that participation should only be channelled through 
collective bargaining’.499 He further argues that it is not a coherent economic choice 
for corporations to embrace codetermination in a free market, unless required by 
law.500 This point is highly debatable and he provides no evidence to support it. The 
only identifiable evidence to partially support this argument is the experiment in 
codetermination conducted between 1960 and 1970 in several UK corporations, 
when it was opposed unconditionally by the majority of managers who could not 
align with the German style of codetermination.501 In Germany, corporations did not 
initially embrace the passing of the Iron, Coal and Steel Codetermination Act 1951 
and Codetermination Act 1976, but eventually realised its economic and social 
benefits.  
 
If codetermination is required by law, then any such law needs to be passed after 
consultation and consent from the majority of companies’ representatives and policy 
makers. The exception to this rule is the imposition of EU law on Member States who 
do not necessarily embrace it, especially the UK. It is interesting to note that the UK 
has always been the ‘black sheep’ when it comes to embracing EU laws, whether it 
is for immigration, jobs or employee involvement.  
 
Industrial relations in the UK took a substantial step forward with the implementation 
of the ICE Directive, which requires that companies within the UK inform and consult 
with employee representatives. The attitude to employee involvement nationally 
remains laissez-faire. British employers’ associations and corporations in general 
have not embraced the ECS, as forming an SE company is voluntary. This explains 
why the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills had only one consultation 
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paper502 before transposing the ECS: the department received no major interest from 
corporations, professional bodies or the public. 
 
5.3 Assorted and restricted methods of employee involvement in the UK 
The UK has various restricted methods of employee involvement. The number of 
employee representatives in companies across the UK rose considerably during both 
the World Wars. These representatives were actively involved with management 
over working conditions, salary negotiations, industrial actions, disciplinary issues 
and so on. However, the government did not ever attempt to regulate or legislate 
employee representatives or workplace consultation during the 20th century. 
 
5.3.1 The decline of trade unions in the UK 
Employees’ interests in the 20th century was conventionally channelled through trade 
unions in the UK. The Trade Union Act 1871, the Conspiracy and Protection of 
Property Act 1875 and the Trades Disputes Act 1906 had laid the foundations for 
unions to be more effective legally. Trade unions had gained considerable strength 
in 1910 (membership was at 2,565,000)503 and many disputes were settled at 
sectoral level between employers’ associations and unions.504 The Conciliation Act 
1896 and the Trade Boards Act 1909 encouraged collective bargaining, but the 
government did not explicitly regulate the negotiations between the unions and 
employers or legislate any forms of requirement or exclusion for representation. In 
the following decades, there was a shift from collective bargaining and the dual 
layers of union association as trade unions developed within the companies the 
employees were employed to represent their interests.  
 
In addition to the social rationale for having a strong trade union, trade unions have 
been reported to serve the economic value of the business. A combined study by the 
London School of Economics and University of Reading, using data from 18 OECD 
countries, concluded that employees in companies represented by trade unions have 
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19% more productivity than companies which do not.505  The study provided positive 
evidence to support the idea of having a cooperative and functional trade union, 
although appreciated that productivity is affected by factors like strategic policies and 
cooperation with the management. Butler506 and Heery’s507 recent research also 
established that non-union employee representation mechanisms are less effective 
in terms of productivity for the management, and unions still dominate the 
representation of employees’ interests. 
 
Businesses in continental Europe have usually considered trade unions as social 
partners concerned with a wider range of subjects and accomplishing a much more 
substantial representative democratic role, unlike the US, where unions historically 
are viewed as disturbing economic efficiency and as ‘hostile bodies’.508  
 
Given that, some decades ago, the unions were the foremost intercessor between 
employees and employer for matters of all significant concern in the UK, why is there 
a decline in trade union membership in the UK? The latest statistical data shows 6.8 
million employees to be trade union members.509 The decline in union membership 
can be attributed to five main factors.  
 
Firstly, membership numbers decline when unions merge. For example, UNISON 
(the second largest trade union in the UK) was a result of the merger in 1993 of the 
Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE), the National and Local 
Government Officers' Association (NALGO) and the National Union of Public 
Employees (NUPE). Barnard reported in 2005 that some of the major trade unions 
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like Amicus’ membership was significantly declining.510 In 2004-2005, Amicus’ 
membership took a fall of more than 100,000 members. Following her report, in 
2007, Amicus was pressured to merge with the Transport and General Workers’ 
Union (TGWU) to form the largest trade union in the UK called Unite.511 Both Unite 
and UNISON have exaggerated their membership numbers on their websites; they 
stress the importance of joining and make the cancellation of membership arduous. 
Furthermore, to induce jobless members to remain in the union, tactics such as 
offering designer sunglasses, pre-paid debit cards with cashback offers and free 
advice on claiming state benefits are now being employed.512 For at least the past 
three years UNISON has stated on its website that it is “serving more than 1.3 million 
members”.513 In fact, aaccording to the Certification Officer (Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills), UNISON’s membership was 1,317,500 in 2011, 
1,301,500 in 2012, 1,282,500 in 2013 and 1,270,248 in 2014.514  
 
Secondly, employment has steadily fallen in manufacturing and the construction 
industries.515 For instance, the decline in the steel industry in the UK is directly 
related to a fall in employment. During the 1870s, the UK was the leading 
manufacturer in metal production, accounting for 40% of the world’s steel. 516 The 
decline in the British steel industry was due first to British Steel’s privatisation in 
1980s, when the Conservative government refused to subsidise plants running at a 
loss, and secondly to the growth of cheap imports of Chinese steel, which are 
marketed at ‘unrealistically low prices’ in the UK.517  
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Thirdly, unfavourable judicial decisions clearly demonstrated a general hostility 
towards trade unions. Unions had no recourse to legal means to defend 
themselves.518 In Associated Newspapers v Wilson519, the House of Lords ruled that 
being an active trade union member520 did not imply that members could seek their 
affiliated union’s assistance to negotiate with their employer,521 but merely meant 
that the member could hold a trade union card. The issue in the case was that “the 
employer decided to offer higher pay increases to employees who agreed to accept 
personal contracts in place of collectively agreed terms and conditions of 
employment. Employees who refused to do so, and consequently did not receive the 
increase, claimed that the employer had taken action short of dismissal against the 
employees on grounds of their union membership contrary to what is now s.146 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992”.522 This ruling set a 
precedent for employers to unfavourably differentiate against employees who were 
trade union members. The ruling was met with wide opposition and there were 
proposals to overturn it;523 subsequently, the European Court of Human Rights 
overturned the ruling and severely criticised it as contravening Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Fourthly, exposures to international competition and increasing market pressures in 
the public sector have reduced the influence of unions.  
 
Lastly, it has been widely suggested that the Conservative government was directly 
responsible for the decline of unions from 1979. Barnard argues that the 
Conservative government was hugely influenced by Hayek’s work524, which 
concluded that unions were a considerable obstacle to the market’s free 
operation.525 Conservative legislation sought to minimise the operation of employees’ 
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representative organisations (for example, the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992). The government demonstrated its aggressive policy 
towards trade unions further by downgrading and shutting representative institutions. 
The Manpower Services Commission526 and National Economic Development 
Council527 were both shut down (the latter, because it had Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) members). The functioning of Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS) were altered to remove the prerequisite of extending and reforming 
collective bargaining.528 The Conservative government also pulled back from 
supporting collective bargaining in the public sector.529  
 
The following graph displays trade union membership in the UK from 1892 to 2014, 
which shows that trade union membership has continued to fall after the 
Conservative party’s victory of 1979, by about 4.8 million members since 1979. 
 
 
Figure 4- Trade union membership in the UK (1892 – 2014)530 
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The influence of trade unions may continue to decline as a result of the Trade Union 
Act 2016. This has been labelled as the ‘biggest crackdown on trade unions for 30 
years launched by Conservatives’.531 This legislation aims to raise the minimum 
turnout necessary in ballots to sanction industrial action to 50%, and it would be 
required by 40% eligible voters to sanction public sector strikes.532 Furthermore, the 
strike notice is to be increased from 7 days to 14 days; employers may use agency 
workers to replace workers who are on strike; and unions may be fined if an official 
armband is not worn by pickets.533 
 
Notable academics like Barnard,534 Wright,535 Edwards et al.536 and Briône and 
Nicholson537 have concluded that trade unions will continue to decline in 
membership and power.538 The hypothesis is that unions will gradually fail 
completely in the next thirty years. Brown and Marsden have been widely quoted on 
UK employers’ attitude on unions:  
“firm by firm and sector by sector, employers have responded to tougher competition 
by tightening controls over work, and either refusing to deal with trade unions at all or 
doing so only on the basis that their role is one of passive consultation or of positive 
contribution to improved productivity”.539 
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This long-lasting decline in trade union influence may have led to the introduction of 
the notion of board-level employee involvement in many companies in the UK. The 
number of companies which preferred to service non-union employee involvement 
mechanisms increased from 16% in 1984 to 46% in 2004 and companies which 
preferred union representation declined from 24% in 1984 to 5% in 2004.540 The 
statistics are a decade old, but indicate the shifting trend away from union 
representation. This trend has been described by Brown et al. as a shift away from 
collective mechanisms for negotiation between employees and employers towards 
‘procedural individualisation’.541 In the future, a corporation’s owners may be more 
receptive to resolving matters in the boardroom than to be challenged by the 
demands of trade unions. This will be in accordance with ‘property rights objections’, 
but at the same time, will pave a way for employee representatives to be part of the 
management and supervisory board.  
 
5.3.2 ICE Regulations or ‘do as you like Regulations’? 
Following the establishment of the ICE Directive, the UK legislated The Information 
and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 (hereafter, referred to as the “ICE 
Regulations”),542 which came into force in 2005. This was at the time considered a 
big step towards greater workplace democracy and employee involvement in the UK.  
 
A statutory framework was established that obligated employers to inform and 
consult their employees on certain areas of business, restructuring issues and 
employment. There had never been a law or policy in the UK dealing with 
information and consultation; most information and consultation provisions emanated 
from EU laws and regulation, beginning with the Directive on collective redundancies 
in 1975.543 
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The ICE Regulations apply to businesses with 50 or more employees. These 
employees have the right to ask their employer to make information and consultation 
arrangements regarding matters that affect the organisation. If the company’s 
management does not initiate such arrangement, then employees are entitled to 
request this formally, as this provision is not automatically applied and further 
requires 10% of the workforce’s support. If the request is made by less than 40% of 
the workforce, then the management must take into account that different rules apply 
for valid pre-existing agreements. The broad drafting of the ICE Regulations means 
that the matters to be informed and consulted upon can be tailored in the agreement, 
but by default, these matters relate to contractual relations, job prospects, substantial 
changes to the company and its economic situation.544  
 
The ICE Regulations constituted a break from the previous norm for managing 
corporate restructuring.545 First, they promoted the initiation of employee 
representation structures in management decision-making.546 Secondly, by 
extending the requirement to inform and consult employees on a variety of matters, 
the regulation probably advanced the development of a holistic structural approach 
to human resource management, which theoretically could decrease a company’s 
dependence on redundancies. Thirdly, the regulations give information and 
consultation rights that are independent of trade union recognition and membership. 
 
It was understood from the communication from the EC on Worker Information and 
Consultation547 that the ICE Directive was aimed at creating a European-level 
framework on informing and consulting employees by increasing social dialogue. EU 
legislators felt that previous legislative measures at both domestic and EU level had 
been inadequate.548 They subsequently drafted the ICE Directive very broadly 
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flexibly, leaving transposition to the discretion of Member States.549 They may 
delegate the employee representatives that are to be informed and consulted, and 
decide how to facilitate workforce and management to discuss information and 
consultation arrangements. The ICE Directive encompasses a ‘general framework’ 
for information and consultation and is limited by the Treaty to a ‘minimum 
requirements’ specification.550 
 
The UK has limited the ICE Directive’s scope and effect by making use of maximum 
flexibility regarding its transposition. First, the ICE Regulations do not require 
employers to inform and consult their employees unless 10% of their employees 
activate statutory measures.551 Hall points out that: 
 
“…the government has pursued a ‘minimalist’ approach to UK implementation more 
generally, reflecting sustained pressure from UK companies and employers’ 
organisations against any ‘gold-plating’ of the ICE Directive’s provisions that may 
impose additional regulation on businesses. In a number of areas, including the 
default information and consultation requirements and confidentiality provisions, the 
government has essentially adopted a ‘copy-out’ approach, reproducing the wording 
of the ICE Directive in the ICE Regulations”.552  
 
By those who consider the right to information and consultation to be fundamental, 
the 10% threshold is considered a big obstacle, particularly in companies where 
there is no trade union presence. The ICE Regulations cover only bureaucratic 
requirements and the UK has completely failed to detail the contents of information 
and consultation arrangements.553 Further, no attempt is made to guarantee that pre-
existing agreements or negotiated agreements will provide better employment 
protection and employment conditions. 
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Secondly, the ICE Regulations do not provide any default involvement rights for 
trade union representatives. They must compete in election with non-union 
representatives. The ICE Regulations do not touch upon unions and there is no 
assurance of any union participation in information and consultation processes. Such 
matters lie solely with the company’s management to negotiate with employee 
representatives, or regulate alone the drafting of the regulation gives companies the 
right essentially to do nothing. As a result, trade unions have been less than 
optimistic that they could use the ICE regulations to their advantage, and the ICE 
Regulations have had a minimal effect on workplace dialogue.554 Gollan quotes 
Scott555 that, in the forthcoming years, the UK will be left without any recognised 
system of employee representation and “the wide corridors of interpretation and the 
specific structuring of the directive may leave the UK with the worst of both worlds, 
neither decent works councils, nor strengthened unions”.556 
 
It is evident from this analysis that the effect of the ICE Regulation in the UK has 
been essentially trivial. One might infer that the UK never intended to fully implement 
the directive’s scope and benefits, but instead to adopt a ‘do as you like’ approach. 
 
5.3.3 Informal involvement techniques 
Many forward-thinking UK companies have started to implement more informal 
methods of involving employees. These ‘informal techniques’ augment employee 
participation to promote some degree of workplace democracy. One such technique 
is ‘quality circles’: these are small groups of employees who meet regularly and 
discuss company activities that affect them: performance, productivity, quality and so 
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on.557 Quality circles usefully resolve small-scale problems and are intended to help 
a company meet its targets of better flexibility and productivity.558 
 
Secondly, managers employ ‘team working’. They divide employees into semi-
independent teams with autonomous power to manage their workload with a view to 
increase or enhance productivity; this in turn gives employees a degree of 
independence and a sense of responsibility.559 
 
Thirdly, ‘Joint Consultative Committees’ (JCC’s) are considered a substitute for the 
works councils found in the rest of Europe. JCCs have fixed-term representatives 
operating at company level and a formal constitution. JCCs represent employees’ 
interests on employment issues, health and safety, welfare services and facilities, 
and in some workplaces financial issues and future plans are covered. 
 
Lastly, ‘works councils’ is a system that has been more effective in other countries in 
comparison with the UK. Works Councils are not elected by all employees and 
National Works Council (NWC) can be formed under information and consultation 
provisions made up of employee and management representatives (per the ICE 
Regulations). NWC have been considered as an effective tool through which a 
company’s management can inform and consult the employees on job or economic 
related issues.560 
 
5.4 UK corporate governance: Shareholders v stakeholders 
It has been long established that, in UK corporate governance, shareholders’ 
interests are given majority consideration. Only residual regard is given to the 
interest of other stakeholders. In 2005, the Labour government made it abundantly 
clear that the fundamental goal for company directors was to maximise shareholders’ 
value and dismissed the notion that a company must operate in the collective 
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interests of different stakeholders.561 This view was later reflected in The Companies 
Act 2006, which explicitly stated that directors must act exclusively in the company’s 
interest, as a whole, and in doing so: 
 
"...have regard (amongst other matters) to the interests of the company’s 
employees,562 the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment,563 and ... in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of 
creditors of the company."564  
 
The theory of maximising ‘shareholder value’ is flawed and has confused corporate 
priorities.565 Lazonick suggests that shareholder value destroys innovation (the key 
to economic prosperity) because it fails to understand innovation as an intrinsically 
uncertain method of accruing and collective learning.566 Similarly, pursuing 
shareholder value results in reduced levels of investment, which eventually means 
declining labour productivity.567 Kay gives examples of UK companies like Imperial 
Chemical Industries (ICI), and US banks like Bear Stearns and Citicorp, which were 
destroyed by pursuing shareholder value.568 However, proposed changes to deal 
with the failure of shareholders to monitor company’s management have been 
counter-productive.569 
 
Maximising shareholder value has been justified in corporate governance on the 
basis of two main arguments: shareholders are essentially owners, and therefore 
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should dictate control (an argument often summarised as ‘property rights 
objections’);570 and shareholders, who invest their capital and bear the maximum 
risk, should therefore control the operations of the company. 
 
Property rights objections have been discussed earlier in Chapter 2- Justifying 
Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance. In response to the second 
argument, it is superficial to say that only shareholders bear the maximum risk. 
Stakeholders – like creditors, employees or taxpayers – also bear risk, in terms of 
livelihoods, investment, businesses, pensions and so on.571 It is therefore only fair 
that stakeholders should be part of the governance that directly affects them. 
 
There has been intense discussion on the benefits of power sharing between 
stakeholders and shareholders in corporate governance. These discussions revolve 
around the nature of the company involved and the relationship between company 
structure and productivity.572 Germany, Austria, Sweden and Denmark thrived during 
crises economic, political and social, because employee involvement – especially 
employee representation – was prevalent in these Member States.573 It is widely 
suggested that electing employee representatives to the supervisory board (for 
example, in an SE or any other company which does not have experience with 
employee involvement) ‘advances a culture where employee involvement is 
regarded by companies more as a norm than as an exception in Member States’.574 
This suggestion is in line with the findings of a study by Ernst and Young, 
commissioned by the EC (Directorate-General Internal Market).575 This study 
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suggests that wider connections exist between ‘employee involvement and the future 
progression of the company’s general ownership structure and governance’.576 Njoya 
points out those companies with established employee involvement traditions adapt 
readily by embracing the closely-held shared ownership arrangement that prevails in 
the EU. But on the counter-side, the causation direction could be quite opposite:  
 
“it may be the fact that these firms have a closely held structure with blocks of shares 
and dominant shareholders presenting holdup problems that makes employee 
involvement necessary.”577  
 
This implies that if a company with employee involvement procures a more disjointed 
shareholding, then employee involvement would no longer be required, and 
therefore the company would be reasonably expected to withdraw employee 
involvement after being made public.578 
 
Board-level employee representatives have often been shown to work in partnership 
with other board members. On many occasions, shareholders and employee 
representatives have mutually agreed on issues to further a company’s interests, as 
previously discussed in Section 2.4.2 Employee involvement, governance and 
ownership with reference to Gold’s study which concluded that that employee 
representatives play an essential role in decision-making, along with shareholders’ 
representatives.579 This has been demonstrated when employee representatives in 
partnership with shareholder representatives defeated a merger proposal when 
employees identified the risks of the merger; and employee representatives opposed 
the outsourcing proposal based on the exchange rates argument (the argument was 
correctly put and the proposal was dismissed). Employees possess extensive 
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knowledge of the everyday workings of a company; consequently, their interests run 
in conjunction with a company’s interests.  
 
UK corporate governance may well be out of date and needs to adopt to the 
European practice of board-level employee representation, for the benefit of 
employees, management and the company. Markey et al. suggest that such 
representation can function effectively in partnership with other forms of involvement, 
like trade unions and works councils.580 But this is easier said than done. Briône and 
Nicholson identify the difficulties of implementation in the UK:581 board-level 
employee representation functions more effectively when the board is dual-
structured (an executive board and supervisory board); the UK will have to break 
free from the single board structure tradition of executives and nonexecutives. UK 
Company Law presents another difficulty. It states that employees on the board 
cannot be ‘representatives’ of employees’ interests. As it stands, employees on the 
board will automatically be bound under s.172, Companies Act 2006 to have a 
fiduciary duty to ‘...act exclusively in the company’s interest... for the profit of its 
members (i.e. shareholders) ... and ... in certain circumstances, to consider or act in 
the interests of other stakeholders (i.e. employees)’. 
 
In the UK, the definition of good corporate governance remains questionable. Some 
recognise the value of employee representatives;582 others see it as merely a way to 
‘reintroduce investment inefficiency’.583 The closure of TATA Steel in Port Talbot has 
presented the British steel industry in the UK with a bigger dilemma than ever before 
by putting 40,000 jobs at risk; more recently, the liquidation of BHS has unarguably 
brought into question the feasibility of the UK’s corporate governance system. The 
UK has failed to recognise the advantages that codetermination may bring to its 
corporations and the economy at large. 
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This reiterates the point made earlier that a diverse boardroom with various 
stakeholder representatives will minimise short-sighted and risky decision-making 
and this also accords with the survey findings of Levinson’s study584 (discussed 
earlier in Section 2.4.3 Property rights objections) which found that 69% of company 
chairpersons considered that employee representatives had a positive impact on the 
governance of their respective companies, while only 5% held opposing views. 
 
5.5 Corporate Governance Reform in the UK 
As one of the latest attempts to give ‘employees a greater voice in the boardroom’, 
the government published and pursued a Green Paper consultation on ‘Corporate 
Governance Reform’ in the UK.585 Theresa May sought in “raising the bar for 
governance standards” by getting employee representatives on the boardroom, so 
that the UK can thrive in a global economy after Brexit.586 
 
The Green Paper raised the three following questions, the submission of which 
would most likely strengthen the employee, customer and wider stakeholder voice:587 
 
“7. How can the way in which the interests of employees, customers and wider 
stakeholders are taken into account at board level in large UK companies be 
strengthened? Are there any existing examples of good practice that you would like 
to draw to our attention? Which, if any, of the options (or combination of options) 
described in the Green Paper would you support? Please explain your reasons. 
8. Which type of company do you think should be the focus for any steps to 
strengthen the stakeholder voice? Should there be an employee number or other 
size threshold?  
9. How should reform be taken forward? Should a legislative, code-based or 
voluntary approach be used to drive change? Please explain your reasons, including 
any evidence on likely costs and benefits.” 
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Company law in the UK already preserves the significance of employees and other 
stakeholders in corporate governance to a certain level (discussed in previous 
Section 5.4 UK corporate governance: Shareholders v stakeholders with reference to 
s.172 of the Companies Act 2006). Notwithstanding, companies in the UK have been 
unwilling to consider the interests of employees and other stakeholders at board-
level, therefore, these provisions need to be bolstered.  
 
In support of question 7. of the Green Paper, the government set out the following 
key options for strengthening reform: (i) “create stakeholder advisory panels”;588 (ii) 
“designate existing non-executive directors to ensure that the voices of key 
interested groups, especially that of employees, is being heard at board level”;589 (iii) 
“appoint individual stakeholder representatives to company boards”,590 and (iv) 
“strengthening reporting requirements related to stakeholder engagement”.591 
 
Notwithstanding, the writer is of the opinion that this was another laissez-faire 
approach towards employee involvement in the UK, as it is incomprehensible that 
the government would seek views to strengthen the employees’ voice at the board 
level by recommending the above options, especially options (ii) and (iii), and 
simultaneously firmly stating that: 
 
“The use of employee representatives on company boards is prevalent in a number 
of European countries but the corporate governance framework in many of these 
countries is very different to that of the UK…Companies in the UK, however, operate 
within a unitary board system where all the directors have the same set of duties, 
and collective responsibility applies. It is a system that we consider serves the UK 
well and we do not intend to change it.” 592 
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This is attributed to the fact that both the government and influential stakeholder 
bodies in the UK do not believe that board-level employee representation will be a 
functional aspect of corporate governance for the UK. There were 240 respondents 
to the above-mentioned questions in the Green Paper, but there was no agreement 
on which of the four options would strengthen the employees’ voice at the board 
level, therefore prolonging the uncertainty on this issue. For example, the Institute of 
Directors is of the opinion that board-level employee representation may be suitable 
for some companies but legislating such a substantial modification to UK board 
structures is not required at this time.593 The rationale provided is that the potential 
advantages of having board-level employee representatives in the UK is 
questionable, therefore, “there is little point in simply electing a “worker” to the board 
if they are subsequently cut out of all the strategically important discussions”.594 
On the key option (ii) for strengthening employees’ voice, scepticism from the 
respondents surrounded the notion that a collective board duty for stakeholder 
engagement could be weakened if a single non-executive director were to be 
designated to this role (see, para 2.11 of the government response to the Green 
Paper consultation).595 Additionally, there were questions raised on the efficacy of 
non-executive directors, as they may be unable to ‘effectively challenge’ the rest of 
the board since they may be ‘isolated on the board’.596 On the key option (iv), the 
majority of the respondents were sceptical to the general idea of having stakeholder 
representatives on the company boards (see, para 2.17 of the government response 
to the Green Paper consultation).597 The cultural norm of evading the inclusion of 
employees’ voice at the board level in UK companies is further verified by statistics 
gathered from the annual reports of FTSE 350 companies, as noted by Grant 
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Thornton.598 Presently, there is only one FTSE 350 company that has a board-level 
employee representative; two companies have employee representatives that visit a 
few board meetings and one FTSE 350 company that has a non-executive director 
with a duty employee engagement.599 These numbers and the above discussion 
strongly suggest that the UK government and stakeholders merely talk about 
strengthening the employees’ voice and that of other stakeholders,600 but the reality 
is that the UK is unwilling to change the laissez-faire trend on employee involvement. 
 
As a result of this Green Paper consultation, the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy actioned two recommendations in relation to strengthening 
the voices of employees, customers and wider stakeholders: (i) the government will 
introduce secondary legislation which will require directors of significant size 
companies (both public and private) to explain how they meet the requirements 
under s.172 Companies Act 2006 of having regard to the interests of employees and 
other stakeholders; and (ii) Financial Reporting Council (FRC) launched a public 
consultation “on the development of a new Code principle601 establishing the 
importance of strengthening the voice of employees and other non-shareholder 
interests at board level as an important component of running a sustainable 
business”.602 This consultation with the draft revised Code was launched in 
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December 2017 and closed on 28 February 2018.603 The revisions and changes in 
the new Code are expected to be published in the second quarter of 2018. It is 
anticipated that the new Code will only encompass enforcing evidence meeting 
s.172 Companies Act 2006 requirements by the directors and any attempt for 
employee engagement will be recommended on a voluntary basis to promote good 
corporate governance practice, for the reasons given above. 
 
5.6 Addressing the barriers / Conclusion 
The UK awaits a major change in its industrial relations. This chapter provides a 
significant contrast to the German model of corporate governance discussed in the 
previous chapter. The chapter has analysed the overall approach to employee 
involvement in the UK, which has evidently been concluded as laissez-faire despite 
various failed attempts by the UK government to promote board-level employee 
representation. In particular, the Bullock Commission’s Report604 and the recent 
Corporate Governance Reform 2016 Green Paper.605  
 
Considering the discussion in Section 5.5 Corporate Governance Reform in the UK, 
the writer believes that a voluntary model of employee representation in UK 
companies will not work. The Companies Act 2006, the UK’s Corporate Governance 
Code or any other law in the UK does not prevent companies from appointing 
employee representatives to their boards. UK companies have independence on 
board composition, but it is evident from the data presented in Section 5.5 that 
board-level employee representation has not been accepted in general. The Green 
Paper clearly articulated the problem and the need to strengthen employees’ voice in 
the boardroom, but failed to effectively address it. Voluntary codes in the UK will 
never achieve the desired effect of strengthening employees’ voice in the boardroom 
“since the first efforts were made to address these issues in the 1990’s”.606 The new 
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UK Corporate Governance Code607 (discussed in the previous section) will not make 
any fundamental changes to strengthen employees’ voice in the boardroom. Rather, 
the new Code will merely reiterate s.172 of the Companies Act 2006 by affirming “the 
board’s responsibility for considering the needs and views of a wider range of 
stakeholders” (para 26) and the board composition will remain “broadly the same” 
(para 46).608 Therefore, if the UK is to really embrace the idea of board-level 
employee representation then any such proposed measures will have to be 
legislative. This can be incorporated in the Companies Act 2006. Employee directors 
can undergo intense training on their directorial responsibilities, thereby dispelling 
any concerns that employee directors are unable to discharge their duties 
meticulously. Voluntary codes and principles are effective when providing guidance 
to a piece of legislation but not as a recommendation to a notion such as board-level 
employee representation, which has not been generally adopted by UK companies. 
 
As analysed in Section 5.3.1 The decline of trade unions in the UK, most employee 
representation is still through trade unions, but this ‘single channel’ approach is 
outdated and on the verge of disappearing. The private sector is now characterised 
by workplaces with few or no trade union members; even where trade union 
members have a substantial presence, the employer may choose not to recognise 
that presence. Despite the reiterating introduction of board-level employee 
representation in the UK following the decline in trade union influence, board-level 
employee representation has still not gained acceptance or momentum as a 
functional substitute. This is evident by the data collected by Grant Thornton from the 
annual reports of FTSE 350 companies.609  
 
Meanwhile, the customisation and limited scope of the ICE Directive by the UK 
legislators, which is now reflected in the ICE Regulations, renders it inadequate.610 
Team work, quality circles and other informal participatory measures are not widely 
prevalent and remain novel. These measures merely engage with employees, but in 
no way, do they strengthen employees’ voice in the boardroom. Works councils in 
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the UK are rare, dispersed and inconsistent in structure; therefore, they are less 
successful in the UK in comparison with other EU Member States. UK companies, 
employers’ associations and even some trade unions consider works councils to be 
a threat to their prerogatives and powers of representation.611 And the flawed model 
of maximising shareholder primacy has led to a decline in the ways in which 
employees’ interests may be represented in UK companies. It can also be concluded 
from the discussion in Section 5.4 UK corporate governance: Shareholders vs. 
stakeholders, that UK corporate governance needs to dispel with the notion of 
maximising ‘shareholder value’, which has been attributed as a flawed model. A 
diverse boardroom with various stakeholder representatives, especially employee 
representatives will minimise short-sighted and risky decision-making. 
 
In summary, the UK’s position can be described as one of falling trade union 
membership, ineffective employee information and consultation mechanisms, 
unreceptive works councils and a corporate governance structure that is long 
outdated. 
 
So, what can the SE do to fill the gap? Can it help to develop a culture of functional 
and beneficial codetermination in the UK? The key aspects of the SE that will be 
beneficial to the UK have already been identified in Chapters 2 and 3. The SE has 
laid the foundation of an EU company model but it has not gained popularity in the 
UK. The UK government is partly to blame as it did not effectively run the 
consultation process: the European Public Limited-Liability Company Regulations 
2004, being a statutory instrument, did not require parliamentary debate. As a result, 
there has been little awareness of the SE model amongst UK businesses and 
professional bodies. One consultative document was published in October 2003, 
which covered both the SE Directive and the SE Regulation.612 The government had 
already hinted that it wants to make minimum changes to the existing rules and has 
stressed that establishing an SE will be completely voluntary. Adopting this attitude 
explains why there were only 22 consultation responses (mainly from professional 
bodies like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Institute of Chartered 
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Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), and the Trade Unions Congress 
(TUC).613 
 
One effective way to increase awareness of the SE and advertise the advantages of 
employee involvement will be to re-open the consultation process on SE and 
employee involvement. The government could propose mandatorily introducing one-
third board-level employee representation in companies with more than 500 
employees. Laws alone cannot accomplish better industrial relations; there must be 
a transition in industrial traditions as well. A new consultation will ensure that the 
issue is debated at the national level. 
 
Secondly, HM Revenue and Customs should propose corporation tax incentives for 
companies setting up as an SE or companies which qualify for board-level employee 
representation. Tax is not specifically covered by the ECS; current UK tax provisions 
provide no such incentive, and have been considered an impediment to the growth 
of employee ownership. A proposal of this kind will ensure the government’s 
commitment to employee involvement and make it more attractive to UK companies. 
One might offer a counterargument that, at a time when the UK is recovering from 
financial deficits, a 1% corporation tax discount may cost around £1bn to the 
Exchequer.614 
 
The UK has sensibly chosen tailor-made tax provisions for some transactions 
affecting the SEs outside the scope of UK Company Law; for example, the formation 
of an SE by a cross-border merger or transfer of an SE registered office. It was 
anticipated that the intention of particular tax provisions will deliver business 
certainty. Another incentive could be to lower the level of national insurance 
contributions paid by employees employed by an SE or a qualifying company with 
employee representatives.615 Financial lending institutions can be encouraged to 
provide loans at attractive rates to the SEs or qualifying companies that advance 
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employee involvement. These efforts will outweigh the legal and regulatory 
complexities in setting up an SE.  
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CHAPTER 6- CASE STUDY: EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATION IN SELECTED MEMBER STATES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Employee representation rights across the EU have remained a contentious issue. 
Factors such as industrial relations systems, and customs influenced by public 
policy, deregulation, law, privatisation, demographic background, technological 
changes and social attitudes have all contributed towards the controversy in every 
Member State. In the past two decades, Member States have taken various 
initiatives to accommodate direct and indirect employee representation, but 
consistency is still far from being achieved. Attitudes vary across the EU; even 
neighbouring Member States demonstrate significant differences in employee 
representation characteristics. Some provide extensive employee representation 
rights; others have no legal provisions to secure employee representation rights at 
all.  
 
Despite these variations, the EU strives to create a ‘social dialogue’, which is 
perceived as an element of economic and social modernisation in addition to 
democratic government.616 The possibility to create a working dialogue between 
employees and companies is understood as a key complement to EU laws in 
accomplishing economic growth617 and social cohesion.618 
 
Board-level employee representation was a phenomenon that was mainly prevalent 
in Germany until the 1970’s. Since its establishment in iron and steel industry in 
1951, board-level employee representation is now extensively found in all large 
German companies and companies in excess of 2000 employees are benefitted with 
                                                          
616
 Commission, ‘The European Social Dialogue: A force for Innovation and Change’ COM (2002) 
341, p6. 
617
 From an economic standpoint, employee involvement results in simplifying exchange of 
information, reducing transaction costs and agency costs etc. 
618
 From a social standpoint, employee involvement raises a platform for fairness and employees are 
able to negotiate their engagement terms (see, Chapter 2- Justifying Employee Involvement in 
Corporate Governance). 
131 
near-parity representation.619 Figure 5 below depicts a map of board-level employee 
representation in companies across the EU at national level and is categorised as 
the following: (i) mainly found in public-sector companies; (ii) found in private and 
public-sector companies; and (iii) no board-level employee representation.  
 
 
Figure 5- Board-level employee representation across the EU at national level 
 
The UK, Bulgaria, Romania, Belgium, Italy, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania and 
Latvia provide no national legal obligation for companies to mandate board-level 
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employee representation. Other Member States that do provide board-level 
employee representation usually have a lower proportion; the exception is 
Germany.620 The percentage of companies with some sort of official board-level 
employee representation is more than 50% in France, Denmark and Sweden (this 
includes both private and public-sector companies).621 This percentage is less than 
20% in Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the Czech Republic, where board-level 
employee representation is restricted to public-sector companies.622  
 
The present literature on international comparative studies of board-level employee 
representation is principally qualitative and has mixed conclusions.623 There are 
hardly any quantitative studies econometrically comparing the differences in Member 
States of the effect of board-level employee representation on company 
performance.624 Berg et al. quote Bryson and Frege’s625 finding that, ‘despite the 
growth in comparative company information, studies that evaluate and contrast 
findings across states are scarce’.626 Bryson et al. also concur that empirical studies 
into the occurrence, outcomes and determinants of board-level employee 
representation are almost non-existent.627  
 
The key significance of this chapter is to analyse the variation in attitude on board-
level employee representation across the EU, which is also attributed to the 
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ambiguous factor of its classification whether under company law or labour law. This 
ambiguity in classification makes the provisions on board-level employee 
representation much intricate in Member States that have any legal basis of 
employee representation. This chapter makes an attempt to lay the foundation for 
future quantitative studies and an established qualitative conclusion for prospective 
international comparative research in the years to come. It explores the variation in 
attitudes to board-level employee representation across the EU, and the system of 
board-level employee representation in the shortlisted Member States mentioned 
above.628 The analysis will be followed by a case study on board-level employee 
representation in carefully shortlisted Member States like Denmark, Poland and 
France. This comparative and exploratory work will form the basis of an argument 
supporting the establishment of a uniform system of board-level employee 
representation in the shape of an SE.  
 
6.2 The separation of employees between company law and labour law 
One prominent reason for variable board-level employee representation perspectives 
within the Member States is the controversial question whether it falls under 
company law or labour law. This difficulty plays a significant role in determining the 
acceptance of board-level employee representation provisions among company 
actors and other third-party stakeholders. Despite the attempts to harmonise 
company and labour law, they remain two different schools of thought for legal 
scholarship, political reality or regulatory policy.629 Some scholars have suggested 
that discounting labour matters from corporate governance can be justified based on 
two factors: the strong separation of labour between labour law and company law; 
and the fact that corporate governance is encompassed within the scope of company 
law.630 Greenfield notes that corporate law is predominantly about shareholders and 
directors, and seldom are the interests of other stakeholders considered. 631 It is rare 
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that corporate law will reflect the relationship between the company and employees, 
simply because the interests of employees are matters of employment and labour 
law.632 Conchon in the European Trade Union Institute Working Paper quotes Simon 
Deakin in identifying the challenges faced by courts of justice as a result: 
 
“The implicit assumptions of company law, particularly during a period when 
shareholder value is to the fore, often run counter to those of labour law, so that 
complementarity is hard to achieve. This gives rise to interesting issues concerning 
which field has priority in specific contexts (corporate restructuring being the most 
obvious). Courts have to use techniques reminiscent of the conflict of laws to resolve 
these tensions, which cannot be solved by merging the two fields except in the 
sense of completely subordinating one set of values and goals to the other.”633 
 
The boundaries between company and labour law have steadily distorted over time, 
making jurisprudence and the production of legal rules more complicated. As a 
result, board-level employee representation remains an outstanding issue for EU 
legislators: should provisions be cast under labour law or company law? Board-level 
employee representation, along with employee information and consultation, 
certainly falls under the umbrella of ‘employee involvement’, which is incorporated in 
the legal domain as a set of provisions relating to labour law.634 This is because 
employee involvement (board-level employee representation, information and 
consultation) is encompassed in Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union, 
whose addition in the Treaty through the integration of the Protocol on Social Policy 
to the Maastricht Treaty instituting the EU, is intended to relate to labour law. In 
essence, the wordings of Article 153 are a reflection of the European Labour Law 
more than anything else. Paragraph 1 of Article 153 of The Treaty on European 
Union reads: 
 
“…the Union shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in the 
following fields: (a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect 
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workers' health and safety; (b) working conditions; (c) social security and social 
protection of workers; (d) protection of workers where their employment contract is 
terminated; (e) the information and consultation of workers; (f) representation and 
collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including 
codetermination, subject to paragraph 5; (g) conditions of employment for third-
country nationals legally residing in Union territory; (h) the integration of persons 
excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to Article 166; (i) equality 
between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment 
at work; (j) the combating of social exclusion; (k) the modernisation of social 
protection systems without prejudice to point (c).” 
 
There are, however, two reasons why board-level employee representation, like 
employee information and consultation, might not fall under European law.635 First, 
different law-making processes govern the regulation of information and 
consultation, in comparison with representation. Article 153 of The Treaty on 
European Union provides for a separate handling of representation by laying down 
the specificity of its related law-making processes, thereby differentiating it from 
information and consultation. Article 153, §5 provide that unanimous agreement is 
necessary for the Council after dialogue between the Committee of the Regions, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament (special legislative 
procedure). Contrariwise, Article 153, §4 provides that law on information and 
consultation requires the European Parliament and the Council to act together after 
dialogue with the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee (ordinary legislative procedure).636 
 
Secondly, the ‘anchorage’ of EU law on board-level employee representation lies in 
separate legal principles in comparison with the law on information and consultation 
mechanisms. The EWC Directive and the ICE Directive637 (both particularly 
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dedicated to company-level employee information and consultation) are established 
on the legal basis of Article 153 The Treaty on European Union. On the other hand, 
the SE Directive638 and SCE Directive639 (both particularly dedicated to employee 
representation) are anchored in an entirely different legal basis whose relationship 
with labour law is rather obscure. This is because Article 352 is not provided under 
the ‘social policy’640 part of the Treaty, but is listed under an unclear part of the 
Treaty called ‘general and final provisions’641. Also, before anchoring the ECS in 
Article 352 of The Treaty on European Union, EU legislators perceived board-level 
employee representation and the SE Directive as being within the parameter of 
freedom of establishment, with a view to achieving a single market (an issue dealt 
within company law). 
 
Further, legal scholarship is divided regarding the question of whether the ECS is 
within the scope of labour or company law. For example, labour law experts like 
Blanpain642; De Vos643; Neumann644 and Neal645 in their research interpret the ECS 
within the scope of labour law. In contrast, company law experts like Andenas and 
Wooldridge646; Grundmann and Möslein647; and Hopt and Wymeersch648 interpret 
the ECS within the scope of company law.649 Policymakers also evaluate and 
incorporate board-level representation differently in their own Member States. Table 
11 below represents the existing board-level employee representation legislation in 
Member States and its scope: 
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Member State Legal Provisions Scope 
Austria Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz, ArbVG § 110 1974 
(Labour Constitution Act 1974) 
Company law 
Czech 
Republic 
Zákon č. 77/1997 Sb., o státním podniku 1997 
(Act n°77/1997 Coll., on state enterprises 1997) 
Company law 
Czech 
Republic and 
Slovakia 
Zakon č. 111/1990 z 19. aprila 1990 o štatnom podniku 1990 
(Act n° 111/1990 of 19 April 1990 on state enterprise 1990) 
 
Zakon č. 513/1991 Sb., obchodni zakonik 1991 
(Act n° 513/1991 Coll., Commercial Code 1991) 
Company law 
 
 
Company law 
 
Denmark lov nr. 370 fra 13. juni 1973 om aktieselskaber 
(Act n°370 of 13 June 1973 on public limited companies) 
 
lov nr. 371 af 13. juni 1973 om anpartsselskaber 1973 
(Act n°371 of 13 June 1973 on private limited companies 1973) 
Company law 
 
 
Company law 
Finland Laki 725/1990 henkilöstön edustuksesta yritysten hallinnossa 
1990 
(Act 725/1990 on personnel representation in the 
administration of undertakings 1990) 
Labour law 
France Loi 83-675 de Democratisation du secteur public 1983 
(Act 83-675 on the democratisation of the public sector 1983) 
 
Ordonnance 86-1135 modifiant la loi 66-537 sur les sociétés 
commerciales 1986 
(Edict 86-1135 modifying Act 66-537 on commercial 
companies 1986) 
 
Loi 94-640 relative a l’amelioration de la participation des 
salaries dans l’entreprise 1994 
(Act 94-640 on enhancing employees’ participation in the 
company 1994) 
 
Loi constitutionnelle de modernisation des institutions de la Ve 
République 2008 
(Constitutional law on the Modernisation of the Institutions of 
the Fifth Republic 2008) 
 
La loi relative au dialogue social et à l’emploi 2015 
(Law on Labour Relations and Employment 2015) 
Labour law 
 
 
Labour law 
 
 
 
 
Labour law 
 
 
 
 
Labour law 
 
 
 
 
Labour law 
Germany Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz - Gesetz uber die 
Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsraten und 
Vorstanden der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen 
und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie vom 21. Mai 1951 
(Mining Co-determination Act - Act on the participation of 
employees in the supervisory boards and boards of companies 
in the mining and iron and steel industry of 21 May 1951) 
 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz vom 11. Oktober 1952 
(Works constitution Act of 11 October 1952) 
 
Mitbestimmungsgesetz vom 4. Mai 1976 
(Co-determination Act of 4 May 1976) 
Labour law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour law 
 
 
Labour law 
Greece Νόμος 1365/1983, Κοινωνικοποίηση των Επιχειρήσεων 
δημοσίου χαρακτήρα ή κοινής ωφελειας 1983 
(Act 1365/1983, Socialisation of state-run undertakings and 
utilities 1983) 
Insufficient data 
Hungary 1988. évi VI. Törvény, A gazdasági társaságokról 1988 
(Act VI of 1988 on Business Associations 1988) 
Company law 
Ireland Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Act No 6/1977 Labour law 
Luxembourg Loi du 6 mai 1974 instituant des comités mixtes dans les Labour law 
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Member State Legal Provisions Scope 
entreprises du secteur privé et organisant la représentation 
des salariés dans les sociétés anonymes 
(Act of 6 May 1974 establishing joint committees in the private 
sector and organising the representation of employees in 
public limited companies) 
Netherlands De Wet van 6 mei 1971 (S 289) houdende voorzieningen met 
betrekking tot de structuur der naamloze en besloten 
vennootschap (Structuurwet) 
(Act of 6 May 1971 (S 289) establishing provisions for the 
structure of public and private limited companies (Structure 
law)) 
Company law 
Poland Ustawa z dnia 25 września 1981 r. o przedsiębiorstwach 
państwowych 
(Act of 25 September 1981 on state enterprises) 
 
Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996 r. o komercjalizaji I 
prywatyzacji przedsiębiorstw państwowych 
(Act of 30 August 1996 on the commercialisation and 
privatisation of state enterprises) 
Company law 
 
 
 
Company law 
Portugal Lei nº 46/79 de 12 de Setembro - Comissões de trabalhadores 
1979 
(Act n°46/79 of 12 September 1979 on works councils) 
Labour law 
Slovenia Zakon o sodelovanju delavcev pri upravljanju - ZSDU (Uradni 
list RS, št. 42/93 z dne 22. 7. 1993) 
(Act on Worker Participation in Management - SDU (Official 
Gazette RS, no. 42/93 of 22 July 1993)) 
Company law 
Sweden Lag (1976:351) om styrelserepresentation för de anställda i 
aktiebolag och ekonomiska föreningar 
(Act 1976:351 on employee representation on board of 
companies and economic associations) 
Labour law 
Table 11- Board-level employee representation provisions and their scope in 
Member States650 
 
Almost half of the Member States listed in Table 11- Board-level employee 
representation provisions and their scope in Member States, classify board-level 
employee representation within the scope of company law, and the other half within 
the scope of labour law. One plausible reason for this could be that, in half of the 
Member States, the labour ministry must have taken the lead on initiating the bill or 
at the concluding proclamation of the legislation, putting the legislation within the 
scope of labour law, whereas in other Member States like the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Denmark, board-level employee representation is integrated as a sub-
section of the commercial code, therefore placing it within the scope of company 
law.651 This separation between company law and labour law has made it difficult to 
achieve uniformity when applying EU laws on employee involvement as there is a 
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great deal of latitude in its interpretation, thereby challenging the scope to achieve a 
‘single market’. 
 
6.3 Employee representation in shortlisted Member States  
Employee representation in both public-sector and private-sector companies has 
been officially recognised across most Member States in the EU and is organised in 
each individual Member State by systems such as trade unions, works councils and 
board-level representation. The particular nature of industrial relations in each 
Member State generates a great deal of variance in employee representation across 
the EU. As mentioned in the chapters discussed earlier, there have been variable 
conclusions on the issue of employee involvement, especially board-level employee 
representation in companies across the EU. Academics have suggested that the 
types of representation adopted are largely influenced by national culture, 
competition, union membership, sector and the size of the organisation.652 Cabrera 
et al. argue in their working paper ‘Employee Participation in Europe’ that the 
national culture in which the company operates influences the degree of 
representation and is a prevailing factor in explaining organisational behaviour.653 
They suggest that ‘a company’s competition level will be positively linked to 
employee representation; union membership will be negatively linked to employee 
representation; size of the organisation will be positively linked to employee 
representation and there will be a higher employee representation in the service 
sector in comparison with the manufacturing sector.654  
 
This hypothesis to some extent generalises the determinants of employee 
representation. It is plausible that national culture is one of the most prominent 
factors that determine the degree of employee representation adopted by legislators 
in their own Member State.655 However, the following case studies will demonstrate 
that employee representation does not depend on union membership, size of the 
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organisation or the sector in which a company operates, albeit these factors do 
influence employee involvement in some Member States.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 5- Board-level employee representation across the EU at 
national level earlier, board-level employee representation across Member States 
varies significantly. The following table collates data by comparing some board-level 
employee representation features across the EU. 
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Member 
State 
Corporate 
governance 
Regulation 
(public-sector) 
Regulation 
(private-sector) 
Scope Proportion or number of 
Employees’ representatives 
Nomination of representatives and 
appointment mechanism 
Eligibility criteria 
Austria Dualistic Yes Yes Ltd. companies 
> 300 
employees 
One-third of supervisory board Appointment by works council. Only works 
council 
members 
(having active 
voting rights, 
i.e. only 
employees) 
Belgium Monistic No No     
Bulgaria Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
No No     
Croatia Monistic and 
dualistic 
(only PLCs 
can opt 
monistic) 
Yes Yes Ltd. companies 
> 200 
employees 
One board member A. Appointment by works council. 
If none, then: 
 
B. Appointment by trade unions or 
a group of employees supported 
by at least 10% of the workforce. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
A. No 
restrictions 
 
B. Only 
employees 
Cyprus Monistic No No     
Czech 
Republic 
Dualistic Yes Yes A. PLCs >50 
employees (or 
<50 employees 
if provided for 
by articles of 
association) 
 
B. Public-
sector 
companies 
A. One-third of supervisory board 
(up to half if provided for by 
articles of association) 
 
 
 
 
 
B. One-third of supervisory board 
 
A. Appointment by management 
board and trade unions/ works 
council or a group of employees 
supported by at least 10% of the 
workforce. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
 
B. Electoral regulations set up by 
employer in accord with any trade 
unions. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
A. Employees 
or external 
trade union 
representatives 
 
 
 
 
B. Only 
employees 
Denmark Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
Yes Yes PLCs and Ltd. 
companies >35 
employees 
 
 
One-third of board with a 
minimum of two members 
(minimum three members on the 
parent company’s board of a 
group falling within the 
regulation’s scope). 
No specific legal procedure. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
Only employees 
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Member 
State 
Corporate 
governance 
Regulation 
(public-sector) 
Regulation 
(private-sector) 
Scope Proportion or number of 
Employees’ representatives 
Nomination of representatives and 
appointment mechanism 
Eligibility criteria 
Estonia Dualistic No No     
Finland Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
Yes Yes PLCs and Ltd. 
companies 
>150 
employees and 
application by 
two personnel 
groups jointly 
representing 
employees 
 
Arrangement between employer 
and at least two personnel groups 
which represents a majority with 
respect to number of 
representatives (unrestricted) and 
the body of their representation. 
 
If there is no arrangement, then 
minimum standards applicable: 
one-fifth of the board (maximum 
four) and the employers decide on 
which board the representatives 
will sit (supervisory, management 
or board of directors). 
Nomination is by personnel 
groups. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
 
Only employees 
France Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
Yes Yes A. Private-
sector 
companies 
 
 
 
B. Privatised 
companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Private 
sector PLCs  
(voluntary) 
 
 
 
 
D. Private 
sector PLCs 
(compulsory) 
A. Two members and up to one-
third of the board in companies 
with <200 employees. 
One-third of the board in 
companies with >200 employees. 
 
B. One to three members subject 
to the relevant privatisation Act 
and the board size. 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Up to one-fourth of the board 
(maximum four members or 
maximum five members in listed 
companies with a board of 
directors). 
 
 
 
D. Less than and equal to 12 
board members (minimum one) 
A. Representatives backed by 
trade unions or supported by at 
least 10% of the workforce. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
 
B. Representatives backed by 
trade unions or supported by at 
least 5% of the workforce (or 100 
employees in companies >2,000 
employees). 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
 
C. Representatives backed by 
trade unions or supported by at 
least 5% of the workforce (or 100 
employees in companies >2,000 
employees). 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
 
D. Following works council’s 
opinion, the general meeting of 
Only employees 
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Member 
State 
Corporate 
governance 
Regulation 
(public-sector) 
Regulation 
(private-sector) 
Scope Proportion or number of 
Employees’ representatives 
Nomination of representatives and 
appointment mechanism 
Eligibility criteria 
>5,000 
employees in 
France or 
>10,000 
globally 
with >5,000 employees in France 
and more than 12 board members 
(minimum two) with >10,000 
employees globally. 
shareholders may choose the 
following: (i) trade unions 
(appointment- election by 
employees); (ii) appointment by 
works council; (iii) appointment by 
TU; and (iv) one employee 
representative is appointed as (i), 
(ii) or (iii) and the other by the 
European works council or the SE 
works council. 
Germany Dualistic Yes Yes A. PLCs, Ltd. 
companies, 
cooperatives 
and 
partnership 
limited by 
shares (KGaA) 
with 500 - 
2,000 
employees 
 
B. PLCs, Ltd. 
companies, 
cooperatives 
and 
partnership 
limited by 
shares (KGaA) 
with >2,000 
employees 
 
 
C. Iron, coal 
and steel 
companies 
>1,000 
A. One-third of supervisory board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Half of supervisory board (one 
member must be an executive 
manager)
656
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Half of supervisory board
657
 
and de facto one managerial 
board member. 
 
A. Nomination of representatives 
by works council or employees 
(10% or 100). 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Nomination of representatives 
via election by employees (20% or 
100). Also, trade unions can also 
nominate two or three 
representatives. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees or by delegates in 
companies with >8,000 
employees. 
 
C. Nomination of some 
representatives by works council 
and some by trade unions.  
Appointment- By the 
shareholders’ general meeting. 
A. One or two 
representatives- 
only 
employees; but 
if > two 
representatives- 
at least two 
employees 
 
 
B. Employees 
or trade union 
representatives 
(external) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Employees; 
trade union 
officials 
(external); or an 
‘extra member’ 
(not a trade 
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Member 
State 
Corporate 
governance 
Regulation 
(public-sector) 
Regulation 
(private-sector) 
Scope Proportion or number of 
Employees’ representatives 
Nomination of representatives and 
appointment mechanism 
Eligibility criteria 
employees 
 
union official or 
an employee) 
Greece Monistic Yes  Public-sector 
companies 
One to two board members Nominations of representatives 
legally are done by employees. 
Nominations of representatives de 
facto are done by TU fractions. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees (official appointment 
by the relevant minister). 
Only employees 
 
Hungary Monistic and 
dualistic 
(only PLCs 
can opt 
monistic 
structure) 
Yes Yes PLCs and Ltd. 
companies 
>200 
employees 
In monistic structure companies, it 
is in accordance with an 
agreement between board of 
directors and works council. 
 
In dualistic structure companies, 
one-third of supervisory board 
(save for any agreement by the 
management and works council). 
Nomination of representatives is 
by works council, although obliged 
to ask trade unions for their view. 
Appointment- By the 
shareholders’ general meeting. 
Only employees 
 
Ireland Monistic Yes  Private-sector 
commercial 
companies and 
state agencies 
One-third of the board Nomination of representatives by 
bodies recognised for collective 
bargaining or trade unions. 
Election by employees (official 
appointment by the relevant 
minister). 
Only employees 
 
Italy Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
No No     
Latvia Dualistic No No     
Lithuania Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
No No     
Luxembourg Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
Yes Yes A. PLCs 
>1,000 
employees 
 
 
B. Private-
sector 
companies 
A. One-third of the board 
 
 
 
 
 
B. One board member for every 
100 employees (minimum 3 
A. Appointment- Election by staff 
representatives (save for in the 
iron and steel industry). 
 
 
 
B. Appointment- Election by staff 
representatives. 
A. Only 
employees 
(save for in the 
iron and steel 
industry) 
 
B. Only 
employees 
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Member 
State 
Corporate 
governance 
Regulation 
(public-sector) 
Regulation 
(private-sector) 
Scope Proportion or number of 
Employees’ representatives 
Nomination of representatives and 
appointment mechanism 
Eligibility criteria 
(the state or 
state 
concession 
holds minimum 
25% of shares) 
members and maximum one-third 
of the board). 
 
 
Malta Monistic No No     
Netherlands Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
Yes Yes ‘Structuur’ 
PLCs and Ltd. 
companies, i.e. 
companies 
with: (i) equity 
capital >16 M€; 
(ii) a works 
council; and 
(iii) >100 
employees, 
including 
subsidiaries
658
 
In monistic structure companies, it 
is one-third of the non-executive 
directors’ seats. 
 
In dualistic structure companies, 
one-third of supervisory board. 
Nomination of representatives is 
by works council. 
Appointment- By the 
shareholders’ general meeting. 
Employees and 
trade unionists 
are not involved 
in collective 
bargaining 
agreements 
with the 
management. 
Poland Dualistic Yes Yes Commercialise
d companies
659
 
and privatised 
companies
660
 
 
 
Two-fifth of supervisory board in 
commercialised companies. 
 
Minimum two-four members of the 
supervisory board (depending on 
the size of supervisory board) in 
privatised companies. 
Further, one member of 
management board in companies 
>500 employees. 
No restrictions regarding the 
nomination of representatives. 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
No restrictions 
Portugal Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
Yes  Private-sector 
companies 
As per individual company’s 
articles of association. 
Nomination of representatives is 
by works council or 100 or 20% of 
employees. 
 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
Only employees 
 
                                                          
658
 Few exceptions apply. 
659
 Commercialised companies are public-sector companies converted into Ltd. companies or PLCs with the State being the sole shareholder. Public-sector companies in Poland 
continue to be governed by Act of 25 September 1981 on state enterprises on employees’ self-management. 
660
 Privatised companies are companies in which the State is no longer the sole shareholder. 
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Member 
State 
Corporate 
governance 
Regulation 
(public-sector) 
Regulation 
(private-sector) 
Scope Proportion or number of 
Employees’ representatives 
Nomination of representatives and 
appointment mechanism 
Eligibility criteria 
Romania Monistic and 
dualistic 
(option) 
No No     
Slovakia Dualistic Yes Yes A. PLCs >50 
employees or 
<50 employees 
if provided 
under articles 
of association 
 
B. Private-
sector 
companies 
A. One-third of supervisory board 
and up to half of supervisory 
board if provided under articles of 
association. 
 
 
 
 
B. Half of supervisory board
661
 
 
A. Nomination of representatives 
is by trade unions or employees 
(10%). 
Appointment- Election by 
employees. 
 
 
 
B. Appointment- Election by 
employees and if there is any 
trade union then direct 
appointment of one of the board 
members (employee side). 
A. No 
restrictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Only 
employees 
(trade union 
members only 
eligible for trade 
union seat) 
Slovenia Monistic and 
dualistic 
(only PLCs 
can opt 
monistic) 
Yes Yes PLCs and Ltd. 
companies that 
satisfy two of 
the following (i) 
>50 
employees; (ii) 
sales turnover 
>8.8 M€; and 
(iii) asset value 
>4.4 M€ 
In dualistic structure companies, 
between one-third and half of 
supervisory board
662
, as provided 
under articles of association. 
 
In monistic structure companies, 
one-fourth of the board and 
minimum one member, as 
provided under articles of 
association.  
Appointment- By works council. Only employees 
 
Spain Monistic Yes  Public-sector 
companies 
>1,000 
employees 
 
Public-sector 
companies 
(metal sector) 
Two to three members (one 
member per entitled participating 
trade union) 
Trade unions participation 
allowed.
663
 
No restrictions 
                                                          
661
 Save for the chair. 
662
 Ibid. 
663
 Representing a minimum of 25% works councils and employee representatives and seats. 
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Member 
State 
Corporate 
governance 
Regulation 
(public-sector) 
Regulation 
(private-sector) 
Scope Proportion or number of 
Employees’ representatives 
Nomination of representatives and 
appointment mechanism 
Eligibility criteria 
>500 
Employees 
Sweden Monistic Yes Yes PLCs and Ltd. 
companies >25 
employees
664
 
Two members in companies with 
<1,000 employees. 
 
Three members in companies with 
>1,000 employees and 
operational in various industries. 
 
The maximum number could only 
be the half of the board.  
Appointment by trade unions is 
guaranteed by collective 
arrangement with the company.
665
 
Generally, 
employees
666
 
United 
Kingdom 
Monistic No No     
Table 12- Variable features of board-level employee representation across Member States667
                                                          
664
 Additionally, decision by local trade union is guaranteed by collective arrangement with the company. 
665
 Regarding the distribution of seats between trade unions, the standard rule will be applicable if there is no agreement among trade unions. 
666
 Not mandatory. 
667
 Table includes own research and is largely based on:  
‘Employee Representation and Information, Consultation and Co-Determination Rights in Europe’ (Practical Law, 1 November 2015) <http://uk.practicallaw.com/9-503-
2690?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=> accessed 16 January 2018; 
A Conchon, ‘Board-Level Employee Representation Rights in Europe: Facts and Trends’ (European Trade Union Institute, 2011) 
<https://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf/2011_ETUI_Report___Board_level_employee_representation_rights_in_Europe.pdf> accessed 18 January 2018; and 
Hornuf et al., ‘The Economic Impact of Forming a European Company’ (SSRN, 15 November 2016) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837009> accessed 17 January 2018 
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Ten Member States do not have any national regulation on board-level employee 
representation (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania and the United Kingdom). Four Member States have regulations only in the 
public-sector (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). The remaining 14 Member 
States have regulations found in both public-sector and private-sector companies 
(Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Netherland, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden). Table 12- 
Variable features of board-level employee representation across Member States also 
illustrates that, in addition to the nature of company (public or private), board-level 
employee representation also depends on the ‘scope and size’668 of the company 
and corporate governance structure. 
 
Member States with different board-level employee representation perspectives are 
shortlisted in the following case studies. 
 
6.3.1 Case study: Denmark 
Denmark provides a substantial comparison with other Member States. Denmark 
accepted the ECS without argument, because the country already has strong board-
level employee representation rights. It is also an interesting comparison because it 
has the highest employee representation rate according to the European 
Participation Index (EPI) 2.0.  
 
The EPI is a comparison tool devised by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) 
to measure the level of employee involvement in Member States. It is a composite 
table that summarises the standard of involvement on three levels (board-level, 
establishment level and collective bargaining) and formal rights.669 The EPI 2.0 is 
calculated as: EPI 2.0 = (workplace representation + (board representation / 2) + 
((collective bargaining coverage + trade union density) / 2) / 3 
                                                          
668
 Member States like Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden have a low 
minimum workforce threshold from 25-50 employees for the regulations to apply. Member States like 
Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary and Netherland have a medium threshold from 50-500 
employees. Member States like Spain, Germany and Luxembourg have higher thresholds from >500 
employees. However, some Member States like Austria (PLC) and Luxembourg (private-sector) do 
not have any minimum workforce threshold. 
669
 European Participation Index (worker-participation.eu) <http://www.worker-participation.eu/About-
WP/European-Participation-Index-EPI> accessed 11 August 2016. 
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The latest EPI 2.0 is represented in the table below: 
Member 
State 
Workplace 
representation 
Board 
representation 
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage 
Trade 
union 
density EPI 2.0 
Austria 0.21 2 0.98 0.35 0.63 
Belgium 0.53 0 0.96 0.55 0.43 
Bulgaria 0.35 0 0.25 0.20 0.19 
Cyprus 0.37 0 0.75 0.70 0.37 
Czech 
Republic 0.18 2 0.44 0.22 0.50 
Denmark 0.68 2 0.80 0.80 0.83 
Estonia 0.52 0 0.25 0.11 0.23 
Finland 0.6 2 0.90 0.74 0.81 
France 0.5 1 0.93 0.08 0.50 
Germany 0.41 2 0.64 0.22 0.61 
Greece 0.04 1 0.85 0.30 0.37 
Hungary 0.26 2 0.25 0.17 0.49 
Ireland 0.29 1 0.35 0.35 0.38 
Italy 0.37 0 0.80 0.34 0.31 
Latvia 0.35 0 0.20 0.16 0.18 
Lithuania 0.21 0 0.10 0.14 0.11 
Luxembourg 0.52 2 0.60 0.46 0.68 
Malta 0.14 1 0.56 0.59 0.41 
Netherlands 0.45 2 0.89 0.22 0.67 
Poland 0.35 1 0.35 0.16 0.37 
Portugal 0.05 1 0.94 0.15 0.37 
Romania 0.52 0 0.30 0.30 0.27 
Slovakia 0.43 2 0.35 0.30 0.59 
Slovenia 0.42 2 0.96 0.44 0.71 
Spain 0.52 1 0.82 0.16 0.50 
Sweden 0.63 2 0.90 0.78 0.82 
United 
Kingdom 0.17 0 0.34 0.28 0.16 
Table 13- European Participation Index 2.0670 
 
In addition, the European Company Survey in 2009 found that employee 
representation in Denmark is the strongest in the EU, with 68% of companies having 
some structure of representation.671 European Company Survey data also reveal 
that the dual form of representation is the principal form of formal representation, 
with 40% of companies having both a trade union and a works council. 20% of 
companies have only trade unions as a single representative form and 8% of 
companies are represented via a single-channel works council. Strong employee 
representation rights in Denmark have been attributed to the following factors:  
  
                                                          
670
 Ibid. 
671
 Aumayr et al., ‘Employee Representation at Establishment Level in Europe: European Company 
Survey 2009’ (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2011) 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1143en.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2016. 
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(i) Trade union and collective bargaining agreements:672 
Denmark has well founded collective bargaining coverage and trade union density. 
Collective bargaining agreements are covered in 80% of workplaces and 67% of the 
entire workforce has trade union membership.673  
  
Denmark’s established custom of cooperation between employers and employees 
has guaranteed that trade unions are included in industrial relations throughout the 
company level. Employers are obligated to have a dialogue with trade unions. A 
company with five or more employees is entitled to elect a trade union representative 
and for every fifty employees, there is one trade union representative. The public 
sector has 99% trade union representation, and the private sector has 78% 
representation. Even companies with fewer than 20 employees have 57% 
representation in total.  
 
Finland and Belgium are the two other Member States where trade unions are 
prevalent in smaller companies, as the only representation system within a 
company.674 In the rest of the EU, trade unions as the solitary bodies for 
representation are found mainly in bigger companies covering a significantly larger 
number of employees.675 This can be explained partly by the prevalence of dual-
channel representation in these companies and partly by the presence of trade 
unions as key brokers even where works councils are bodies of single-channel 
representation.676  
 
The extensiveness of collective bargaining in Denmark is much bigger when 
compared to the UK. Collective bargaining in Denmark covers pensions, notice 
periods, holidays, working-time agreements, and health and safety. The minimum 
                                                          
672
 Duffy et al., ‘Working Together: A Vision for Industrial Democracy in a Common Weal Economy’ 
(Jimmy Reid Foundation, 2013) <http://reidfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/IndustrialDemocracy.pdf> accessed 13 August 2016. 
673
 L Fulton, ‘Denmark: Trade Unions’ (worker-participation.eu) <http://www.worker-
participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Denmark> accessed 18 September 2016. 
674
 Aumayr et al., ‘Employee Representation at Establishment Level in Europe: European Company 
Survey 2009’ (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2011) 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1143en.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2016. 
675
 Ibid. 
676
 Ibid. 
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requirements for these are defined under Danish employment law, which also 
includes the minimum requirements for employer-employee agreements. 
 
(ii) Co-operation committees:677 
The co-operation committees in Denmark (equivalent to works councils in other 
Member States) facilitate routine industrial relations and are made up of a 
proportionate number of employee and management representatives. Shop 
stewards have automatic membership. The trade union representatives in the 
companies are given priority on the committee membership, before other elected 
employees are considered. The management representatives consist of board 
members and supervisory staff. Unlike many works councils, the co-operation 
committees are denied a veto over management decisions despite having 
consultation rights.678 
 
(iii) Board-level employee representation:679 
Since the 1987 amendments to the Act No. 370 of June 13, 1973 on public limited 
companies680 and Act No. 371 of June 13, 1973 on private limited companies681 
(see, Table 11- Board-level employee representation provisions and their scope in 
Member States), employees may ‘demand’682 to elect a minimum of two employee 
representatives,683 and up to one-third of the board in companies (both public-sector 
and private-sector) with >35 employees. Small companies are governed by the 
board of directors and bigger companies are governed by the dualistic governance 
structure. The board has the authority to veto decisions in both cases. Board-level 
employee representatives share the same power and responsibilities as the other 
board members. They are involved in the management board’s appointment and 
                                                          
677
 Duffy et al., ‘Working Together: A Vision for Industrial Democracy in a Common Weal Economy’ 
(Jimmy Reid Foundation, 2013) <http://reidfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/IndustrialDemocracy.pdf> accessed 13 August 2016. 
678
 Aumayr et al., ‘Employee Representation at Establishment Level in Europe: European Company 
Survey 2009’ (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2011) 
<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1143en.pdf> 
accessed 1 September 2016. 
679
 Commission, ‘Employee Representatives in an Enlarged Europe: Volume 1’ COM (2008), 163-164. 
680
 Lov nr. 370 fra 13. juni 1973 om aktieselskaber. 
681
 Lov nr. 371 af 13. juni 1973 om anpartsselskaber. 
682
 As this is not a mandatory provision, this demand needs to be triggered by at least one-tenth of 
employees or one or many trade unions representing at least one-tenth of employees at company 
level.  
683
 Three employee representatives in the parent company. 
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directly discharge decision-making on the board. It has been reported that 80% of 
board-level employee representatives were content with the exchange of information 
and with their influence on the board.684  
 
With Danish culture already enshrining such strong board-level employee 
representation rights, the ECS was readily welcomed. Denmark was the first 
Member State to transpose the SE Directive685 on 26 April 2004 and the SE 
Regulation686 on 6 May 2004 into national law, with positive consensus from the 
unions and companies. It is interesting to note that until 15 April 2009, there were 
only two SEs registered in Denmark. The ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of 
the Statute for a European Company (SE)’ characterise Denmark: 
 
“…by a medium-high level of attractiveness in respect of national legislation 
applicable to the SE and by a medium-high level of attractiveness as regards the 
implementation (or non-implementation) of the options left open by the SE 
Regulation. When implementing (or not implementing) the options left open by the 
SE Regulation, Denmark has tended to reduce its overall attractiveness. As regards 
the intra Member State analysis, Denmark stand out with one of the highest level of 
attractiveness of the SE compared to the domestic public limited-liability 
company.”687 
 
The minimal number of SEs in Denmark at that time may have been due to the 
complexity of the procedures in creating an SE than compared with the national 
public limited-liability company. Maybe companies were simply sceptical about the 
SE model and uncertain about its viability.  
 
Notwithstanding this, the Danish legislator adopted a flexible position on the SE 
Directive’s transposition in two respects. First, Danish law allows a company’s 
                                                          
684
 Commission, ‘Employee Representatives in an Enlarged Europe: Volume 1’ COM (2008), 163-164. 
685
 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European 
company with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294/22. 
686
 Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) 
[2001] OJ L294. 
687
 ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE) - 2008/S 
144-192482’ (Ernst & Young, 2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/se/study_SE_9122009_en.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2016. 
153 
administrative office that is outside the EU to be involved in establishing an SE (only 
if the said company is established under Danish law, has its registered office in 
Denmark and has an actual and constant link with Danish economy). Secondly, 
there is no requirement for the SE’s head office and registered office to be in the 
same place.688 Further, the possibility to opt between a one-tier and two-tier 
governance structure, and the option to unrestrictedly transfer its registered office, 
have added to the SE being an attractive company form in Denmark. Subsequently, 
the number of SEs registered in Denmark rose to 292 (as of 21 March 2014) despite 
any special tax or legal provisions to promote SEs. Denmark is now the Member 
State with the second highest number of registered SEs after the Czech Republic.689 
 
Denmark was also the first Member State to extend board-level employee 
representation rights to its companies functioning in other countries,690 which allows 
employees of subsidiary companies to vote and possibly have board representation, 
pending agreement of the shareholders’ general meeting.691  
 
Denmark provides an important example of a cooperative approach to industrial 
relations that has been widely successful. This may be the reason that 55% of all the 
registered companies in Denmark have board-level employee representation.692 
Denmark’s trade union and collective bargaining agreements further  
 
“proves that high-levels of trade union density and collective bargaining coverage 
can reduce industrial conflict and increase productivity if it is built on a co-operative 
industrial relations culture and legislative framework”.693 
                                                          
688
 Ibid. 
689
 ‘2125 European Companies (SEs), Registered in 25 Countries’ (worker-participation.eu) 
<http://www.worker-participation.eu/var/ezwebin_site/storage/images/media/images/folie0321/97028-
1-eng-GB/Folie03.png> accessed 13 August 2016. 
690
 Per the Danish Company Act 2010. 
691
 A Conchon, ‘Board-Level Employee Representation Rights in Europe: Facts and Trends’ 
(European Trade Union Institute, 2011) 
<https://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf/2011_ETUI_Report___Board_level_employee_representation_rights_i
n_Europe.pdf> accessed 14 August 2016. 
692
 A Conchon, ‘Board-Level Employee Representation Rights in Europe: Facts and Trends’ 
(European Trade Union Institute, 2011) 
<https://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf/2011_ETUI_Report___Board_level_employee_representation_rights_i
n_Europe.pdf> accessed 14 August 2016. 
693
 Duffy et al., ‘Working Together: A Vision for Industrial Democracy in a Common Weal Economy’ 
(Jimmy Reid Foundation, 2013) <http://reidfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/IndustrialDemocracy.pdf> accessed 13 August 2016. 
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6.3.2 Case study: Poland 
Poland is one of the latest nations to have joined the EU694 and is considered as 
Europe’s economic success story. It was the only Member State to have avoided the 
2008 financial crisis and continues to grow economically.695 It ranks sixth of the EU’s 
strongest market economies and is the leading economy in Central and Eastern 
Europe.696 Board-level employee representation in Poland is lawfully mandated in 
public sector companies and in ‘commercialised companies’ (post-public 
companies).697 Commercialised companies are companies that are formed through 
conversion of a public enterprise into a limited liability company or joint-stock 
company. 698 Since 1989, changes in the Polish political system led to economic 
changes that, in turn, generated major changes in board-level employee 
representation. Employees were granted rights to organise into independent trade 
unions. In privatised companies, The Act of August 30, 1996 on the 
commercialisation and privatisation of state enterprises699 (see, Table 11- Board-
level employee representation provisions and their scope in Member States), 
provided employees with the right to elect 30% of a company’s supervisory board 
members and one member of its board of directors. This was possibly done to win 
employees’ support for their company’s privatisation; in reality, the new management 
often eliminates employees’ board-level representation rights after companies have 
been taken over. Companies frequently introduced parallel changes following 
ownership transfer, which would result in provisions overriding any board-level 
employee representation rights.700 
                                                          
694
 Poland became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004. 
695
 ‘Doubts Raised over Poland’s Success Story’ FT (6 May 2016) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/e5bc9c00-12c6-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173.html#axzz4K9U1283N> 
accessed 26 August 2016. 
696
 'Polish Economy - Invest in Poland' (Emerging Europe) <http://emerging-europe.com/regional-
opportunities/poland/polish-economy-invest-gdp-growth/> accessed 29 August 2016. 
697
 D Skupień, 'The Statute for a European Company and the Polish Model of Employees’ 
Involvement' (University of Lodz) 
<http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahU
KEwiD9bHgjsDPAhWBcRQKHSZCAu4QFggeMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fmb.unimore.it%2Fon
-line%2Fhome%2Feventi%2Fconvegni-in-ricordo-di-marco-
biagi%2Fdocumento8374.html&usg=AFQjCNFJeSP7mcJwQwd6xlwojB8F4rfQDw&sig2=4Wzq3a1QcI
oKYmB_xRZjIA> accessed 4 September 2016. 
698
 Ibid. 
699
 Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1966 r. o komercjalizaji I prywatyzacji przedsiębiorstw państwowych. 
700
 ‘Worker Board-Level Representation in the New EU Member States: Country Reports on the 
National Systems and Practices’ (Social Development Agency and European Trade Union Institute for 
Research Education and Health and Safety, 2005) <http://www.worker-
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Poland has various arrangements of employee representation and employees can 
be represented in the following ways: 
(i) Trade unions:701 
Trade unions are usually set up in ex private-sector companies (transport, energy 
and retail sectors). A trade union can be recognised if it has a membership of ten or 
more. A trade union organisation at the level of a company can be established if the 
founding members work in the same company; however, an intra-company trade 
union can be established if those members work for two or more companies. Polish 
trade unions are mostly influential at company level and their coverage includes 
monitoring compliance with Polish Labour Law, determining regulations at company 
level (for example, wage and work regulations, and collective labour agreements) 
and individual labour issues. One distinct feature of Polish unions is that they lack 
the authority to nominate board-level representatives, as only employees themselves 
have this power.702 It has also been suggested that the Polish trade union structure 
is ‘fairly decentralised’703 and only 12% of employees acknowledge being affiliated to 
trade unions, despite Poland’s strong trade union tradition.704 
 
(ii) Works councils:705 
A Polish works council is an established consultative organisation made up of 
employee representatives. It can be established in companies with 50 employees or 
more. Interestingly, these works councils can be established only by big trade union 
organisations. Works councils are associated with the unions in single-channel 
representation and are effectively an extension of trade unions. Works council 
members are selected by employees in the absence of trade unions at establishment 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
participation.eu/content/download/4280/58922/file/PRESENS_reports_BLR_in_NMS_readyforprint_fi
nal.pdf> accessed 29 September 2016. 
701
 Ibid. 
702
 Save for ‘welfare pacts’ (an agreement as a result of direct negotiation with the management) that 
allow the unions’ to nominate supervisory boards representatives. 
703
 N Kluge and M Stollt, ‘The European Company- Prospects for Worker Board-Level Participation in 
the Enlarged EU’ (Social Development Agency and European Trade Union Institute for Research 
Education and Health and Safety, 2006) 
<https://www.etui.org/content/download/2604/29038/file/booklet2006.pdf> accessed 14 September 
2016. 
704
 ‘Employee Representation and Information, Consultation and Co-Determination Rights in Europe’ 
(Practical Law, 1 November 2015) <http://uk.practicallaw.com/9-503-2690?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=> 
accessed 18 August 2016. 
705
 Commission, ‘Employee Representatives in an Enlarged Europe: Volume 2’ COM (2008), 115. 
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level; thus, an independent works council exists besides trade unions. Despite being 
independent, Polish works council functions are limited to information and 
consultation. 
 
(iii) Ad hoc representatives:706  
Employees may elect employee representatives on an ad hoc basis if no trade 
unions are recognised by a company. These employee representatives are primarily 
consulted on working hours, group dismissals, health and safety issues, social fund 
regulations and temporary deferral of the application of a few labour law provisions. 
 
Very little statistical data exists to quantify the benefits of board-level employee 
representation in Poland. Krzysztof Jasek’s Practitioner Report has led many new 
companies to consider the positive aspects of employee involvement.707 He gives an 
example of Famed SA, which was a potentially bankrupt company whose workforce 
steeply declined from 1000 to 400 in four years. Owing to the ‘enormous 
determination’ of Famed SA employees, the company transformed into an 
employee-owned company (almost 50% of its shares) in 1998, collectively with an 
external investor. Subsequently, employees were instrumental in decision-making. 
The trade unions obtained representation rights on the supervisory board in the 
privatisation negotiations. Further, the external investor also chose employees as his 
board representatives as it was felt that the employees had a profound involvement 
in company affairs and their perception of business practices was invaluable. Thus, 
five out of six members on the board were employees. The company’s agenda for 
the board meeting was more than just discussing strategy and included production 
and sales, costs and predicted profits, and salaries. The rationale behind this was to 
provide board members with wide-ranging knowledge of the company, enabling 
them to contribute to development planning. This example of Famed SA served as a 
case study for many companies, promoting the principle of employee representatives 
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 ‘Employee Representation and Information, Consultation and Co-Determination Rights in Europe’ 
(Practical Law, 1 November 2015) <http://uk.practicallaw.com/9-503-2690?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=> 
accessed 18 August 2016. 
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 ‘Worker Board-Level Representation in the New EU Member States: Country Reports on the 
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on the supervisory boards as generating ‘synergies’ and ‘cooperation’ in company 
operations.708  
 
Although the Polish legislator implemented the ECS in less than a year after Poland 
joined the EU,709 the attractiveness of the SE as a legal company form is 
disappointingly low. The ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a 
European Company (SE)’ categorise Poland as: 
 
“…a medium-high level of attractiveness in respect of national legislation applicable 
to the SE and by a medium-low level of attractiveness as regards the implementation 
(or non-implementation) of the options left open by the SE Regulation. When 
implementing (or not implementing) the options left open by the SE Regulation, 
Poland has tended to reduce its overall attractiveness. As regards the intra Member 
State analysis, Poland is characterised by a medium level of attractiveness of the SE 
compared to the domestic public limited-liability company.”710 
 
This characterisation may be somewhat optimistic. Until 15 April 2009 (at the time of 
the study), there were only 2 SEs registered in Poland; as of 15 July 2014, there are 
4 SEs in total registered in Poland (AERFINANCE SE, AmRest Holdings SE, 
LETUMO SE and MCAA SE).711 This number is low compared with Denmark, which 
too had only two SEs as of 15 April 2009, and 292 as of 21 March 2014. 
 
It is surprising that, despite being one of the strongest EU economies, Poland has 
failed to see the economic strength of incorporating an SE. For example, a national 
public limited-liability company in Poland is unable to transfer its registered head 
office out of the Member State of its incorporation, but an SE incorporated under 
Polish legislation can transfer its registered office abroad. Additionally, a national 
public limited-liability company in Poland fails to provide the option of a monistic 
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corporate governance system, but incorporation as an SE in Poland does provide 
such an option.712 
 
The usual explanations for the lack of interest in opting as an SE include the 
complexity of procedures in creating an SE compared with national public limited-
liability company, and cynicism and inexperience about the viability of an SE (as 
contrasted with Denmark). Complications of the monistic governance structure, the 
comparatively high minimum share capital and the difficult application of both EU 
and domestic provisions in the case of the SE are also potentially deterrent 
factors.713 Another major deterrence is the requirement to establish the SNB to 
negotiate the method of employee involvement in the SE and to gain assent to the 
arrangement prior to it being registered in the National Register. A limited liability 
company and a national joint-stock company in Poland do not impose such 
requirements.714 
 
Thus, employee involvement, especially board-level employee representation, in 
Poland is mostly restricted to public-sector companies. And the future of public-
sector companies is seemingly bleak, as privatisation has led to a decline in their 
number. Consequently, employee representation is being ‘eroded’.715 The SE has 
not been welcomed in the Polish market and the ICE Directive716 has been the 
subject of trade union apprehension: they fear   
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“…losing their monopoly at the workplace and that employers could promote the 
establishment of “union-free works councils” in order to weaken the position of the 
trade unions in the company”.717  
 
6.3.3 Case study: France 
France is the third largest economy in the EU and the sixth largest in the world. 
France’s GDP in 2015 was $2.42 trillion and just 18% short of the UK’s GDP, which 
was $2.85 trillion.718 The country has always maintained its reputation as one of the 
most forward-looking and highly-developed nations in the world and French leaders 
are continually seeking to tie France’s future to the constant development of the 
EU.719 Unlike other Member States, employee representation in France has a 
constitutional basis. The Preamble to the Constitution of 27 October 1946, which is 
integrated in the present Constitution of 4 October 1958, allows “all workers to take 
part, through their representatives, in the collective determination of working 
conditions and in company management.”720 The directions on employee 
representation in companies and the right to strike has a constitutional basis, as the 
French Constitution empowers the law to establish labour law’s broad principles.721 
 
In general terms, recently privatised public-sector companies in France have board-
level employee representatives, but companies in the private-sector can also 
exercise this option.722 Until very recently, no legislation explicitly required board-
level employee representation in companies within the private sector. This echoed 
France’s robust ‘syndicalist customs that inclined to highlight the commitment in 
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various trade unions to the basis of employees’ control of industry and employee 
involvement’.723 Employee shareholders may also be represented by board-level 
employee representatives. The number of board-level employee representatives can 
vary, depending on whether the company is a public-sector or private sector 
company; the size of the company; and the size of the board. In a public-sector 
company with more than 1000 employees, one-third of the board is nominated by 
employees; in a newly privatised company with fewer than 15 board members, 
employee representatives have three seats.724 
 
The dual channel model of representational participation best describes the 
employee representation regime in France and can be explained historically. The 
current system is a product of a gradual accumulation of representative forms that 
developed at different stages of French industrial relations history.725 Employee 
representation rights in France are constituted in the following ways: 
(i) Trade union (Délégué syndical): 
After the crisis of May 1968 in France,726 the Law of December 27, 1968 was 
passed, which guaranteed for the first time that the unions had an official footing in 
the workplace. Subsequently, a trade union could create its own bargaining unit in a 
company if it satisfies the prerequisite to have at least two members. This bargaining 
unit represents the interests of its members and promotes the activities of the union. 
Historically, trade unions in France, along with other countries in southern Europe, 
considered themselves “…vanguard organisations who existed in order to represent 
workers in struggle…and their aim was to challenge the power and authority of 
employers and not work in cooperation with them”.727 This may explain why, in 
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modern times, smaller and medium-sized companies do not have trade unions. They 
are present, however, in private-sector companies, with membership at 8% of the 
French workforce. Despite the low figure of union membership, it is an ‘established 
and important institution’ in companies where it has retained its presence.728 
 
To improve their image, two of the main French confederations of trade unions – 
CFE -CGC729 and CGT730 – are seeking to extend employee involvement and 
generalising board-level employee representation rights, which are presently limited 
to public-sector and privatised companies.731 The French Institute of Board-level 
Representatives, the IFA (Institut Français des Administrateurs),732 along with CFE-
CGC and CGT, have argued that public-sector companies should either willingly 
agree to employee representatives or must explain the reason for their 
unwillingness.733 The proposals were considered by the French legislator, but only 
resulted in procedural modifications in the conduct of labour relations with the 
passing of the Law on Labour Relations and Employment 2015.734 The absence of 
an overarching approach to board-level employee representation can be explained 
by the lack of harmonisation on the issue among the French confederations of trade 
unions, as some unions consider the issue insignificant (e.g. CGT-FO735).736 
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(ii) Individual employee delegation (Délégués du personnel): 737 
Most recently, the Law on Labour Relations and Employment 2015738 (mentioned 
above) extended the prospects of group employee representative bodies within a 
mutual body called the individual employee delegation. They are organised in 
companies with 11 or more employees and in companies with fewer than 50 
employees. Most of the duties and powers of health and safety committees and 
works councils are devolved to the individual employee delegation.  
 
(iii) Works councils (Comité d' Entreprise): 
Works councils (Comité d' Entreprise) in France were established by the ordinance 
of 22 February 1945,739 with a view to integrating employees more fully in the 
management of a company’s operations.  
 
The key functions of a French works councils are to guarantee employees’ collective 
expression, and to safeguard employees’ interests economically, professionally, 
culturally and socially. Companies with more than 100 employees were to have a 
committee that would represent all categories of employees. Owing to low trade 
union membership, the interests of the entire workforce is represented by the works 
councils. Nonetheless, unions play an important role in the works council, especially 
by exercising their exclusive power to nominate candidates for election in the works 
council in the first ballot.740 
 
On the management board and the supervisory board, the rights of a works council 
representatives are limited and their role is broadly consultative in nature, albeit that 
they are allowed to express opinions.741 A works council’s negative opinion is 
immaterial to the employer; their veto rights and enforceability are restricted; and an 
employer is only obliged to acquire works council consent in minor matters, such as 
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a company doctor’s appointment.742 In rare cases, the scope of information and 
consultation with the works council has extended to human resources issues, social 
issues and company strategy before the board makes a binding decision.743 
 
(iv) Health and safety committee (Comité d' Hygiène, de Sécurité, et des conditions 
de Travail):744 
In companies with more than 50 employees, the health and safety committee 
operates to safeguard employees’ health and safety, improving working conditions 
and preventing professional risks. 
 
(v) Collective bargaining agreements (Conventions Collectives de Travail):745 
The law of February 11, 1950 generalised collective bargaining in France, thereby 
establishing the industry as the foremost level for bargaining. The Aurox reforms of 
1982 were introduced to reinforce collective bargaining and employee 
representation, which enforced an annual obligation to negotiate working time and 
salary at the company level and a five-yearly obligation to negotiate job 
arrangements at the industry level. In contrast to other Member States, collective 
bargaining agreements in France are of substantial significance and it is considered 
an irony in the French industrial relations system that, despite the low level of union 
membership (8%), France has a high proportion of collective bargaining coverage 
(approximately 98%). It is debatable whether such a high coverage simply results 
from the extension of collective bargaining agreements by the Ministry of Labour. 
Collective bargaining agreements are mostly legally binding upon employers, 
regardless of whether the employer was involved in any collective bargaining or was 
associated with any employers' representative grouping that was party to the 
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negotiations.746 Even the specialised French Labour Courts usually interpret any 
disputed collective bargaining agreement provisions in the employees’ favour.747 
  
The irony extends to the central role that trade unions play in collective bargaining. 
Only official trade unions are authorised to bargain and sign collective bargaining 
agreements. This matter had been controversial for a long time, and the 
Constitutional law on the Modernisation of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic 
2008748 introduced new requirements to ascertain if a union is truly representative 
and permitted to be involved in collective bargaining at company, industry and 
national level. It also provided that, in the absence of trade union delegates, staff 
delegates and works councils can negotiate and sign collective bargaining 
agreements on some issues. Further, the binding nature of collective bargaining 
agreements in France is much stronger than in Member States like Greece, Portugal 
and Germany. For example, if collective bargaining agreements are concluded by 
the trade unions, then it is firmly binding on the employers. 
 
French law thus separates the functions of two prominent employee representation 
bodies: trade unions, which engage in collective bargaining and sign collective 
agreements; and works councils, which primarily operate for information and 
consultation on limited management decisions. That being said, employee 
representatives’ rights in French corporate governance are extended to monitoring 
company management. Public-sector companies in France are obligated to have 
employee directors on either the supervisory board or board of directors. Subject to 
whether these managerial bodies include private-sector representatives, they can be 
two- or three-sided. One-third of directors are employee representatives, in 
comparison with the two-thirds of directors nominated by the shareholders’ body.749 
The monistic system of corporate governance is most prevalent in France, although 
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companies have been able to choose between the monistic and dualistic system of 
corporate governance since 1967.750  
 
It has been argued that corporate governance and the employee representation 
system in France are far from being perfect. Lapôtre’s study identifies the 
shortcomings in French corporate governance.751 The company boards selected for 
his study revealed that the directors did not have enough authority to question the 
President Director General (PDG752), and the most senior manager was independent 
and powerful with respect to decision-making. On board composition, Lapôtre’s 
study provides evidence that board directors are usually the members of similar 
social networks as the PDG; to complicate matters further, a high percentage of the 
members of the board are ex-PDGs or existing PDGs. Additionally, at the Annual 
General Meeting, PDGs are delegated with ‘proxy voting rights’ by the absent 
shareholders. Thus, the PDG usually has the bulk of the votes of those represented 
at the meeting, and often more than 50% of voting rights. As a result, this senior 
manager normally selects the directors accountable for his supervision. Monitoring of 
his behaviour, therefore, is “rarely rigorous”. Most board meetings last no longer than 
three to four hours, which is undoubtedly insufficient time to make strategic decisions 
or monitor their implementation. Lastly, the code of corporate governance in France 
backs the appointment of ‘independent’ directors to deal with homogeneity, but fails 
to lawfully define ‘independent’. Consequently, these directors may not have any 
genuine interest in the company.  
 
In relation to the employee representation system, the Constitutional law on the 
Modernisation of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic 2008753 has added to its 
complexity. For example, trade unions representatives and the representatives of the 
trade union bargaining unit, the works councils, the individual employee delegation 
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and health and safety committees, all share representative roles in a division of roles 
which is defined incoherently.754 Additionally, Laulom argues that: 
 
“the low level of unionisation combined with a highly pluralist system certainly 
reinforces complexity…even if this plurality of representation can lead to some 
competition, in practice they are more complementary than competitors (even if of 
course competition is possible among various unions, and the 2008 Acts reinforces 
electoral competition). When trade unions are present, they will usually play an 
important coordinating role. When there are no representative trade union in 
companies, the possibility given to works councils or to staff delegates to negotiate 
dispensatory agreements could be discussed. Are these representatives 
independent and competent enough to negotiate agreements which can be less 
favourable than the law?”755 
 
France is one of the few Member States that implemented the ECS in its domestic 
law after the proposed deadline.756 The ECS presents a new corporate governance 
system under French law, which explains the insertion of new chapters in both the 
French Labour Code and Commercial Code, despite the fundamental option already 
provided under the French corporate governance system to choose between the 
monistic and dualistic system.757 
 
The ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company 
(SE)’ categorise France: 
 
“…by a medium-high level of attractiveness in respect of national legislation 
applicable to the SE and by a low level of attractiveness as regards the 
implementation (or non-implementation) of the options left open by the SE 
Regulation. When implementing (or not implementing) the options left open by the 
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SE Regulation, France has tended to reduce its overall attractiveness. As regards 
the intra Member State analysis, France is characterised by a low level of 
attractiveness of the SE compared to the domestic public limited-liability company, 
not taking into consideration the specific incentive provided for the SE as regards the 
increased freedom in the definition of the statutes.”758 
 
As with Poland, the study’s findings on the attractiveness of SE in France are overly 
optimistic. At the time of the study, 15 SEs were registered in France, as of 15 April 
2009. By 21 March 2014, the number had risen by only eight bringing the total to 23 
SEs.759 
 
Menjucq et al. note that French legislators took a very ‘conservative’ approach and 
modelled the French SE on the French SA (Société Anonyme)760 system, save for 
applying the complete flexibility extended by the ECS.761 As the monistic and 
dualistic system of governance already existed for the SA, no important 
modifications were necessary under French law. The French SEs are subject to SA 
rules for management and administration issues and general meetings. French 
legislators were also ‘conservative’ on labour aspects when implementing the SE 
Directive and focused on promising employee involvement rights extensively. Still, 
some independence was provided to redefine the latitude of the prevailing employee 
representative bodies when entering into collective bargaining.762 
 
If a French SE duplicates a pre-existing SA company form, then theoretically it 
should be an unanimously popular company form in France. However, a report on 
‘The Societas Europaea or SE: The New European Company’ (commissioned by the 
French Minister of Justice) identified that the SE model in France has a “long way to 
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go to strengthen its attractiveness”.763 Among the identified negative drivers, 
inadequate mobility in the SE is widely discussed. Member States like Ireland, the 
UK and the Netherlands have a system of ‘registered office’ that allows companies to 
have their headquarters anywhere ‘they see fit’ and independent of their registered 
location. In contrast, the French system is based on the ‘real seat’ theory, which 
requires that SEs must have their registered office and central administration “in the 
same place”.764 The impediment placed by the French legislator to allowing a 
company’s administrative office outside the EU/EEA to participate in an SE’s 
creation acts as a significant deterrent. Despite being challenged by the EC, the 
French legislators have held their ground. It is interesting to note that there is no 
such requirement for the French SA.765 Another deterrent to form an SE in France is 
the set of rules concerning employee involvement and negotiating procedures, 
especially trade unions’ involvement in the negotiating process (SNB members are 
selected by the trade unions).766 
 
Board-level employee representation in France is an intricate system and the SE has 
not really taken off as a preferred company structure. The intricacy of the French 
representation system is arguably linked to the particular capital structure of French 
companies. In comparison with any other Member States in the EU, French 
companies “have been dominated both by the influence of the state and the direct 
control of the banks, who established close and stable relations between 
management and shareholders to the exclusion of worker interests”.767 It is therefore 
challenging to make board-level employee representation work in both public and 
private sector companies. Additionally, before the introduction of numerous labour 
law provisions on employee representation, French Company Law was inclined to 
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encourage monistic rather than dualistic governance.768 Since the crisis of May 
1968, employee involvement and representation were reflected in French Labour 
Law (see, Table 11- Board-level employee representation provisions and their scope 
in Member States). 
 
As well as being intricate, the French position on employee representation is 
ambiguous. For instance, French legislators tried to revise the representation system 
in public-sector companies by passing the Act 83-675 on the democratisation of the 
public sector 1983769. This allows employees to elect their board-level employee 
representatives in public-sector companies. It was completely unanticipated that this 
would be received unfavourably by companies, and, only three years later, public-
sector companies declined significantly.770 However, French legislators were 
committed to empower employees with board-level employee representation rights 
and they passed the Edict 86-1135 modifying Act 66-537 on commercial companies 
1986771, which provided that private-sector companies may have employee 
representatives (elected by the workforce) securing one-third of the board by a way 
of the articles of association. Similarly, for privatised companies, Act 94-640 on 
enhancing employees’ participation in the company 1994772 was passed, which 
provided that up to three members of the board are employee representatives 
(elected by the workforce) by a way of statement in the articles of association.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the variation in attitude on board-level employee 
representation across the EU. A significant ambiguity of board-level employee 
representation classification whether under company law or labour law of different 
Member States was discussed in detail, thereby confirming the complication among 
company actors and other third-party stakeholders in accepting board-level 
employee representation provisions. Since company law and labour law are two 
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different schools of thought for legal scholarship, political reality and regulatory 
policy, therefore, it has been difficult to harmonise EU laws on employee 
representation like the ECS, as it is interpreted variably. 
 
The analysis in this chapter has laid the foundation for future quantitative studies on 
the issue of board-level employee representation across the Member States. 
Comparative research in the future can also benefit from the data gathered and the 
discussions on the issue.  
 
In the context of an SE, the comparison and exploration of the ambiguity in board-
level employee representation and also its classification supports the notion of 
achieving an uniform system of board-level employee representation in the form of 
an SE. Member States like Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Romania and the UK, which do not legislate on board-level 
employee representation may find inspiration in the added benefits of board-level 
employee representation in their corporate governance structure to achieve the EU’s 
social objectives. 
 
The case studies of Member States in this chapter and the last two chapters 
provided a comprehensive outlook on the distinctiveness of board-level employee 
representation in the EU.  
 
Denmark demonstrated a more accepting nature to employee representation, 
whether it be in the context of an SE or at the national level. Being the Member State 
with the highest EPI employee representation rate and with the second highest 
number of registered SEs, the Danish economy is the topmost in terms of many 
social indicators of progress.773 This explains why the Danish approach of extending 
board-level employee representation rights of its national companies to subsidiaries 
in other countries was adopted by Norway and Sweden.774 
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Despite various arrangements of employee involvement in Poland and being 
Europe’s economic success story, Poland seemed less attractive to the idea of an 
SE. The absence of good empirical data to quantify the benefits of board-level 
employee representation in Poland and its strong monistic corporate governance 
structure makes it difficult to argue the SE’s attractiveness in the Polish industrial 
relations system. Additionally, Poland was identified as one of the Member States 
which found the SE overly complicated in incorporation procedures in comparison 
with its national public limited-liability companies. 
 
The analysis in this chapter also dismissed the findings of the ‘Study on the 
operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE)’, which were 
overly optimistic in categorising both Poland and France “…by a medium-high level 
of attractiveness in respect of national legislation applicable to the SE”. 
 
The French position on board-level employee representation provided a very 
interesting case study. This was mainly because despite employee representation 
having a constitutional basis in France and the numerous laws on employee 
involvement,775 the French position is far from simple on this. Act 83-675 on the 
democratisation of the public sector 1983776 legislated board-level employee 
representation in public-sector companies and within three years of its 
implementation there was a huge decline in public-sector companies in France. This 
directly suggested that empowering employee rights made the public-sector 
companies unacceptable as a company form by various stakeholders and the 
company’s management. Additionally, the French system dissuades trade unions 
and because of the division into number of competing confederations contending for 
union membership, the French confederations of trade unions are the least influential 
in the EU. The works councils (Comité d' Entreprise) do have extensive consultative 
capacity, but cannot impact any substantial decision-making. Further, the discussion 
on the findings of Lapôtre’s study demonstrated the complexities in French corporate 
governance articulately. For example, the autocratic tradition in relation to the 
directors and the PDGs, the selection of directors, the duration of board meetings 
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and the absence of the legal definition of ‘independent directors’ which results in 
having directors who have no genuine interest in the company due to their 
independent nature. 
 
Against this background, the SE seems a rational choice to unify board-level 
employee representation and facilitating the expansion of businesses across the 
Member States. A board that does not represent the interests of the employees 
directly by its employees is counter-productive.  
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CHAPTER 7- REVIEWING THE EUROPEAN COMPANY 
STATUTE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The advent of the SE has received mixed responses within Member States. It proved 
successful in some and unpopular in others.  Because it took more than 40 years to 
become realised in legislation, the idea of a ‘European Company’ is the result of 
multiple compromises between the Member States. One might expect that legislators 
have now had ample time and practical experience of the SE to identify the 
shortcomings that make it unpopular and inhibit its establishment in Member States. 
These shortcomings directly conflict with the SE’s goal of achieving a single EU 
market and to resolve the challenges of globalised markets. It was optimistically 
supposed that this new form of company would eradicate the complications arising 
from the unequal treatment of companies by national legislation in Member States, 
make cross-border restructuring easier for corporations and facilitate uniform 
procedures.777 However, issues like insolvency, tax and labour were left to the 
discretion of the Member States, causing much uncertainty and making it impossible 
to use the new legal entity for reincorporation or cross-border mergers.778  
 
This chapter builds on the previously discussed shortcomings of the ECS, focusing 
on a possible review of the ECS by addressing its shortcomings and identifying the 
challenges of harmonising companies in future across Member States. 
 
The EC is obliged under the SE Regulation to consider whether any amendments 
are needed to the ECS. In 2011, the EC initiated a major consultation779 on the 
review of the SE Directive and also commissioned a ‘Study on the operation and the 
impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE)’780. After this consultation, 
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which was a mere procedural requirement, the EC communicated that ‘it was quite 
early on to make a complete evaluation of the SE Directive’.781 The ‘Study on the 
operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE)’ raised 
interesting issues, and the EC initiated another consultation on the results of this 
study.782 This, however, received many varied responses, and stakeholders like the 
ETUC dismissed its key findings, saying, for example, that it presented employee 
involvement “as a key negative driver without making it clear that this thesis was 
based on a perception by a group of potentially biased interviewees and not on the 
legal reality”.783 Following this consultation, the 2012 Action Plan on EU Company 
Law and Governance contained no recommendations to revise the ECS.784 The only 
positive impact of these consultations was the launch of: 
 
“an information campaign to increase awareness of the European Company (SE) 
Statute through a comprehensive website785 bringing together practical advice and 
relevant documents on the Statute."786  
 
In fact, the SE website787 is no more than a basic information section on the SE that 
lacks an SE database788. 
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The small number of established SEs so far indicate that the ECS has not been the 
triumph that was foreseen before it came into force.789  
In their commentary on the EC’s Consultation on the Results of the Study on the 
Operation and the Impacts of the Statute for a European Company, Accountancy 
Europe state that ‘SE endeavours the possibility of business operations on a 
sincerely EU basis and is promising enough in meeting the objectives of the 
integrated single market’790 but scholars like Enriques argue that the ECS is an 
additional set of optional rules introducing a new legal entity governed partially by the 
ECS itself and partly by national corporate laws.791 For example, the SE Regulation 
lays out the existing regulations for European limited liability companies and 
indicates that there are no laws for this type of company apart from the laws of a 
particular Member State. Similarly, the SE Directive makes no assertion of any 
substantial rules that must be followed regarding employee involvement in limited 
liability companies, but rather leaves the matter to the discretion of Member States. 
 
7.2 Introducing ‘Employee Dispute Resolution’ (EDR) to the negotiation 
process 
When an SE is created, the SE Directive necessitates negotiations with an employee 
representative body to agree on the way that employee involvement will be 
organised. 
 
Employee involvement negotiations could have one or more of the following 
outcomes: (i) an SE will not be required to provide for employee involvement where 
no company involved in the establishment of an SE is regulated by employee 
involvement policies prior to the establishment of the SE; (ii) the ‘standard set of 
rules’ will apply if an SE is established by setting up a subsidiary or a holding 
company or by merger;792 (iii) the employee negotiating body may withdraw from 
existing negotiations and depend for the provision of employee information and 
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consultation on a Member State’s existing rules; (iv) prevailing employee 
involvement rules in a Member State will continue to apply where a national 
company is transformed into an SE; (v) management and employees can agree on 
the form of provision for employee involvement; (vi) an agreement; and (vii) if the 
time frame793 for negotiations end without a mutually acceptable arrangement, then 
the ‘standard set of rules’794 will apply.795 
 
A ‘standard set’ of rules will allow employees’ interests to affect an SE’s significant 
decisions, because they give employees the right to appoint, elect, oppose or 
propose some members of the supervisory/administrative body in the SE and every 
employee representative will have the same rights as the members who represent 
shareholders. These rules may seem a little generic and is a major deterrent in the 
UK, if not so much in Germany. Management bodies of UK companies are highly 
unlikely to initiate an extensive consultation exercise with their employees and will 
not threaten employee relations by dismissing their opinion on information, 
consultation and involvement.  
 
EU legislators designed the SE in a way that harmonised only marginal elements of 
company law. They delegated employee involvement to an additional negotiation 
procedure. It was assumed that this would instigate EU-wide cross-border regulatory 
competition or that businesses would opt for the SE over other company forms to 
evade compulsory codetermination obligations. The linking of employee involvement 
in the SE decisions provided under the ECS has in fact made it a very contentious 
problem.  
 
Two key issues identified in the ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the 
Statute for a European Company (SE)’ make the negotiation procedure less 
attractive and effective.796 
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(i) Representatives of the trade union in the SNB: 
It is hard to understand why research concluded that the presence of trade union 
representatives in the SNB797 should be a ‘negative driver’ in setting up an SE. On 
the contrary, since a company’s management employs the expertise of law firms in 
establishing SEs, it is only fair that employees use the experience of trade union 
representatives for negotiations. Doing so would put the negotiating parties on an 
almost equal footing, and create a smoother and more informed negotiation process. 
Dr. Hendrik Höhfeld (Syndikus, MAN Diesel SE) reported in the ‘Die Societas 
Europaea (SE)’ seminar798 that, during the negotiation process of MAN Diesel SE, 
the presence of trade union representatives on the SNB was productive and he saw 
nothing to discourage trade union involvement. It appears that apprehension in 
companies towards trade union involvement is driven by cultural norms in Member 
States. Such norms have been a constant barrier to industrial relations in the past. 
 
(ii) Complicated, costly and lengthy negotiations: 
SE procedures are onerous in Member States where employee involvement is not a 
norm in companies. Research has identified that in Member States like Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland and UK, the guidelines on employee involvement in setting up 
an SE are far more complicated than the guidelines for establishing national public 
limited companies.799 The time frame for negotiations is almost never adhered to, 
suggesting that they are overly complicated and time consuming.800 Adhering to the 
time frame is imperative: the stock market may judge that, if a company’s 
management and employees are not in agreement, then the company’s productivity 
will be limited, detrimentally affecting the company’s stock value.801 Negotiations 
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may be complicated further by the lack of information about the SE available to 
negotiating parties. Language issues may also arise, because the transposition laws 
of a particular Member State are usually accessible only in the national language. 
 
EuroCommerce adds to the argument that the negotiation procedure is hampered by 
an absence of regulatory certainty.802 EuroCommerce, in its capacity as a European 
social partner, made the same recommendation to the EC to simplify the SE 
Directive on establishing and operating an SE. 
 
To mitigate such issues, a resolution model like ‘Employee Dispute Resolution’ 
(EDR) should be adopted under the SE Directive. EDR can embody reliable and 
efficient methods of settling disputes related to the negotiation procedure, and can 
be far faster in achieving consensual resolution than the ‘standard set’ of rules. EDR 
can be a stand-alone procedure regulated by an independent body and the process 
can be initiated either by the employee representatives’ body or by the supervisory 
body of a prospective SE. 
 
EDR can operate as either an independent or a mandatory scheme. Independent 
schemes can be undertaken by the management and the employees’ 
representatives when the SE establishment procedure is initiated, or once it is 
certain that the negotiations will end without agreement or within the time frame. 
Independent schemes use experts or other third parties to assist during the 
negotiations procedure.803 Mandatory schemes can be applied as a condition when 
the SE procedure is initiated. Mandatory conditions may include membership of a 
designated regulated sector to the membership terms of which the company must 
adhere (e.g. ombudsmen). 
 
Parties can be made aware of EDR by attending an ‘information conference’ before 
SE administrative procedural formalities commence.804 Neither the management nor 
                                                          
802
 ‘1
st
 phase consultation art.144 TFEU on the possible review of Directive 2001/86/EC’ 
(eurocommerce, 2011) <https://www.eurocommerce.eu/media/7275/position-empl-
consultation_european_company-20.09.2011.pdf> accessed 28 March 2018. 
803
 For example, in recent decades, UK chartered accountants have been carrying out of businesses 
and shares. 
804
 This concept is based on UK model of family mediation, where the parties are required to attend a 
mediation information session prior to litigation. 
179 
the employees would be obligated to accept EDR, but the ‘information conference’ 
will help smooth the process of employee involvement negotiations and improve their 
outcomes. 
 
7.2.1 The proposed mechanics of EDR 
The EC could achieve EDR by launching an ‘EDR Pledge’.805 It is proposed that the 
design of a ‘pledge’ to employ EDR within an SE would be a very progressive step 
and will ensure the smooth running of negotiations. There should be extensive 
encouragement for prospective SE organisations and companies to welcome the 
pledge, which will demand a genuine commitment and not just a token arrangement. 
 
Communications from the EC, the EC’s SE website and the ETUI website can 
periodically cover EDR techniques and EDR schemes in their information contents. 
Other promotion methods could include magazine and journal articles, email 
correspondence to the member base, conferences, and presentations. The member 
base could organise meetings with senior managers of key European companies 
that are yet sceptical to adopt SE as their form of company.  
 
To ensure effectiveness in encouraging negotiating parties to comply with EDR and 
EDR decisions, ECS can include a provision to impose costs sanctions on 
negotiating parties if they are unreasonable806 in resolving a dispute. For example, 
an EDR Pledge Report807 can be published quarterly that would recognise difficulties 
that negotiating parties might encounter and show how they could be resolved 
through the use of EDR. Research has shown that uptake of a service or a facility is 
maximised when its efficacy is publicised. 
 
The binding nature of EDR decisions should depend upon the fact that if the 
negotiating parties entered into the scheme voluntarily like in ‘independent schemes’. 
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For ‘mandatory schemes’, where some ombudsmen make a decision there could be 
an appeal process to safeguard that resolutions made are not unreasonable to either 
party. 
 
EDR schemes should be financed directly by the prospective SE companies, if not 
by the EC or trade organisations. Such funding will ensure that the scheme is run 
cost effectively and competently and will mitigate the costs of individual companies in 
contributing to mitigate their individual need to contribute funds. 
 
7.3 Failure to deal with insolvency provisions 
Insolvency, liquidation and winding-up of SEs are areas of law that have been left to 
the discretion of Member States. These are important issues that require employee 
involvement, both for information and for consultation. The problem is particularly 
acute where there is uncertainty in a Member State on these issues. 
 
The UK is a case in point. Insolvency practitioners in this country face an issue 
involving the ‘conditions to consult’ prior to making redundancies (per s.188 of the 
Trade Union & Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992). Companies have an 
obligation to consult with employees when intending to make twenty or more of the 
workforce redundant. Redundancies should not be initiated until after 30-45 days 
after the consultation has commenced.808 The UK has in place many recognised 
‘special circumstances’ that mitigate a company’s obligation to consult with 
employees, but insolvency falls outside that scope. The UK Secretary of State is also 
to be notified of a company’s intention to make redundancies (45 days prior to first 
dismissals if more than 100 employees are involved, and 30 days prior to first 
dismissals if between 20 and 99 employees are involved).809 National legislation810 
fails, however, to adequately resolve four issues that thwart notification and 
consultation in insolvency situations. 
(i) The ‘sham’ consultation: 
Unlike the consulatation procedure defined in the ICE Directive, the Trade Union & 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 does not provide for meaningful 
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employee consultation that would avoid dismissals, lessen the consequences of 
redundancies or reduce the number of employees initially intended to be made 
redundant. 
 
In GMB and Others v Susie Radin Ltd,811 the Court of Appeal did make an effort to 
stress the requirement for meaningful consultation with employees and adopted tests 
to susbtantiate this: to consult with representatives when plans are still at a decisive 
period; satisfactory information that forms a foundation for the employee 
representatives to prepare a response; sufficient response time; and a careful 
consideration by the company of the response. 
 
In practice, however, in the cut and thrust of insolvency, it is almost impossible to 
achieve meaningful consultation with employees except in the case of a proposal for 
a long-term reorganisation. 
 
(ii) The ineptitude to fund ongoing business: 
Where a company is near insolvency proceedings, the company will be unable to 
employ the entire workforce and sustain the ongoing costs of business during the 
consultation period. 
 
(iii) The requirement to consult carries the risk of confidential information being leaked 
during insolvency proceedings, thereby potentially diminishing the company’s value. 
 
(iv) Incompatibility with insolvency law: 
The period of 45 days prior to first dismissals is inconsistent with the time frame of 
14 days given to administrators to decide which contracts of employment, if any, 
should be adopted under the Insolvency Act 1986. The significance of adopting an 
employment contract is that the salary of employees becomes an administration cost 
that is to be paid as a priority over other creditors.812 The capital available to other 
creditors will therefore be unreasonably reduced, if the adoption of contracts of 
employment merely results from the obligation to consult. By law, contracts are 
automatically terminated in a compulsory liquidation. In a voluntary liquidation, the 
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company must terminate running its business except for, as prescribed for its 
beneficial winding up (s.87 of the Insolvency Act 1986). Section 214(3) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 provides that if a director is certain of a foreseeable liquidation, 
then the director must action: 
 
“every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors as 
(assuming him to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation) he ought to have taken.” 
 
If insolvency is practically inevitable, the directors will rarely carry on the normal 
course of business just to facilitate employee consultation, because doing so would 
render them personally liable for misfeasance and/or wrongful trading. 
 
As a way of recommendation, The ECS should include a provision to distinguish 
clearly between redundancies in insolvent and solvent situations. EU legislators, in 
partnership with stakeholders like INSOL Europe, should be encouraged to devise a 
more comprehensive test to be able to perceive definite conditions and contemplate 
a practically achievable level of consultation. Doing so will make the SE a more 
attractive form of company.  
 
Reforming the terms for managing insolvency will also reduce costs to national 
governments. This issue is EU-wide, although the scale of the problem has not yet 
been accurately assessed, as only cases at a significant level are reported. In 
Germany, for example, during the preliminary period in insolvency, the earnings are 
funded from the public purse. Employment Tribunals in UK carry on distributing 
protective awards even though a company may be insolvent,813 and the government 
is obliged to meet such costs or lessen the return to other unsecured creditors. This 
reform will result in a significant decline in the costs to the state (for example, 
National Insurance in the UK), as the scale of protective awards will decrease. 
 
The rationale for addressing the shortcomings on collective redundancies 
information and consultation obligations under the Trade Union & Labour Relations 
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(Consolidation) Act 1992 within the context of the SE is to provide a working model 
on these aspects that can be adopted in the ECS. This will ensure that SE has an 
effective insolvency provisions features that are not necessarily addressed by the 
laws of individual Member States, thereby making it more comprehensive and a 
popular choice of a company form. 
 
7.4 The need to include tax provisions 
The ECS is regarded as ‘fiscally neutral’. It does not create a beneficial tax regime 
because tax provisions814 have been left to the discretion of Member States.815 In 
accordance with a Member State’s fiscal legislation, applicable at branch level or 
company level, an SE is taxed like any other multinational corporation where its 
administrative office is located.816  
 
Researchers and others are agreed that this situation has led to disharmony across 
the EU with respect to SE being an adoptive form of company817 and a major 
deterrent for companies to opt for SE across the EU, despite the EC’s proposals to 
legislate on this matter.818 Frits Bolkestein (EC Commissioner responsible for 
Internal Market and Taxation) writes: 
 
“I concede that work remains to be done in some areas: in particular, I refer to the 
taxation aspects, which, quite rightly, are of concern to potential users819…This 
leaves the SE-Statute without any tax rules. This is a rather unfortunate situation, 
which I regret very much. Clearly, the lack of appropriate tax rules significantly 
reduces the practical attractiveness of the European Company Statute. Business 
representatives emphasize this quite forcefully.”820 
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Having a separate tax regime for the SE may be a persuasive incentive for 
companies to adopt the SE. There were attempts to legislate SE tax arrangements in 
1970, 1975, 1989 and 1991, which contained suggestions for tax provisions 
regarding the determination of an SE’s tax residence, tax provisions relating to the 
establishment of a holding SE, the conditions for allowing cross-border transfers of 
an SE’s tax residence without tax penalties and  a system to balance losses of 
foreign ‘Permanent Establishments’ from the SE’s national profits in its registered 
Member State.821 However, Member States have continuously refused to surrender 
their independence in tax matters even before and after the ECS came into force.822 
The only progress that has so far been made was in the Council Directive No 
2005/19/EC,823 which contained a tax treatment arrangement of an SE’s corporate 
seat cross-border transfer from one Member State to another, and dependent on 
specific legal structure. Further, Kirshner states that “protectionism kept the 
European Member States from attaining consensus on a harmonized tax regime for 
the SE companies”.824 For example, Member States with relatively low corporate tax 
rates worry about losing their competitive advantage (12.5% in Ireland825 and no tax 
on retained incomes in Estonia826). 
 
It is hard to understand why taxation rules should be left to the Member State where 
the SE is registered. The European Court of Justice has found multiple violations of 
tax treatment of European companies with respect to fundamental freedoms in 
varying EU cross-border circumstances. In Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of 
Scotland,827 there were instances where a reduced tax liability was refused to non-
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domiciled companies. In Case C-35/98 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v B.G.M. 
Verkooijen,828 the ECJ identified the denial of exemptions in income tax where 
dividends are remunerated by non-domiciled company.829 In Case C-324/00 
Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt,830 the ECJ acknowledged that slim 
capitalisation laws were applied only to non-domiciled shareholders and their 
associates. Overseas permanent companies were subject to unfavourable tax 
treatment for the reasons of: (i) their shareholdings in other Member States (Case C-
307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v Finanzamt 
Aachen-Innenstadt831); (ii) cost deduction of the domestic head office level (Case C-
141/99 AMID v Belgische Staat832); (iii) stamp duty rates of credit arrangements 
closed in other Member States (Case C-439/97 Sandoz GmbH v 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland833); and (iv) 
lessees leasing company assets from non-domiciled lesser (Case C-294/97 
Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG ν Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna834). 
 
Further, one Member State refused tax credit on dividend to non-domiciled 
companies (Case 270/83 Commission v France (Avoir Fiscal)835) and rejected 
acknowledgement of carrying tax losses forward if accounts were retained in another 
Member State (Case C-250/94 Futura Participations SA and Singer v Administration 
des contributions836). 
 
The ECS cannot be revised in the area of tax provision unless Member States give 
up the ‘fiscally neutral’ concept of an SE. A survey conducted by the Accountancy 
Europe revealed that 62% of Member States favoured applying domestic tax rates 
and domestic collection systems to incomes calculated via a common base system 
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and believed that no different tax system was essential for SE.837 No Member States 
prefer a European tax scheme centrally operated with tax revenues allotted to 
Member States,838 despite a decade of work by the EU to implement a European 
corporate tax rules mechanism.839 The EC needs to propose supplementary tax 
provision in the ECS so that the SE would not be subjected to second-grade tax 
treatment, thereby making it more lucrative for companies to opt for the SE as a 
company form in the EU. 
 
7.5 Specific recommendations to the ECS 
It is evident from the analysis presented in Chapter 3- Evaluation of the Functioning 
of the European Company Statute, and the issues raised in this chapter, that the 
ECS impedes the progress of the SE as a company form. The EC needs to take into 
account the issues raised in previous consultations and the ‘Study on the operation 
and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE)’ to revise the SE 
Directive. 
 
The provisions in the ECS regarding employee information and consultation are 
ambiguous, because they differ from the provisions in the EWC Directive and the 
ICE Directive. For example, the procedure to establish a SNB to consult on 
employee involvement arrangements is lengthy and still largely unfamiliar for many 
businesses. Additionally, the application of ‘standard rules’ was considered to be 
restricting the extent of a voluntary method of employee involvement negotiations, as 
the ‘standard rules’ apply the maximum level of employee involvement in companies 
intending to establish themselves as an SE. In certain instances, it was likely that a 
majority of employees may be compelled by a minority to accept an employee 
involvement model that they did not want. 
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The ambiguity of Article 66 of the SE Regulation, which involves conversion to a 
public limited liability company from an SE, will incur higher legal fees for the 
companies concerned, which would require more technical and professional support. 
The issue of ‘no decision on conversion into a public limited-liability company should 
be taken until the two-year period has elapsed since its registration or before the first 
two sets of annual accounts have been approved’ is too lengthy and should either be 
removed or shortened.840  
 
The SE could in fact be used to withdraw greater employee involvement rights if two 
merging companies with reduced employee involvement provisions intend to 
establish an SE in a Member State that has higher national employee involvement 
rights.841 Similarly, a company with higher employee involvement rights will lose 
those rights if an SE is formed by being taken over by a company with zero or 
minimum employee involvement provisions. Presently, the only resolution to this 
potential abuse of SE is the success of the negotiation procedure. 
 
Article 4, General Provisions, Title I of the SE Regulation provides that the minimum 
subscribed capital should be €120,000. This subscribed capital may not be a 
deterrent issue for large corporations; however, it is a major deterrent for medium-
sized companies that are looking to expand their business across other Member 
States. It is therefore suggested that this subscribed capital should be revised as 
follows: 
Number of employees in a company Proposed subscribed capital 
>2000 €120,000 
≥500 – 2000 €60,000 
<500 €30,000 
Table 14- Suggested subscribed capital 
 
This proposed scale would ensure fairness of the minimum subscribed capital 
requirement depending upon a company’s workforce and simultaneously make the 
SE an attractive company form at Member State level. 
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The EC reported that many responses were submitted regarding the possible 
amendments to the way an SE is formed (procedures and conditions).842 One such 
amendment was to provide flexibility in the conditions of formation of an SE by 
conversion. The creation of an SE by conversion is specifically restricted to public 
limited-liability companies. The ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the 
Statute for a European Company (SE)’ found that many private limited-liability 
companies have converted into an SE, initially by primarily converting into a public 
limited-liability company.843 It was previously proposed and is reiterated in this 
research that a revision could be made to Article 4, General Provisions, Title I of the 
SE Regulation, permitting a private limited-liability company to be converted into an 
SE and providing security to shareholders and third party interests. 
 
Further, one aspect of formation that has been left untouched is ex nihilo formation 
of an SE. Individuals cannot form an SE, and national companies intending to form 
an SE must be able to show that their business or operation has a cross-European 
aspect844 This is said to be a considerable barrier, especially when an individual or 
company does not presently operate across Europe but intends to do so by forming 
an SE. Therefore, providing such flexibility to individuals and businesses could 
further increase the popularity of the SE as a form of company across the EU. 
 
Article 7, General Provisions, Title I of the SE Regulation provide the option for 
Member States to have an SE’s head office and registered office in the same 
Member State. More than one-third of Member States have exercised this option. 
The UK is one of the Member States that did not agree with the option. The ETUI 
firmly believes that this option ‘should be maintained’, the rationale being that, since 
more than one third of Member States have exercised this option, some consensus 
on the issue has been achieved, and that removing this option will lead to potential 
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abuse of SE by ‘tax hopping’ and circumventing employee involvement rights.845 
Nonetheless, removing this provision will make the SE as flexible with respect to 
freedom of establishment as some public limited-liability companies in several 
Member States.846 
 
The issue of confidentiality is not provided for under the SE Regulation, but vaguely 
and minimally stated in the SE Directive. Paragraph 13 of the Preamble in the SE 
Directive provides that: 
 
“…the confidentiality of sensitive information should be preserved even after the 
expiry of the employees’ representatives terms of office and provision should be 
made to allow the competent organ of the SE to withhold information which would 
seriously harm, if subject to public disclosure, the functioning of the SE”. 
 
Employee representatives on an SNB or other representative body have an 
obligation to respect the confidentiality of information or other crucial aspects of the 
negotiation procedure; but this obligation is towards the ‘competent organ’ of the SE 
and when this obligation is breached, it is this ‘competent organ’ that can bring 
action. Several company laws in Member States, especially in the UK, do not 
recognise obligations owed by any interested parties to the managerial board as an 
entity, given that the directors are agents for the company or effectively act as one. It 
is therefore proposed that, if the employees’ obligations were owed to the companies 
intending to form an SE itself, rather the ‘competent organ’, and if any breach of 
confidentiality were pursued on the company’s behalf by the ‘competent organ’ or the 
managerial board, the SE Directive would be more in line with the company law of 
such Member States. Furthermore, there should be specific rules listing the 
consequences of any breach, depending on its severity (for example, dismissal of 
employment, financial penalties, or criminal charges, if necessary), as presently the 
directive gives no clarity on such consequences.847 
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The ECS has not dealt with the establishment costs of SE. Creating an SE involves 
paying variously high fees and administrative costs, depending on the formation 
method, the company size and the Member State where it intends to be registered. 
The EC should initiate proposals to remove establishment cost barriers 
 
Reviewing and amending the ECS will not be sufficient to make the SE an effective 
company form. The potential and benefits of the model must be successfully 
communicated. The current literature, communications from the EC and other 
initiatives either by the EC or trade unions, fail to advertise and communicate the 
benefits of adopting an SE or the complete mechanism of an SE to the relevant 
businesses and stakeholders.  
 
As well as reviewing the ECS, the SE Regulation should be simplified. Employee 
involvement is not the key factor when businesses consider becoming an SE and 
other driving factors include an efficient and flexible management provided under SE 
and the trans-European dimension to their business. The SE Regulation should be 
revised to make cross-border requirements clearer. References to the national 
legislation of a Member State where an SE is registered should be minimised, as 
should the options given to Member States on various aspects of adopting the SE 
Regulation. As previously mentioned, given the large proximity of references to the 
laws of Member States, the SE can be considered to have 28 different forms rather 
than one single ‘European Company’. This makes the uniformity of SE ambiguous 
and less attractive. 
 
7.6 Case Study: The Czech Republic (an SE haven) 
The Czech Republic is an important case study because the SE is more prevalent 
here than in any other Member State. Out of 2,757 registered SEs across the EU, 
1,898 are in the Czech Republic alone.848 This data is extremely perplexing: the 
Czech Republic has no historical background of employee representation and the 
Czech Republic contributes merely 1.2% of the total EU GDP, which is 
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approximately 20 times less than that of Germany.849 It is hard to understand why 
such a small economy should find the SE so popular, when the model has a target 
audience of big organisations with substantial cross-border activities. The analysis of 
this high prevalence of SEs in the Czech Republic can serve as a guide to other 
Member States and types of company, which may help to suggest ways of making 
the SE a more popular form of company in other Member States. 
 
The Czech Republic has an extremely advanced industrial base, which has been 
attracting foreign investment for some time. Extensive foreign investments have 
been focused on the pharmaceutical, engineering, automotive and chemical 
industries, which have been the main drivers in the Czech Republic’s economic 
transformation. The Czech Republic retains a stable economic and social policy and 
is frequently mentioned as one of the most prosperous new EU economies.850 The 
tax regime in the Czech Republic is also an incentive to attract businesses: the 
country offers a tax-relief system to large-scale investors, a low tax rate of 5% on the 
default profits of investment funds and various other governmental investment 
inducements.851 Unlike many other Member States, Czech Company Law provides 
for unions and some employees to have appointment rights to the board of 
directors.852 
 
The motivations to establish SEs has been investigated before,853 but in the context 
of SEs in Czech Republic the research is fairly limited. Ernst & Young’s ‘Study on the 
operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE)’854 made a 
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comparative analysis of the SEs across the EU, but the empirical data in this study is 
unhelpful. Ernst & Young conducted only 60 interviews in total across the EU by 
sending out an online questionnaire to current SEs; the number of interviews or 
responses from the SEs in the Czech Republic is unknown, but Ernst & Young’s 
study did provide fairly detailed country-specific information. The reasons offered for 
establishing an SE signified only the general advantages of the model, and not why 
the Czech Republic was a more popular SE haven than any other Member State.  
 
For example, Ernst & Young’s study on Czech Republic concluded that one of the 
positive drivers for setting up an SE in the Czech Republic was corporate 
governance, as a one-tier structure can be chosen and the size of the board can be 
reduced to a bare minimum of one member on the supervisory board and one on the 
management.855 Neither of these possibilities is available to Czech public 
companies. 
 
“Czech company law regarding public limited-liability companies only provides for the 
two-tier system…The rules applicable to the SE, as regards in particular its 
organisation and management, are generally seen as more attractive than those 
applicable to the Czech public limited-liability companies. The possibility of having a 
board of directors and a supervisory board each with only one member is perceived 
as the main driver for having an SE instead of a national public limited liability 
company, which must have at least three members on its board of directors / a one 
member in the case of a sole shareholder, and at least three members on its 
supervisory board.”856 
 
However, this conclusion is ambiguous if not entirely incorrect. First, less than 10% 
of the 1,898 SEs registered in Czech Republic have opted for a one-tier corporate 
governance system (according to the Czech Commercial Register).857 Secondly, 
s.194(3) Act n° 513/1991 Coll., Commercial Code 1991858 provides for an exception 
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for companies with single shareholders in terms of board size, as they are permitted 
to have a single member on the board of directors. 
 
In their study, Ernst & Young made a general statement that the attractiveness of 
forming an SE can also be attributed to tax considerations.859 In relation to the Czech 
Republic, this again is an obscure deduction: the taxation provisions of an SE are 
decided by the Member State where an SE is registered, and an SE in the Czech 
Republic is taxed at a relatively high rate of 19% corporation tax.860 Other Member 
States have much lower rates of corporation tax: for example, Cyprus is taxed at 
12.5%, Latvia and Lithuania both at 15%.861 Despite having such low tax rates the 
number of SEs registered in Cyprus is only 24 and Latvia and Lithuania both have 
fewer than 10 SEs in total.862 
 
It might be argued that the flexibility of Czech Company Law explains the rise of the 
SE as a popular company model in the country. But Slovakia, a neighbouring 
Member State with relatively identical company law provisions, has only 123 
registered SEs.863 The two countries share the same Commercial Code: (i) Act n° 
111/1990 of 19 April 1990 on state enterprise 1990864; and (ii) Act n° 513/1991 Coll., 
Commercial Code 1991865 (see, Table 11- Board-level employee representation 
provisions and their scope in Member States). For example, as with Czech Company 
Law, Slovakia’s Company Law also provides for public limited-liability companies for 
the dualistic corporate governance system, the possibility that the board of directors 
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can have a single member and the minimum of three members on the supervisory 
board (s.200(1) Act n° 513/1991 Coll., Commercial Code 1991).866 
 
Eidenmüller and Lasák conducted an empirical study to ascertain the motivations of 
Czech SE founders and used the data from Czech national Commercial Register on 
all SEs registered in the Czech Republic.867 In the last quarter of 2010, they gathered 
data from 40% of all the SEs registered in the Czech Republic. Their principal 
findings which drove the motivation to establish an SE were interesting in 
comparison with other Member States:868  
 
First, the European image of the SE was quite attractive rather than a limited liability 
company (Společnost s ručením omezeným / s.r.o.) or a joint stock company 
(Akciová společnost / a.s.). Their survey provided 82 positive responses from the 
registered SE’s in the Czech Republic out of the 88 on the image of the SE.869 
 
Second, the easy internal governance system offered by the SE is quite a preference 
and this “does not necessarily concern the availability of the one-tier board system, 
but rather the reduction of management board members and of members of the 
supervisory board”.870 
 
Third, the regulatory procedures of setting up an SE in the Czech Republic are 
favourable, for example, an SE can be registered within 10 working days in the 
Czech Republic.871  
 
Fourth, the choice to move a company’s registered office to another Member State 
and cross-border mergers were also revealed to drive the incorporation of the SEs in 
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Czech Republic (52 incorporations stated this as their motivation between 
September and November 2010).872 
 
Eidenmüller and Lasák also reported that the ‘financing scheme’ in the Czech 
Republic is “another state-specific advantage for SE users”.873 Most of the SEs 
incorporation in the Czech Republic are facilitated by professional service 
providers.874 These professional service providers in combination with the country’s 
minimal regulatory burden makes it very easy for prospective businesses to set-up 
an SE. Professional service providers and other significant providers of credit sell 
Czech SEs to potential buyers by lending them the minimum share capital required 
for the formation of an SE at a 0% interest rate.875 This practice is apparently very 
common in the Czech Republic, thereby removing the problem of finding €120,000 
minimum capital from small or medium-sized companies which was identified as 
significant deterrent to set up an SE (previously discussed in Section 3.3 The 
efficiency of the SE Directive). 
 
It is also interesting to discover that adopting or circumventing employee 
representation has no significance whatsoever in the incorporation of the SEs in the 
Czech Republic. ‘Survey Results 3’ in Eidenmüller and Lasák’s study shows that out 
of 88 positive responses to denote the most central motives for setting up an SE, 
only one related to employee participation.876 When companies have fewer than five 
employees, the question of employee representation becomes more or less 
irrelevant.  
 
Compared to other international companies limited by shares, the SEs in Czech 
Republic benefits from free cross-border business operations and VAT refunds.877 
Also, there has been no indication either in Eidenmüller and Lasák’s study or 
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otherwise, that that the Czech Republic’s tax regime has been a driving factor for the 
popularity of the SEs. 
 
The above analysis makes it obvious that the principal reason for the high and 
growing number of SEs in the Czech Republic is the flexibility offered to prospective 
businesses, both by the state and the professional service providers. This flexibility is 
demonstrated in the minimal regulatory burden under which companies must 
operate. It is also seen in the ample opportunities for companies to make use of the 
financial services offered by professional service providers and lenders. This may be 
why, “since February 2006, The World Bank officially considers the Czech Republic 
a standard, fully developed free market economy.”878 These principal findings 
demonstrate the success of the SEs in the Czech Republic. Most of the companies 
that have set up an SE in the country are small or medium-sized businesses: 1808 
SEs out of 1898 registered SEs in the country have fewer than five employees.879 In 
other Member States, such enterprises would be dissuaded from becoming an SE by 
the high minimum registered capital requirement. The loan facilities on offer in the 
Czech Republic remove this requirement. This analysis disproves the finding from 
Ernst & Young’s study, which found that the only negative driver for setting up an SE 
in Czech Republic was the requirement of the minimum registered capital: “An SE is 
required to have a higher minimum registered capital (EUR 120,000) than a national 
public limited liability company (only approximately EUR 80,000)”.880 
 
This case study suggests that a Member State can make the formation of an SE 
more attractive in two ways. First, it can make the formation process less 
bureaucratic and burdensome. Secondly, by offering financial help to businesses – 
either through selling the company or by offering a loan – and either through the 
state itself or by means of commercial financial institutions – Member States could 
                                                          
878
 L Stehlik, 'Financing a Start-up Company in the Czech Republic' (AGS) 
<https://www.expats.cz/prague/article/prague-business/start-up-companies/> accessed 28 April 2017. 
879
 ‘SE Companies: Facts and Figures 2017’ (SEEurope, March 2017) 
<http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company-SE/Facts-Figures> accessed 25 April 2017. 
880
 ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE) - 2008/S 
144-192482’ (Ernst & Young, 2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/se/study_SE_9122009_en.pdf> 
accessed 28 April 2017. 
197 
remove the first hurdle faced by any small or medium-sized business wanting to 
become an SE: the minimum registered capital of €120,000.  
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CHAPTER 8- THE FUTURE OF THE SE v EUROPEAN 
COMPANY LAW 
 
8.1 Introduction  
Constantly changing economic and social realities in Europe put in question the 
future of conventional industrial relations, and employee involvement in particular. 
Employee involvement predominantly channelled through trade unions has now 
become questionable.  
 
The UK should ideally be moving towards the future by embedding social democracy 
in its industrial relations. It seeks to further fairness at work and the fair treatment of 
employees,881 to ensure industrial success by augmenting flexibility in employee 
involvement, and encouraging innovation and efficiency.882 To achieve increased 
productivity and a high-value economy, the focus is now on legislating for greater 
workplace cooperation.883 Mechanisms for the collective representation of 
employees such as trade unions will not be bolstered, but merely embraced as an 
instrument of promoting workplace cooperation. Nonetheless, the current economic 
scenario is disappointing and does not show any signs of a high-value economy; 
instead, the recent quarterly growth and levels of GDP for the UK data from the 
Office for National Statistics reported that the UK economy rose by just 0.2% in 
2017’s first quarter.884 
 
If they are to improve the economic condition of Member States like the UK and 
sustain a better future for employees and their involvement rights, EU legislators 
must, as a first step, learn the lessons from the 2008 financial crisis. Bagdi notes that 
the crisis caused escalated market competition and, on that basis, groups 
companies into two categories: first, companies that decided to cut costs and made 
collective redundancies, thereby causing peak unemployment in many Member 
States; and second, companies that resolved to overcome the financial crisis by 
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opening dialogue with the employees on decision-making, working conditions and 
risk management, with a view to regaining profitability.885  
 
As a next step, EU legislators must amend the ECS so that such legislation 
promotes an effective working model of board-level employee representation rights, 
since doing so will be instrumental in mitigating future crises.886 Additionally, EU 
Company Law collectively needs major reform in those aspects that were identified 
during consultations and reports submitted to the EC. 
 
This chapter analyses the EC’s consultation process that has directly affected the 
ECS. If the EC had a functional consultation mechanism, it would have generated 
interest and responses from stakeholders, which would have most likely led to an 
effective revision of the ECS. This could have been a major contributing factor in 
addressing the shortcomings in the ECS. A holistic view of European Company Law 
is taken in this chapter since the SE is an integral part of any European company, 
the future of the SE and European Company Law is entwined. Further, the feasibility 
or viability of the SE Directive in terms of cross-border facilitation will also be 
evaluated, as it is arguable that the Cross-Border Mergers Directive may have 
overshadowed or duplicated it.  
 
8.2 Critiquing the EC’s consultation process 
EU Company Law has been gradually developed as a Europe-wide body of 
legislation. It has provided for the SE to become a company form and for the 
establishment of entities like the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG). EU 
Company Law has also harmonised domestic law in the Member States in respect 
of: (i) shareholder rights; (ii) divisions and mergers; (iii) minimum regulations for 
single-member private companies; (iv) financial accounting and reporting; (v) branch 
disclosure; (vi) takeover bids; and (vii) preserving a public company's capital.  
 
In 2003, the EC issued a consultation document on reviewing the future of EU 
Company Law. It was the first consultation to review the future of the ECS. 
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‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
Union - A Plan to Move Forward’887 received responses from across Europe, but the 
least number came from British stakeholders, despite the UK being the Member 
State that made most submissions (see, Figure 6- Company law submissions to the 
EU by Member States below). 
 
 
Figure 6- Company law submissions to the EU by Member States888 
 
Stakeholders like The Association of British Insurers (ABI), which makes formal 
submissions on the EU Company Law communications, on this occasion submitted 
that any appropriate and desirable modifications to the ECS in practice was “not a 
priority”, despite making detailed comments on other questions raised in the 
consultation.889 The Expert Forum of Financial Services Users (Fin-Use) produced a 
vague response on the ECS question by merely submitting that it supports the 
development of the ECS.890 This response stood out because, out of 14 responses 
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on company law questions that were submitted by Fin-Use, the one on ECS was the 
only single sentence response.891 
 
Directorate General (DG) Internal Market and Services published a report stating 
that many major stakeholders and representatives had criticised the methodology 
recommended in the consultation’s ‘Action Plan’ for resolving employee involvement 
issues within the ECS.892 They resolutely opposed the idea that the ECS would be 
applicable 
 
“…in a somewhat compulsory way in cases of cross-border mergers or transfer of 
seat, as well as rules that could lead to the import of different systems of employee 
participation in countries where such a system did not exist.”893  
 
The report rationalised that this opposition may result in deterring cross-border 
mergers and could challenge the competitiveness of European companies. The 
report suggested that the applicable law should be that of the Member State in which 
the incorporated company was merged or the one to which the seat was transferred. 
Furthermore, it was also suggested that the SE Directive should encompass 
investment funds so that it could allow fund managers to elucidate their fund ranges. 
The problems associated with cross-border mergers stand as one of the foremost 
hurdles for investment funds in achieving a single market.  
 
In 2012, the EC consulted trade unions, business federations, universities, liberal 
professions, individuals, investors, public authorities, think tanks, civil society and 
consultants across the EU on the future of company law in the EU.894 Its objectives 
were to investigate the viability of the current company law legislation and whether 
amendments were necessary to meet market and societal needs. The consultation 
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looked at issues such as: (i) reviewing the capital regime for companies in the EU, so 
that the existing minimum capital requirements and procedures on capital upkeep do 
not constitute a considerable impediment to dividend distribution;895 (ii) the need to 
merge all EU Company Law Directives to make them more effective; (iii) reviewing 
the extent and objectives of EU Company Law and exploring further areas for 
harmonisation; (iv) whether the EC should initiate legislation on problems in relation 
to groups of companies;896 (v) the need for additional legislation on cross-border 
movement of EU companies; and (vi) the significance and limitations of legal entities 
within the EU (for example, the SE).897 
 
DG Internal Market and Services collected 496 responses from 26 Member States, 
and from a few countries outside the EU.898 It was disappointing to note that many 
stakeholders who responded to this consultation considered the significance and 
limitations of the SE as “low priority” (e.g. European Company Law Experts (ECLE)) 
or had “no opinion” on it (e.g. The Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA))899. ECLE 
submitted that “EU company legal forms are not among the top priorities for EU 
intervention”900. BNP PARIBAS made the minimum response of stating that if an 
‘attractive tax device’ were to be added to the SE Directive, it would generate more 
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interest.901 However, the details of such a tax device were left for the EC to imagine. 
Sweden’s official response was that, due to a broad absence of interest in the SE 
from trade and industry, the resources should be better utilised on other regulatory 
work, as it believes that the number of registered SEs is still far too low.902 It was 
expected that Sweden would have something more substantial to add to the review 
of the SE, as Swedish corporate governance was considered to be the best in the 
world by the World Economic Forum during that time.903 
 
8.3 Achieving superior EU Company Law and corporate governance 
regulation strategy 
EU legislators should consider four areas of reform to improve EU Company Law 
and develop a strategy for regulating corporate governance. 
 
First, EU legislators should enforce an ECS codetermination model that would 
require the inclusion of employees across all Member States. It is unacceptable that 
domestic legislation on codetermination embraces only employees that work 
domestically and overlooks employees that are based in subsidiaries or regional 
offices in other Member States. For example, Volkswagen AG has no employee 
representatives in the supervisory boards of their Spanish subsidiary SEAT or of 
their Czech Republic subsidiary ŠKODA.904 If these branches were to be shut down, 
employees in Spain and the Czech Republic are in a much more unfavourable 
position than employees based in Germany. Even if this cannot be categorised as 
discrimination against a foreign workforce, the situation violates European common 
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market principles.905 An enforced ECS codetermination model should require the 
inclusion of employees across all Member States and be applicable to all companies 
with cross-border functions. Individual Member States would take little interest in 
taking these measures. 
 
Secondly, to harmonise codetermination, EDR – the revised model of the negotiation 
procedure – should be made mandatory for all companies with cross-border 
functions within the EU. The benchmark of companies performing cross-border 
functions could be further scrutinised.906 The SE Directive provides that employee 
involvement provisions in the SE will be based upon negotiations between the 
management and employees before an SE is created. This provision allows for an 
adjustable mechanism of employee involvement that is tailor-made to the specific 
needs of the particular company. Member States may be permitted to apply default 
statutory provisions in the case of failed negotiations, thereby ensuring that national 
differences would stay intact. 
 
Third, to harmonise European Company Law, EU legislators should create a 
functional mechanism that effectively regulates the acceptance or blocking of reform 
proposals by Member States. The details of such a mechanism do not form a part of 
this research. This may seem an autocratic proposal, as the EU without its Member 
States is nothing; however, every Member State has a different view on employee 
involvement. The ECS took more than four decades to come into force. Such 
differences and delays are the major impediment to harmonise EU corporate 
governance, company law and labour law. Historically, the radically diverse 
approaches to employee involvement across the EU have impeded the development 
of new supranational company forms and provisions. If ‘enhanced cooperation’ 
between Member States could be achieved (Article 326 - 334 of The Treaty on 
European Union), the harmonisation of European Company Law will be more swift 
and effective. Shortcomings and inadequacies could be much more quickly revised 
and implemented. 
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Lastly, EU legislators must firmly encourage Member States to participate in the 
consultation process. The UK, for example, largely ignored consultations by the EC 
on the ECS.907 
 
Achieving greater participation could be achieved by implementing an extensive 
impact evaluation by stakeholders and interested parties in Member States for any 
novel piece of legislation. This can be further coupled with Member States, ensuring 
that stakeholder bodies directly affected by the novel legislation must be obliged to 
make comprehensive submissions on the consultations.908 This may raise 
enforcement issues if Member States do not comply with the obligation to submit 
responses; such issues could be met by imposing considerable financial penalties on 
the Member States. These states are part of an EU club; as with many clubs, 
effective participation is necessary to ensure the longevity of the club’s aims and 
objectives. 
 
The EC must also reorganise the consultation process, to make it more systematic 
and effective and to encourage reorganisation of the consultation process in Member 
States. On average, consultations by the EC have a response deadline of 12 weeks 
and late submissions are rarely acknowledged. The EC must realise that much 
legislation is technically and operationally complex; stakeholders and interested 
parties must have sufficient time to respond. Insufficient response time could lead to 
multiple consultations.  
 
Multiple consultations also often result from the failure of the consulting body to 
properly anticipate and comprehend the scale of the legislation in question and the 
questions or issues covered. For example, in the UK, the Council Directive No 
2014/65/EU909 (hereafter, referred to as the "MiFID II Directive") has been consulted 
over six times, with the implementation date being January 2018. This multiplication 
of consultations results from the fact that many areas that were initially consulted 
upon were not wide-ranging. Consultees were identifying new issues with every 
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consultation and the minimal response time made the process arduous.910 The latest 
consultation paper (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Implementation - 
Consultation Paper VI, CP17/19) was published on 3 July 2017 and has a response 
time of just over eight weeks (7 September 2017).911 It is also astonishing to find that 
this latest consultation, and the previous consultation paper (Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II Implementation - Consultation Paper V, CP17/8)912 both 
consulted on the same issue of ‘implementation proposals’; evidently there were 
shortcomings in identifying these ‘implementation proposals’ on the first instance.913 
 
8.4 Cross-Border Mergers Directive v SE Directive 
The lack of legal certainty has constantly affected the cross-border mobility of 
companies in the EU. Decades ago, the issue of cross-border mobility was about 
objectives; today it is about proper procedure. The development of case law and 
rationale from Cartesio,914 Uberseering915, Inspire Art,916 Centros917 and Daily Mail918 
has laid the foundation for interpreting freedom of establishment and cross-border 
movement within Member States. 
 
Before the transposition of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive, the SE was highly 
beneficial and instrumental in enabling companies to merge simply across Member 
States. The Cross-Border Mergers Directive simplified a complicated, costly and 
onerous process into a readily available company law instrument.  
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The Cross-Border Mergers Directive has itself faced procedural complications, but 
overall is successful in advancing economic activity between Member States. 
Between 2008 and 2012, the number of cross-border mergers has risen by a 
staggering 173% (there were 132 cross-border mergers in 2008, which by to 2012 
rose to 361). 919 
 
The Cross-Border Mergers Directive also considerably increased the prospective 
scope of board-level employee representation by making it more global.920 It makes 
the significant distinction between a monistic and a dualistic board structure. The 
application of board-level employee representation policies in an SE is only relevant 
to companies in which representation rights existed preceding the merger. The issue 
of employee involvement actually limits the progress of companies with monistic 
board structure. Co-determination structures offering more than one-third board-level 
employee representation is usually customised to the supervisory boards’ 
participation. Their objective is to institute employee representation in overseeing 
corporate governance, but not to engage the employee representatives in the 
company’s actual management. Therefore, any potential provisions must distinguish 
between the monistic board structure and dualistic board structure.  
 
The agreement adopted in the Cross-Border Mergers Directive ought to be applied 
to all EU company forms. Member States would then be able to call for one-third 
board level employee representation in all forms of EU companies with a monistic 
board structure. Article 16 (4)(c) of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive permits 
Member States to introduce regulations allowing companies with a monistic board 
structure to restrict board-level employee representation to one-third. This provision 
is put into practice by the UK (the only Member State to have done so) in § 39, 
Chapter 5 of The Companies (Cross-Border Mergers) Regulations 2007,921 which 
provides that: 
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“the UK transferee company may limit the proportion of directors elected, appointed, 
recommended or opposed through employee participation to a level which is the 
lesser of one third of the directors”. 
 
The SE was intended to apply to companies with cross-border functions across the 
EU and to minimise trade limitations, thus primarily focusing on EU companies. But it 
has also appealed to international businesses that wish to expand in the EU. 
Businesses outside the EU can enter the market by creating a subsidiary with an EU 
partner company. For example, Narada (one of the foremost battery suppliers and 
manufacturers worldwide)922 incorporated a joint venture subsidiary called Narada 
Europe SE with its Norwegian partner Eltek923 (an energy and transmissions 
systems supplier to the telecommunication sector).924 Narada owns 60% of Narada 
Europe SE and the remaining 40% is owned by Eltek. The SE was formally 
established by Eltek Sweden and Eltek Norway to complete legal technicalities of 
establishment (at least two participating companies must have an EU origin).925 The 
driving factor for this SE’s incorporation was the convenience in cross-border 
mobility of transfer of the headquarters and registration office to any other Member 
State provided under the SE Directive.926 
 
At present, both the SE and the ECS seem minimally attractive. The shortcomings of 
the SE have contributed to its potential not being fully utilised, and to its being a less 
acceptable and less popular form of company. The SE Regulation should be urgently 
revised to make the SE more sustainable, by dealing with the issue of transferring a 
company from one Member State’s jurisdiction to another.  
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The SE Regulation falls short in six significant aspects when compared with the 
sophisticated Cross-Border Mergers Directive.927 First, the SE cannot be a European 
form of company because of frequent references to Member State domestic law in 
the SE Regulation, which provides many diverse variations subject to the company 
law of the Member State where it was incorporated.  
 
Second, the SE cannot be created by a choice ab initio, but needs the former 
incorporation of companies from other Member States to create the SE as a 
subsidiary or merge into an SE. The form is only offered to domestic public type 
companies (i.e. a PLC or an AG).  
 
Third, the SE Directive provides for separate systems of employee involvement, 
effectively placing this matter within the jurisdiction of a Member State’s domestic 
legislation. In a merger, the matter can come under the jurisdiction of either of the 
Member States involved. 
 
Fourth, the flexibility of the SE is reduced because the registered office must be in 
the same Member State as the real seat’s location. The SE does not have the 
freedom of domestic companies to relocate their real seat anywhere in the EU. EU 
legislators did not foresee the situation of the SEs being obligated to comply with the 
‘real seat’ theory. The issue of an SE having its head office and registered office in 
the same Member State is not a concern for ‘real seat’ Member States because, in 
those states, national company forms operate under similar conditions. If a 
company’s management is transferred to another Member State, it would no longer 
be identified as a company in the original Member State; instead, it would be 
considered dissolved.   
 
‘Incorporation theory’ Member States like the UK do not have this condition. A 
company’s management can be relocated to any Member State without the company 
losing its legal personality. Arguably, the requirement to have an SE’s registered 
office and head office in the same Member State is excessively prohibitive and 
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disadvantageous in ‘incorporation theory’ Member States like the UK. Further, there 
is uncertainty about the definition of ‘head office’, as it lacks legal meaning. 
 
Fifth, the legal capital to set up an SE – €120,000 – is exorbitantly high for small or 
medium-sized companies. The amount is almost five times the required threshold of 
a domestic PLC (Article 6 of the 2nd Company Law Directive)928. Notwithstanding, if 
financial flexibility is offered to businesses by their respective members states or EU 
then this may be less problematic for small or medium-sized companies (as seen 
with the Czech Republic in Section 7.6 Case Study: The Czech Republic (an SE 
haven). 
 
Lastly, SE will never be attractive if the SE Directive is not in harmony with business 
time constraints. The EC should shorten the time it takes to establish an SE, which is 
currently anywhere between six and twelve months. 
 
Bech-Bruun’s study indicated that the Cross-Border Mergers Directive was 
instrumental in increasing cross-border mergers, especially in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis, when cross-border mergers and acquisitions had drastically 
decreased.929 Thus, it can be fairly predicted that there will be further growth in 
cross-border mergers, with a probable impact on cross-border employee 
involvement, particularly in Member States with comparatively low levels of board-
level employee representation. To increase the SE’s attractiveness, the EC must 
take into account the revision proposals mentioned previously.930 The SE’s cross-
border merger practice requires alignment with that of the Cross-Border Mergers 
Directive, which is better structured.  
 
                                                          
928
 Council Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 
on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are 
required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in respect of the formation of public limited 
liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such  
safeguards equivalent [2012] OJ L315/74: this is no longer in force. 
929
 ‘Bech-Bruun Study on the Application of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive’ (Lexidale, 2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/mergers/131007_study-cross-border-merger-
directive_en.pdf> accessed 10 July 2017. 
930
 See, Chapter 7- Reviewing the European Company Statute. 
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That being said, there is much work to be done to reduce the procedural 
complexities of cross-border functions and movement of companies within the EU. 
On 2 February 2012, the European Parliament put before the EC a resolution on a 
14th Company Law Directive on the cross-border transfer of company seats, to:  
 
“...allow companies to exercise their right of establishment by migrating to a host 
Member State without losing their legal personality but by being converted into a 
company governed by the law of the host Member State without having to be wound 
up.”931  
 
It is suggested that the mobility question must be governed by the uniformity rule 
within the domestic legislation of a Member State and considering the neutrality rule 
among various methods of cross-border mobility.932 A standardised regulatory 
framework ought to deal with the consequences of a company’s movement across a 
border, with cross-border mergers, with the transfer of registered office or with 
conversion to the available company form vehicles in the host Member State or 
available EU company form vehicles like the SE.  
 
Another procedural complexity is the absence of a uniform business register.933 The 
EC believes that combining business registers across the EU will encourage cross-
border business and save up to €70 million every year as: 
 
“company registers provide company information that is essential for consumers and 
business partners alike, such as information on a company's legal form, its seat, 
capital and legal representatives...help to facilitate cross-border electronic access to 
business information, by ensuring business registers are updated, and business 
information is more easily and readily accessible. These changes are crucial for 
                                                          
931
 ‘European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on 
a 14th company law directive on the cross-border transfer of company seats (2011/2046(INI))’ 
(2013/C 239 E/03) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012IP0019&from=EN> accessed 1 June 2017. 
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companies when setting up branches, conducting cross-border trade or providing 
cross-border services in the EU.”934  
 
It is of the utmost importance to manage company information and share companies 
registers within the EU. The effective date of most companies’ resolutions with 
respect to cross-border activities is conditioned to their cataloguing in the business 
register of the companies concerned. An EC Working Staff document regarding the 
interconnection of central, commercial and companies’ registers has suggested that, 
to achieve an effective cross-border activities system, it must be supplemented by a 
suitable regulation of the upkeep and usability of companies’ information across 
Member States.935 
 
8.5 Brexit- The Future of the SE in the UK 
Contingent on the Brexit negotiations that will be adopted in the near future, EU 
Company Law incorporated in the British legal system may be either obliterated in its 
entirety or certain handpicked provisions amended to suit the system. There remains 
uncertainty about the future direction of the EU, if and when the Brexit happens, the 
status of the UK and the changing dynamics of the EU company law. There is 
certainty, however, on the fact that European corporate entities like SE with 
registered offices in the UK will lose their legal identity, as they are built on EU 
Regulations. The impact after Brexit on the SEs in the UK will lead to two possible 
outcomes: (i) most of the SEs in the UK will either move to other Member States 
(e.g. Ireland); or (ii) the SEs that choose to remain will be automatically converted 
into a UK company form (e.g. PLCs).936 Such companies will be prone to onerous 
disclosure requirements or burdensome administrative issues if they had branches 
or subsidiaries in other Member States. Therefore, it will be easier for SEs to 
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 ‘Linking business registers across Europe will stimulate cross-border trade and save up to 
70 million euro a year’ (European Commission, 24 February 2011) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
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2009/101/EC as regards the interconnection of central, commercial and companies registers’ 
(European Commission, 2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/business_registers/20110224_impact_en.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2017. 
936
 Similarly, UK company forms will no longer be able to convert into an SE. Further, free movement 
of companies, cross-border mergers and cross-border conversions will become inaccessible if the 
relevant Member States do not offer mutual and bilateral provisions permitting cross-border 
conversions or mergers for companies outside the EU. 
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relocate to other Member States. German companies which are established as SEs 
in the UK will inevitably relocate to other Member States, as Erik Schweizer 
(President of the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce- 
DIHK) notes that “Brexit will significantly damage the business of German companies 
with the UK” after a survey of 2,200 companies published by the DIHK.937  
KPMG produced an impact analysis report which highlights some following aspects 
that will need due consideration by European corporate entities like the SE after 
Brexit: 
Aspect Consideration 
Practicability of 
transfer in time 
The questions and possibility to transfer all appropriate functions (including, 
but not limited to, productive assets); and considering possibilities for 
moving European head offices. 
Legal and tax 
structure 
Considering a new form of company and/or planning a contractual basis for 
transferring the SE’s head offices; considering exit taxes and carry forward 
tax losses; considering subsidies loss received in the UK; updating the 
changes in the VAT set-up; and revising the service level agreement 
regime. 
Human resources Elaborating a communication policy which will coherently clarify the transfer 
to current employees and increase retention; transferring employee groups 
to the new locations; and protecting the transfer of knowledge (i.e. where 
current employees in the UK are substituted by the new employees). 
Assets, licences and 
properties 
Moving all appropriate contracts, intellectual property and assets; applying 
for new licences, permits and market authorisations to guarantee their 
legitimacy for all EU businesses; and implementing new local health, 
security and environment standards. 
Operations Revising invoices and flow of goods; adopting set-ups like financial 
reporting to meet the new local standards; and updating the IT systems to 
conform with the new organisational structure. 
Table 15- Aspects for consideration to transfer the SE’s head offices and operations 
from the UK to other Member States938 
 
ECS has been transposed in UK’s legislation like any other Member States. Even 
though post Brexit, these laws will surrender their status as measures based on the 
EU law and promoting cross-border operations, they may still serve as the 
foundation for cross-border associations. A company form like an SE can serve as 
an ideal model of a company form for the UK after Brexit. It is suggested that if the 
UK addresses the novel solutions identified in this research on the shortcomings of 
the European Company Statute, then it can be inspired to develop a new company 
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form based on the features of the SE. This will at least ensure that there is a 
theoretically perfect form of company in the UK and any practicalities issues can be 
swiftly revised after running public consultations, when this new company form has 
had 1, 3 and 5 years of experience.  
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CHAPTER 9- CONCLUSION 
 
This research has demonstrated that employee involvement, and board-level 
employee representation rights in Member States in particular, have been 
undermined by using the SE as an instrument, despite board-level employee 
representation being recognised as a fundamental right within the EU (Article 153 of 
The Treaty on European Union and Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union939).  
 
Additionally, the variations in employee involvement traditions, legislation and 
practices across the EU make it arduous to achieve any uniformity on the subject. It 
is clear that EU legislators have made an attempt to enshrine board-level employee 
representation in EU Company Law, but this attempt seems futile, as there are 
loopholes in existing EU law. The data gathered in this research has identified only a 
few instances when companies within the EU have used the SE Directive to 
circumvent employee involvement rights in practice940 (due to various limitations the 
data gathered on this point were minimal), but it is still theoretically possible to do so 
and some SEs may have done so. 
 
An ideal definition of ‘employee representation’941 can be a first step towards 
achieving consistency. Such a definition will remove any confusion about the 
relevant words in the different languages spoken across the Member States, lessen 
ambiguities and limit the freedom for interpretation in different Member States. 
 
Chapter 2- Justifying Employee Involvement in Corporate Governance demonstrated 
that employee involvement is an essential contributor to a company’s governance. 
Employee involvement does not restrict a board’s power to function effectively; 
objections based on a corporate owner’s property rights can be dismissed. Any 
corporate law issue needs to outweigh its disadvantages so that the issue becomes 
a positive aspect of governance. Employee involvement undoubtedly enhances a 
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 [2016] OJ C202. 
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 For example, GfK SE, Fresenius SE and Surteco SE 
941
 See, Chapter 1- Employee Involvement in the EU’s Corporate Governance Regime 
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company’s value through the participation of representatives in rational and 
knowledgeable decision-making.  
 
Nonetheless, research conclusions can be confusing, especially when ambiguous 
issues are debated from the perspectives of various countries. The timing of the 
research, the political traditions and trade union traditions of a particular country, the 
composition and values of the company, research methodology and the personal 
positive or negative mind-set of the researcher all seem to influence research 
conclusions. The debate remains open. The German position, which dominates most 
of the literature review, provides successful examples of employee involvement, and 
the economic and governance success of the German companies is unquestionable. 
 
EU law currently takes a potentially laissez-faire approach towards employee 
involvement. Hence, the term ‘neglected’ is often used to describe employee 
representation at board level. It is also important to note that we may not need to 
debate the issue of imposing employee involvement because the benefits speak for 
themselves: it helps to generate higher shareholder value, company value and stock 
value; it benefits employees; and it contributes to good corporate governance. The 
obstacles in recognising these arguments lie within the political traditions of some 
Member States, the antagonistic nature of some companies that are unwilling to 
share power with employees, and the perceptions and agendas of some trade 
unions. 
 
This research concludes that the ECS has brought substantial reforms (for example 
with issues like board-level employee representation, which had been outstanding 
for decades in the EU) and seeks to promote social and economic integration. It is, 
however, still new in its approach and has many 'striking similarities' with the present 
EWC Directive (for example, the creation of SNB).942 EU Directives effectively have 
no great impact on domestic and EU Company Law because they are under-
enforced (choice to restrict the directive’s scope); because they regulate or cover 
peripheral issues; and because they are interpreted and enforced differently in each 
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 B Keller and F Werner, 'New Forms of Employee Involvement at European Level- The Case of the 
European Company (SE)' (2011) British Journal of Industrial Relations 629-630. 
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Member State.943 Similarly, the SE Directive only provides a basic framework and 
the detailed rules of law have been left to the discretion of the Member State where 
the SE is registered; and the SE Regulation refers to domestic legislation of Member 
States frequently. The SE Directive potentially takes a laissez-faire approach to 
employee involvement, but it cannot be denied that attempts and changes have 
been made to increase social welfare.  
 
With respect to the tax-related issues while setting up an SE or transferring an SE’s 
registered office, EU legislators will have to move forward to create a balance of 
interests between free movement of the SEs and the freedom to establish and offset 
tax planning.944 In order to develop the SE’s economic status in comparison with 
similar domestic legal business entities, no biased legislative tax laws should be 
adopted. Nonetheless, an appropriate tax framework needs be drafted to resolve the 
existing SE’s tax problems. 
 
The ECS has set the foundations for a comprehensive and a suitable system that 
would assist in achieving the objectives of SE and of the EU. But this foundation is 
incomplete and sometimes contradicts the SE’s objectives: for example, encouraging 
employee representation at board level while creating provisions to allow companies 
to circumvent it. Aspects of the employee participation negotiation procedure have 
been left uncertain by the SE Directive (as discussed in Section 3.3 The Efficiency of 
the SE Directive). However, the SE Directive is still new in its application and SE is 
still not a common choice among global or even EU companies. But the 
shortcomings of the directive should not be ignored: shortcomings that defeat the 
fundamental principles of the statute and the rights provided under Article 153 of The 
Treaty on European Union. 
 
If the EU is to refer to German corporate governance in developing its own policy, 
then, rather than adopting it wholesale, specific advantageous features of the model 
must be identified to influence other governance systems. The German corporate 
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governance model is not without its faults. Codetermination (see, Section 4.4 
Codetermination: An ideal corporate governance feature of the EU) is one of the 
features of German corporate governance that is absent in the Anglo-American 
model; if adopted, it can serve as an unequivocal exhibition of social democracy. 
Even during the financial crisis of 2008, codetermination in Germany was applauded 
for its ‘progressive effects owing to its impact to efficiently measuring the crisis 
concentrated on social partnership’.945  
 
The EU has regarded employee involvement as a central constituent of the EU 
social market economy. EU Company Law has adopted most aspects of 
codetermination in its Cross-Border Mergers Directive,946 European Cooperative 
(SCE) and the ECS.  
 
Other aspects of the German corporate governance model are worthy of merit. The 
German audit system is undoubtedly efficient and provides a true picture of a 
company’s performance (see, Section 4.9 Enhanced auditing systems), as well as 
helping it to avoid conflicts of interest. Agency costs can never be totally mitigated, 
and agency problems can never be fully resolved. An ideal corporate governance 
mechanism (see, Section 4.5 Minimal agency costs in German corporate 
governance model) successfully mitigates agency conflicts by finding optimal 
resolutions, advancing the normative goal of cumulative social welfare and 
acknowledging rights of the involved parties, especially employees.  
 
Different company players will always seek to further their interests. EU corporate 
governance follows a mixture of stakeholder and shareholder theories, but it is 
suggested that more emphasis should be put on securing the interest of 
stakeholders. The other transacting parties’ interests can be well administered and 
furthered if there is a good corporate governance mechanism, as demonstrated by 
the German system. Any corporate governance mechanism should advance the 
interests of the company as a whole. Agency costs between company players, or 
other issues that arise in the company, should be statistically weighed for their 
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advantages and disadvantages, and the decision should be based on seeking to 
resolve the most detrimental issue first.  
 
Any suggestion for improving corporate governance in EU cannot be absolute. 
Factors like social practices, history, work traditions, and trade union principles affect 
the corporate governance mechanisms in each Member State. It can be theoretically 
concluded that, if certain aspects of German corporate governance (as identified in 
Chapter 4- Lessons from the German Model of Corporate Governance) are applied 
in Member States that have different forms of governance, then it might have a 
positive result on that Member State’s social culture and the economy as a whole. 
EU legislators can be commended for introducing SE, which enshrines most of these 
aspects of German corporate governance. They have left it optional for companies to 
accept this form of company, which will in a few years provide clear data that can be 
used as a comparison with other EU company forms. It will only be then that aspects 
like the economic effect of codetermination can be empirically checked.947 
 
In contrast to Germany, the UK’s position can be concluded as one of falling trade 
union membership, ineffective employee information and consultation mechanisms, 
unreceptive works councils and a corporate governance structure that is long 
outdated. Measures like re-opening the consultation process on SE and employee 
involvement will increase awareness of the SE and advertise the advantages of 
employee involvement. These objectives could also be met if HM Revenue and 
Customs introduces tax incentives for companies setting up as an SE or companies 
that qualify for board-level employee representation. Financial lending institutions or 
other similar service providers can be encouraged to provide loans and services at 
attractive rates to the SEs or qualifying companies that advance employee 
involvement. This has proven to be particularly successful, as per the findings of this 
research (see, Section 7.6 Case Study: The Czech Republic (an SE haven)). These 
efforts will outweigh the legal and regulatory complexities in setting up an SE. 
 
Industrial democracy in the UK has failed. If the UK is to survive the economic 
changes ahead, it must embed employee involvement in its companies as a matter 
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of principle. Employee involvement will bring about the reform in the UK’s corporate 
governance that is needed to protect the long-term interests and success of its 
companies. The correlation between employee involvement and improved corporate 
governance (especially decision-making) has been found to be widely positive in 
most Member States. It would be naive to assume that all the lessons from German 
corporate governance will solve all the UK’s governance issues, but it cannot be 
denied that Germany survived financial recession and is still leading the EU 
economy, while the UK has barely progressed. 
 
Systems of board-level employee representation in the EU are diverse. A system of 
employee representation that may work for one Member State is not guaranteed to 
succeed in another. There can be no definitive answer on whether board-level 
employee representation falls within the scope of company law or labour law; there is 
extensive latitude to interpret domestic board-level employee representation 
provisions or the provisions within the ECS. Section 6.2 The separation of 
employees between company law and labour law suggests that, if labour law is 
categorised as the regulation of an inter-connected relationship among employees, 
employers and trade unions,948 then one may define board-level employee 
representation within the scope of labour law. However, if company law is 
categorised as the regulation of characteristics like limited liability, designated 
management under a board structure, legal personality, transferable shares and 
investor ownership, then board-level employee representation may conveniently fall 
within the scope of company law.949 Therefore, the boundary between board-level 
employee representation provisions under company law or labour law will remain 
blurred,950 save for the adoption of SE as an appropriate company form, which would 
result in uniformity in the interpretation of its provisions in each individual Member 
State.  
The notion of a pan-European company, based on a uniform set of laws that 
increase the possibilities of cross-border business, is yet to be fully achieved. The 
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SE as a form of company brings many benefits to businesses intending to expand 
across the EU. It has the benefit of administrative flexibility and promotes a ‘social 
Europe’ through employee involvement. That being said, the ECS contains 
limitations that have stopped SE achieving its potential, particularly in terms of: (i) the 
absence of tax and insolvency provisions; (ii) the obscurity of the employee 
negotiation procedure; and (iii) the potential to misuse the ECS to circumvent 
employee involvement rights in companies intending to establish as an SE.  
 
Many businesses would be inclined to adopt the SE, if it offered a unified set of tax 
and insolvency rules. The tax debate on SE has initiated dialogue on the prospect 
and structure of a European-level tax regime,951 and the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal gained popularity more than a decade 
ago.952 Kirshner’s research also provided evidence that ‘most companies favoured 
it’.953 
 
The obscurity of the employee negotiation procedure can be mitigated by the 
adoption of the proposed EDR mechanism (see, Section 7.2 Introducing ‘Employee 
Dispute Resolution’ (EDR) to the negotiation process). This model will ensure the 
effective transition of the negotiation procedure, which currently is one of the 
deterrents of setting up an SE (time frame between 6 to 12 months). This negative 
driver was also identified in the ‘Study on the operation and the impacts of the 
Statute for a European Company (SE)’.954 
 
The Czech Republic case study provided an important insight on the popularity of 
SEs. The findings coherently demonstrated that by offering financial help to 
businesses (either through the state itself or by means of financial/professional 
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services providers) – Member States could remove the first hurdle of high minimum 
capital requirement to set up an SE faced by any small or medium-sized business. 
This is a significant aspect to achieve viability of an SE, and it must be paid due 
consideration by the EC when reviewing the SE Directive. 
 
The EC has not acted to improve the attractiveness of SE to businesses. It has 
identified the shortcomings of the SE Directive, but failed to address them. Further, 
the failure by the EC and other stakeholders to advertise the advantages of the SE 
as a preferred corporate form for EU businesses makes the SE a less well-known 
option, and the widely anticipated disadvantages of adopting it make it minimally 
attractive. The SE Regulation provides for measures to formally address its 
shortcomings. 
 
Harmonising EU laws appears to be the only rational choice to create uniformity and 
contribute to social welfare, whether in relation to agency conflicts or worker issues. 
Representation of employees on corporate boards contributes valuable first-hand 
operational knowledge to corporate board decision-making and facilitates strong 
measures for checking and reducing agency costs within the company.  
 
Revising the EU consultation process should be one of the EC’s top priorities. The 
‘Summary of Responses to the Public Consultation on the Future of European 
Company Law’ is subject to much criticism itself as a part of the consultation 
process.955 The report by the DG Internal Market and Services (Section 8.2 
Critiquing EC’s consultation process) gave only a ‘qualitative presentation’ of the 
responses and omitted any statistical data that could have been beneficial for 
research purposes. Additionally, the apparent lack of interest in commenting on the 
review of the SE Directive by stakeholders, public bodies and other interested parties 
was also a major factor in preventing the SE from becoming a popular company 
form. It would therefore be beneficial if the EC demonstrated in its summary of 
response report any indication of possible initiatives that the EC might assume in the 
future in this area. Respondents would be able to see their recommendations and 
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comments acknowledged, thereby generating more responses in future and 
encouraging non-responding stakeholders to make submissions. 
 
The Cross-Border Mergers Directive is an effective instrument for cross-border 
activities. Its application has been popular and will continue to be so in the future. 
Therefore, it is imperative that the EC considers and addresses the revision of the 
ECS more than ever now, so that SE does not lose its viability or its ‘unique selling 
point’ as the image of a European form of company. 
 
The EC must reform the ECS swiftly so that SE can become a viable substitute for 
national company forms. In doing so, it should take note of the flexibility of national 
company forms in Member States. Amending the ECS would mean simplifying it, so 
that Member States would be limited in their options to regulate the application terms 
of the ECS. This will ensure that a perfect EU company vehicle will be available to 
businesses from China, Russia and India – and, indeed, from anywhere else in a 
rapidly globalising economic environment. 
 
This research has demonstrated that while the SE Directive has the potential to meet 
the objectives stated in Article 153 of The Treaty on European Union and make 
employee involvement a prominent aspect of EU corporate governance, but it can 
also be used as a mechanism to circumvent codetermination rights. If EDR was to 
be introduced and the conversation in Section 7.5 Specific recommendations to the 
ECS considered, then the legal uncertainties in the SE Directive with respect to 
negotiation procedures and employee involvement procedures can be dealt with 
adequately. There has been no considerable shift in attitude towards employee 
involvement in the UK, but rather various futile attempts and conversations. A 
uniform model of board-level employee representation is imperative to achieve the 
social objectives of the EU, as the employee involvement rights within corporate 
boards across the Member States differ substantially. A revised ECS is an ideal 
solution to bring about that uniformity, as it has been demonstrated that the ECS in 
its current form has not really brought about the change that was anticipated after 
decades of political negotiations.  
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